mitting themselves to a permanently substantial participation in the responsibilities of Imperial citizenship. If each great colonial group should agree at an Imperial Conference to join, in a degree at all corresponding with its resources, in a general scheme of Imperial defence and in estimating such correspondence a much more modest standard should be employed in the case of young and expanding than in that of old and consolidated communities-then the least that they could expect in return would be some such share in the control of the united scheme of defence as is indicated in the revived proposals of the Imperial Federation League. With such a share on that side there is no reason why they should not be satisfied. Their representatives would no doubt be in a minority, and would not, for an indefinite time to come, be in a position to enforce the adoption of their views, in case of a divergence between them and the 'predominant partner,' even if they all agreed and acted together at the Imperial Council. But there is no reason whatever to regard as probable any anti-central colonial combination in regard to questions of defence; and even if by any strange concurrence of chances such a combination should occur, the colonists are Englishmen like ourselves, accustomed to the rule of the majority, and fair-minded enough to recognise as reasonable that, in the last resort, the common undertaking should be controlled by those whose contribution to it is by far the largest. Further, the proposal which we are considering would have, from the colonial point of view, as it would from the English, the merit of avoiding all suspicion, such as may attach to most forms that have been suggested of a Parliamentary federation of the Empire, that they would expose the people of its several states to the danger of interference in their domestic affairs by representatives of well-meaning but ignorant kindred communities.

There does, however, seem to us to be room for question whether the suggestions of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee allow adequately for the reasonable wish of colonists pledged to participation in Imperial quarrels to exercise an influence over the lines of foreign policy by which such quarrels may either be averted or their issues chosen with a due regard to the feelings and interests of the Empire as a whole. cannot but feel that something more than cognisance' of the course of foreign questions, such as is indicated as suitably appertaining to the Imperial Council, may rightfully be claimed for it, or should in some other way be secured to the Colonies represented on it. And such a claim, we are convinced, would be at once recognised as reasonable by the original signatories

to the Special Report of the Imperial Federation League and by English opinion of all shades. From this point of view, there is a good deal to be said for the proposal, which has occasionally been put forward, that standing colonial representatives should be admitted to the meetings of the Imperial Cabinet at all times when foreign affairs are under its consideration, or should be regularly, and as of right, taken into consultation by the Foreign Secretary in all matters affecting colonial interests. The former of these suggestions may, at first sight, seem to involve an innovation at variance with existing traditions of Cabinet responsibility; but it has to be remembered that the Cabinet itself is, strictly speaking, a body not 'known to the Constitution.' It is a Committee of persons, chosen by a political leader enjoying the confidence of the House of Commons, for the good conduct of public affairs. It is not unknown for experts on special subjects to be admitted to Cabinet meetings for the sake of enlightening the deliberations of Ministers, and it may well be maintained that expert advice on the interests and feelings of the great self-governing Colonies is a species of enlightenment of which the Executive of the Empire is so constantly in need that it cannot be administered in too direct a form. However that may be, there can be no doubt in any quarter of the soundness of the principle laid down by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in his striking speech on March 14th, 1900, when, referring to the question of any permanent and binding arrangement for the co-operation of Canada in the quarrels of Great Britain, he said that if that subject were raised his position would be: If you want us to help you, call us to your councils.' The method in which a satisfactory system of continuous consultation could best be secured is not a matter for dogmatic treatment; it must be worked out by British statesmanship. That it should be so worked out is being more and more clearly demanded by practical patriots throughout the dominions of the Queen. Very significant among the many indications of this demand is the fact that the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of the Empire, held in the last week of June 1900, passed a resolution, with only one dissentient voice, in favour of an Imperial Conference to consider the question of colonial participation in the naval and military defence of the Empire, and an unanimous resolution in favour of the formation of an Imperial Consultative Council at an early date.' It is, indeed, difficult to see how the present Ministers of the Queen could justify themselves to posterity if they failed to take advantage of the present tide of Imperial thought and feeling, in order to give permanent

organic efficiency to the splendid national resources which have been brought to light by our recent troubles.

There is reason, then, to hope that we are not far from the realisation, at least in germ, of what have for many years past been recognised by a steadily growing number of patriotic Englishmen in all parts of the Empire as the fundamental requisites of lasting Imperial unity and security. And are we not also on the way towards a remedy, at least in germ, of those evils of our political system at home which, as we have endeavoured to show, are liable, if neglected, to cripple in no small measure our means of effective defence against national perils of exceptional, perhaps even of unprecedented, gravity? There is no constitutional revolution in the creation of an Imperial Council. The machinery of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, both here and in the self-governing Colonies, would, as the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee are careful to show, continue to run undamaged by the working of the new agency. But at the same time there would unquestionably be set up an influence making for that detachment of Imperial issues from the operations of the party system, which is so urgently needed. The Imperial Council would not be a party body. If it existed at this moment on the lines suggested, while the representatives of the United Kingdom holding seats in it would be mainly Conservatives and all Unionists, the Canadian member would be appointed by the Liberal Government of the Dominion. And, we should like to add, its existence would afford an opportunity not now existing for securing the direct participation of leading members of the political party not in office at home, in the conduct of Imperial affairs. We can see no reason why, for example, an Imperial Council such as we have been considering should not be strengthened, on the invitation of a Unionist Prime Minister, by the accession of such statesmen as Lord Rosebery, Sir Henry Fowler, and Sir Edward Grey. They would sacrifice no principle in joining it; and their experience of affairs, and well-known sympathetic apprehension of colonial points of view, would very materially enhance its efficiency and the confidence with which it would be regarded in all parts of the Empire. Obviously, such an arrangement would tend in a marked degree to advance the much-to-be-desired detachment of the domestic party system from influence upon Imperial affairs.

Even if an Imperial Council were not widened in the way just indicated for some years to come, the existence and working of such an agency in our midst, called into being, as it would have been, as the instrument of a newly realised and sacred British unity throughout the world, would have a most salutary effect.

The constitutional powers of Parliament, the width of the potential sweep of the party system, would remain in theory unchanged, but, step by step, the practice would become more and more profoundly affected. The presumption as to what is deemed 'natural' in political life will be altered. If the Ministers who are members of the Imperial Council are able to say that the policy in regard to defence or foreign affairs which they are pursuing has the support of their colonial colleagues, it may come to be regarded as unnatural for the Opposition to challenge or condemn it. The rights of criticism and even of Parliamentary and platform resistance will remain, but they will be exercised with increasing reserve, and with a reluctance which will, in any case of justifying extremity, enhance their effect. The knowledge that in all circumstances Imperial policy is the result of full consultation between the leading Ministers of the day and the chosen representatives of the Colonies will naturally raise a presumption in its favour. The voices even of Radical cavil against a firm and clear Imperial line will be, if not stilled, reduced in number and shrillness by the evidence that such a line has been taken up and is being pursued with the approval of the chosen plenipotentiary representatives of the profoundly democratic daughter-states of the Empire.

Thus we may hope to be put in the way of minimising our greatest national danger on the home side, by dealing in a rational and equitable spirit with the requirements of the situation from the point of view of the Colonies. The precise working-out of the conditions on which the colonists may reasonably be expected to undertake a permanent share in Imperial responsibilities may differ somewhat from the lines of that Imperial Council which we have been considering, but the heart and essence of the administrative changes needed in that connexion will remain the same; and if they are conceded, as we are convinced they will be, the first and most important step will have been taken towards the deliverance of the public life of these islands from its most signal defect, and towards securing the fabric of the Empire against the perils by which at present it is menaced.

ART. XIII.-THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. III.

THE

HE third period of the war in South Africa, of which we now attempt a retrospect, though it lacks something of the dramatic intensity which characterised both the earlier stages of the conflict, is perhaps from a military point of view the most interesting, and the one which, when its history comes to be written, will contribute most to the advancement of the art of command. The campaign of the autumn surprised the British nation by disclosing the unexpected strength and energy of an adversary who had been under-estimated. The consequence was that a considerable fresh effort was made, and that Lord Roberts was entrusted with the direction of the

expanded army. His appearance in the field was the turningpoint of the war. The temporary collapse of the Boer resistance, which accompanied or followed the capture of Cronje at Paardeberg and the march of the British to Bloemfontein, offered a strong contrast to the stubborn pertinacity with which until then the Boers had everywhere held their ground. The occupation of Bloemfontein, however, was followed by a fresh display of Boer energy which disappointed those who had believed that the capture of the Free State capital would suffice to end the conflict. But the British advance, when it was renewed, was, in spite of one or two minor mishaps, so rapid and continuous, and the failure of the Boers to defend any of the decisive points was so complete, as apparently to justify those who from the first had regarded the destruction of the Boer power as a foregone conclusion. Yet it is probable that when the story becomes fully known the third period of the war will prove to have been more remarkable than either of its predecessors in respect of the difficulties to be overcome, the possibilities of disaster, and the judgment and courage displayed in the direction of the British forces.

Of this third period of the war, however, our present knowledge is even scantier than that which was obtainable of the previous periods until some time after their close. The presence of Lord Roberts attracted the majority of the correspondents to his headquarters, so that hardly any details of the minor movements have been received. With commendable prudence he refrained from publishing, and therefore from allowing others to publish, any hints of movements to come, and his telegraphic reports were in the main confined to very brief and summary accounts of what had been done. The telegrams from the newspaper correspondents, as a rule, added little to these