and the United States. The reason is the simplest imaginable. The American people themselves are not considering those questions. The issues which must be decided by them are too momentous to be complicated either with smaller matters of foreign policy, as to which a mild interest only is felt, or with questions of mere sentiment. No observer of American opinion at the present day, who is also conversant with popular feeling in the past, can fail to be impressed by the decided change that has taken place in the mental attitude of the people towards England. Yet Englishmen, whose interest in American politics has naturally been confined to questions of trade, or of the relations between Canada and the Republic, probably understand clearly neither the former nor the present condition of public opinion. They have fancied a spirit of hostility towards their country which has not existed for many years. The active material as well as moral support given to the cause of Home Rule for Ireland was dictated rather by devotion to the Declaration of Independence principle of the consent of the governed' than by a sentiment of opposition to England. If the Republicans made much of every piece of evidence they could accumulate that England greatly desired the downfall of the protective tariff in the United States, the point of their argument was not that protection would injure English trade, but that the trade interests of the two countries were mutually opposed, and that Americans should promote their own interests rather than those of their rivals. When questions of territorial boundary have been raised, each country has, of course, defended its own contention. The isolation of the American Republic, its few points of contact with the politics of the world, its frequent changes of administration, and its lack of a body of trained diplomatists, have given its methods in dealing with its neighbours an amateurish character, and a crudeness which has often seemed reckless and brutal. Beneath the surface there was probably no more firmness on the one side than the other, and on neither side was there an antagonistic spirit that would outlast the decision of the controversy.

The facts that a vast proportion of the American foreign trade is with England, and a large share of Great Britain's foreign trade with the United States; that America's chief industrial struggle has always been to protect its own products from English competition; that Great Britain is practically the only neighbour of the Republic on the American continent, and that numerous boundary, navigation, fishing, and trading questions have always been pending between the Union and the Dominion-all these facts have served to create an idea in

America that the two countries could never agree. Whenever the discussion of any question has become acute, American statesmen have expressed their opinion of what they deemed British arrogance and obstinacy in language which is popularly designated as 'twisting the lion's tail.' This oratorical device may be reprehensible, but it is not confined to any one country. But the general attitude of America has been profoundly modified during the last three years. Every American at heart believes that the task of conquering Spain, and still more of imposing the terms of peace, unmolested, was facilitated by the friendly conduct of the British Government. If it be also true that no American who has studied the history of the world fancies that the great and most welcome assistance thus rendered was prompted by pure disinterestedness, his appreciation of the value of British action or abstention is not diminished. All governments base their policy upon considerations of self-interest. Great Britain, in this case, opened the eyes of Americans to the fact that the common interests of the two nations are more numerous and more important than their mutual antagonisms.

It is easy enough to discover in the Democratic platform apparent indications that hostility towards England exists, and is to have its part in determining the result of the pending canvass. The party condemns the Hay-Pauncefote treaty as a surrender of American interests not to be tolerated by the American people'; it 'condemns the ill-concealed Republican alliance with England . . . which has already stifled the nation's voice while liberty is being strangled in Africa'; and it' views with indignation the purpose of England to overwhelm with force the South African Republics.' Few votes are caught by these utterances. At the beginning of the war in South Africa many Americans, not merely the Irish politicians who are ever seeking a quarrel with England, but natives of the best class, sympathised strongly with the Boers. At the clubs the discussions on the justice of the case were frequently warm and even angry. It is impossible to say on which side was the sympathy of a majority of the people; but it is not unlikely that, on the whole, England was regarded as being in the wrong. It would nevertheless not be the popular judgment that the interests of civilisation will be promoted by the success of the Boers. No person of standing or influence in public affairs suggested an attempt to assist them with anything more potent than an expression of disapproval of their enemies. Even Mr. Bryan cautiously refrains from going further. As the war dragged on and the startling events in China attracted the

attention of the world, interest in the South African struggle died away. It would be difficult at the present time to collect an assemblage of a hundred people in any large American city to listen to the most eloquent champion of the Boers.

Again, on the question of the Nicaragua Canal and the Clayton-Bulwer and Hay-Pauncefote Treaties, there is only a languid interest in America. It was discussed with a certain degree of passion by some of the newspapers a few months ago. Both parties profess themselves to be in favour of the construction and ownership of the canal by the Government of the United States. But no one is really excited over the subject, no one anticipates trouble, no one doubts that the matter will be amicably arranged. That both Great Britain and the United States have rights in the case is recognised by the Republican administration which is at present charged with the conduct of foreign affairs. The same fact would be recognised, after a little harmless and meaningless bluster, by the Democrats, if they should obtain power. In fact it is not to be doubted that both the foreign and the colonial policy of the Government would remain virtually unchanged under a Bryan administration, despite the violent phrases of the Democratic platform and the wholesale condemnation placed upon everything the Republicans have done.

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The

The part played by America in the Chinese crisis does not enter into this canvass. But the Republicans surely ought to have found in the events in that quarter of the world the strongest vindication of their Imperialistic' policy. possession and occupation of the Philippines alone enabled the Government to take an honourable share in the rescue of the besieged Legations. All Americans approve the persistency with which Mr. Hay has opposed the partition of China, and hope for his success. Yet the Republicans have failed to use this point, as they might have done, to disprove the Democratic accusation that the present administration has involved us in so-called world-politics, including the diplomacy of Europe and the intrigue and land-grabbing of Asia.'

That there is much that is objectionable and much that is petty in American politics no one denies. Americans themselves do not allow the world to forget it. The accusations and counter-accusations in the party newspapers and on the stump bring most of the misdoing to the surface. On the other hand, the tendency to exaggeration, which is perhaps national characteristic, is not well understood beyond the limits of the Union. Foreigners naturally believe that each party is right in its opinion of the other; that public men are for the

most part guided by unworthy motives, or dissuaded from statesmanlike action by fear of the consequences to their personal fortunes; that corruption is rife and boss-rule triumphant; and that, in short, political strife has but one end and aim-vote-getting and place-getting. It is necessary to make a large discount upon all these points. Other nations have gone through epochs when such accusations might well have been brought against them. Let it not be forgotten that England herself encountered and wisely decided great questions of government when there were evils in her political system as extensive and seemingly as ineradicable as those which are sometimes supposed to have free sway in the States-and not wholly unlike them. All students of history know that the evils were but minor incidents, and that a vast majority of the people were right-thinking and well-meaning men. So it is to-day in the United States. Small politicians contend over the candidates for office, intriguers plot and plan to advance their personal fortunes, but the people as a whole, regretting that they must now and then be used by the little political tradesmen for sordid purposes, vote, as they fervently believe, most effectually to promote the honour and welfare of their country. In recent years they have had to decide questions of great moment. Some of them, at least, they have decided wisely, if results are made the test. Other questions lie before them. The people face these issues with courage and with soberness.

ART. X.-FEDERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

1. Correspondence between the Colonial Office and Governor Sir George Grey respecting his Recall from the Cape of Good Hope, and his subsequent Reappointment. Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, April 17th, 1860.

2. Correspondence respecting the Proposed Conference of Delegates on Affairs of South Africa. (C. 1399.) 1876.

3. Further Correspondence respecting the proposed Bill for enabling the South African Colonies and States to unite under one Government. (C. 1732.) 1877.

4. Further Correspondence respecting the proposed Confederation of the Colonies and States of South Africa. (C. 1980.) 1878.

EVE

VER since the British Government recognised the independence of the emigrant Boers under the terms of the Conventions of Sand River (1852) and Bloemfontein (1854), the establishment of a Federal Government under the British Crown has been advocated as the natural means of recovering the lost solidarity of the Europeans in South Africa. To-day that object no longer exists, since the formal annexation of what are now the Orange River and Transvaal colonies has brought the whole of European South Africa (with the exception of the German and Portuguese territories) under British rule. Nevertheless, the creation of a federal administration remains the goal of South African statesmanship, as being at once the most economic and the most efficient system of government for the British South Africa of the future.

Before discussing the present conditions of South Africa, in so far as they affect this question of Federal Union, it will be useful to refer briefly to the past. Since the mischievous results of the renunciation policy of 1854 came to be perceived, three attempts have been made to remedy the mistake by the establishment of a Federal Union:

(i) The abortive attempt of Sir George Grey in 1858;

(ii) The unsuccessful endeavour to unite the colonies and states by Imperial initiative under the provisions of Lord Carnarvon's South Africa Act, 1877;

(iii) The partially successful effort of Mr. Cecil Rhodes in 1889-94 to bring about a Commercial Federation.

A statement of the motives which influenced the promoters and opponents of these movements respectively will serve to reveal the significance of present conditions, and assist the reader to estimate in what respect these conditions are likely to promote or delay the attainment of Federal Union in the future.