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really profit to know; not least, perhaps, in putting before the young people better models of the heroic in literature. Such an anthology as Mr. Henley's, or, on a smaller scale, that of Mr. Sidgwick and Mr. George might well be adopted by the school boards. A taste that had learned to appreciate the 'Ballad of Agincourt' or the 'Ballad of the Revenge' would turn of itself from the balderdash we have been examining. Further, it should be possible to give in the upper forms of elementary schools some simple training in the meaning of citizenship, both national and imperial. The knowledge that comes to boys of the upper classes by the way, in conversations at home, never comes at all to their less favoured fellows unless it is expressly communicated; and it is not beneath the care of a great people to see that its sons should receive that groundwork of knowledge which would enable them to take an intelligent interest in the questions of policy which they will one day help to decide, instead of shouting-to quote one more of these slovenly, immoral, and degrading compositions

'What a dear old land to fight for,

What a grand old nation still,

When you read your hist❜ry,

Don't it make your heart's blood thrill?
We don't know if the quarrel's right or wrong,
And, hang it, we don't care;

We only know there's going to be a fight,

And Englishmen must be there.'

ART. XII. THE CHINESE CRISIS.

1. The Overland' to China. By Archibald R. Colquhoun. London: Harper and Brothers, 1900.

2. La Rénovation de l'Asie.

Paris: Armand Colin, 1900.

By Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu.

3. China, the Long-lived Empire. By Eliza R. Scidmore. New York: The Century Co., 1900.

4. Village Life in China. By Arthur H. Smith. New York: Fleming H. Revill Co., 1900.

5. The Attaché in Peking. By A. B. Freeman-Mitford. (New edition.) London: Macmillan, 1900.

6. Personal Narrative of Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China in 1860. By H. B. Loch (Lord Loch). Third edition. London: John Murray, 1900.

7. Correspondence on the Affairs of China. (Foreign Office Blue-books, Nos. 1, 2, 3: 1900.)

HE intricacies of the questions connected with the Chinese

crisis owe their peculiar difficulty to the circumstance that, in China, internal decay and external ambitions seem to have arrived simultaneously at a point of collision. It would be difficult to foresee the outcome, even were the elements in contention less numerous and varied; but, as it is, no one can pretend to a prescience which can gauge accurately the wills and intentions of the Great Powers, or settle their precise influence on the situation of the Chinese themselves. A correct estimate of the previous policies and present interests of the Powers, and of the conditions hitherto prevailing in the Celestial Empire, may, however, enable us so to shape our line of conduct that it will have some reasonable chance of success. We cannot control the whirlwind, but with good piloting we may yet outride it. Our diplomacy in China has to deal with the same factors as in European or, rather, in world politics. We have all the Great Powers on the scene, under varying conditions which render it still more difficult to know how to treat them. If we glance briefly at the policies in pursuance of which these Powers, like ourselves, embarked on a career in the Far East, we shall be able at all events to estimate with some degree of accuracy what we may expect them to do in the future. For it must be borne in mind that we and the United States, alone of all the Great Powers, are without design, without a plan, without a settled policy in our foreign relations.

The broad lines of European policy during the last thirty

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years may be very briefly indicated. The Triple Alliance, between Germany, Austria, and Italy, inaugurated some dozen years after the Franco-German War-an alliance whose object was the protection of the central European States against Russia and France--has for many years past been losing its effectiveness. The reasons for this lie partly in the many difficulties of race, religion, and diverse interests which make Austro-Hungary a country with two bodies, two wills, and one head.' Only the consummate tact of the present ruler could hold together this amalgamation of Slav, Teuton, and Magyar. These causes make the second partner in the Triple Alliance a weak one; and with the death of the Emperor the situation will be even more hazardous. The third partner, Italy, suffers likewise from internal dissension, and has come near financial ruin through the crushing military burden imposed on her by the alliance. A desperate effort to retrieve her fortunes by foreign adventure met with disaster; and Italy, though not without a future, is to-day almost a quantité négligeable in the calculation of European forces. While these Powers, for internal reasons, were losing ground, Russia was consolidating herself and waxing more and more powerful. Advances were made to her, especially by France; and when in 1891 the long-wished-for entente with that country was at length consummated, it was evident that the Triple Alliance was not a sufficient protection, for Germany at least, against two such powerful neighbours, and a secret understanding was effected with Russia by Bismarck. There was also a rapprochement between Austria and Russia—a necessity for the former in view of the ambition of her neighbour and her barely disguised steps towards the Balkan States. Italy was thus left isolated, and, with her enormous sea-coast and peculiar situation, will have her hands full for many years in arranging her internal difficulties and providing a sufficient navy to protect her peninsula.

Friendship, if not an alliance, with Russia has been the keynote of German policy throughout the nineteenth century: it was the stronghold of Bismarck during the critical time when the German Empire was being made. Interrupted by the events of 1878-9, and subsequently revived, it underwent another shock on the dismissal of Bismarck, only to be restored on the retirement of his successor, and to be cemented, apparently on a firmer basis than before, by the agreement of the three Powers after the treaty of Shimonoseki. Across the Rhine, too, the relations of Germany have improved. After the Franco-German war no friendly understanding seemed possible between Berlin and Paris; but of late years a change

has occurred. No longer are German composers taboo in Paris, nor French artists in Berlin. Even Alsace and Lorraine, we are told, no longer want to exchange their masters. A direct alliance is hardly within the scope of possibilities, but an indirect rapprochement has undoubtedly taken place, and the hatchet is buried although the pipe of peace has not yet been smoked. This new attitude has made it the more easy for Germany to be on good terms with Russia.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century the Continental Powers were all infected with the desire for colonisation. They looked round the world, to find most of the white man's countries already occupied; but in Africa and the Far East there was yet room. The scramble for Africa came first; and before long that continent was parcelled out, on paper if not in reality, amongst the European Powers. Now there are two great motives which, as a rule, initiate the desire for colonisation-the needs of an overflowing population, and the desire to establish new markets. These motives, added to the spirit of adventure which runs strong in his blood, have carried the Anglo-Saxon to all quarters of the globe. Other motives, however, lay at the root of latter-day German, French, and Russian so-called colonisation. Germany, it is true, has an overflowing population, and her sons, eminently qualified for success as colonists, are being assimilated every year in large numbers in the United States, South America, and the British colonies. Russia, too, has an overflow in Europe, and strains ever towards the sea and the sun; but France has none of these inducements. Her population is stationary, and her Government is not called on to support individual enterprise over-sea, for there is little in France. With her, as in a minor degree with Germany and a very large degree with Russia, colonisation is a political move; and with all three the strongest motive both for colonisation and the creation of sea-power has been the desire to counterbalance the overwhelming Anglo-Saxon expansion throughout the world. Under such conditions, broadly treated, were the three great Continental Powers bound by a certain thread of unacknowledged mutual interest when, in 1895, the Chino-Japanese war took place. The circumstances are well known in which the Triple Alliance in the Far East became an accomplished fact.

The modern history of Chinese relations with Europe falls naturally into two distinct periods. The first, dating from the Anglo-French occupation of Peking in 1860, continued till 1895, when the Chino-Japanese war ushered in the second. During the first period Britain was entirely occupied with

endeavours to protect her trade and extend it if possible. France occupied herself with the conquest of Tongking, hitherto under Chinese suzerainty, and with missionary enterprise-not without an ulterior object. Germany was building up a trade with China. Russia was quietly pushing eastward; and the diplomatic successes of Mouravieff Amursky excited little attention, notwithstanding that they gave Russia a position in the Chinese provinces of Manchuria quite different from that hitherto obtained by any other Power in China. The attitude of China during this period was one of obstinate opposition to all change, the only concession to the spirit of the age being a characteristic attempt to save face' by the creation of a sham army and navy, and the appointment of ambassadors to the European capitals. Japan, on the contrary, awakened by contact with European nations, was fitting herself in every possible way to compete with them; organising her resources, improving her knowledge, and increasing her trade.

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The second period, one of brief duration, is crowded with events, and must be dealt with in greater detail; but here it is sufficient to recall, first, the interference of the Triple Alliance after the Chino-Japanese war, and then the encroachments and demands which followed thick upon each other and were granted by China, demoralised and shaken by her recent defeat. In the course of these demands Germany acquired, as a compensation for the death of two missionaries, one of the finest harbours on the coast of China and a practical protectorate of the province of Shantung. Russia got Port Arthur and Talienwan, and practical control of Manchuria, while her diplomacy secured her a paramountcy, not only in Peking, but in the whole of Northern China. Great Britain obtained Weihai-Wei, and some territory at Kaulung, facing Hong Kong; France certain rights over Hainan, and a port in the southernmost peninsula of China. Japan was permitted to retain Formosa, with a claim over the Pescadores and the province of Fukien. Besides these territorial concessions, euphemistically called 'leases,' the whole of China was theoretically divided into 'spheres of influence. These spheres, however, do not depend for their foundation on the goodwill of the Chinese, but on the obvious convenience of the Powers. Other concessions of great importance permitted the building of railways and the exploitation of mines throughout entire provinces, some as large as Britain; while trading privileges were also wrung from the Chinese, who have not hitherto regarded any of these enterprises with favour. During this period China, in her attempts to meet the demands frequently made on her for

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