sure of the solemn examination of the scholars in their particular department. German scholarship does not understand how to ignore even the most senseless novelty advocated in the name of science, but, with the thoroughness characteristic of their scholarship as a whole, gravely analyze a still-born hypothesis to see how dead it really is. German theological scholarship in the days of Luther regenerated Christianity, because it was the scholarship of Christian faith. Modern German scholarship can do a great work for the inner development of the Christian faith if it again is taken captive, not under philosophy and subjective speculations, but under faith. As it is, it is the greatest factor and power in the world of Christian thought today. Then it would be such a power entirely for good. II THE GHOST THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION. BY REV. EDWARD M. DEEMS, PH.D., HORNELLSVILLE, N. Y. THE ghost theory of the origin of religion challenges the attention of all thoughtful people, not only because its author, Mr. Herbert Spencer, is one of the greatest thinkers of our age, but also because it is the account given of the origin and development of religion by the most popular school of evolutionists. In order to obtain a comprehensive view of the theory, we must go back to Mr. Spencer's definition of evolution. He says that it is “an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."* Undertaking to exhibit in his system of philosophy the phenomena of evolution in synthetic order, he has to provide for the facts of sociology, and accordingly says that there are three broadly distinguished kinds of evolution: the inorganic, the organic and the superorganic. In dealing with sociology we have to do with the third kind, which is distinguished from organic evolution by "including all those processes and products which imply the co-ordinated actions of many individuals." + Mr. Spencer claims that only some of the vertebrata and sundry primates show true rudimentary forms of superorganic evolution, and in his Principles of Sociology restricts his attention to that form of superorganic evolution which "human societies exhibit in their growths, structures, functions, and products-that is, to the phenomena of sociology." This is, by the way, as near as he comes to giving a definition of sociology. Taking up the question of the original factors of human society * First Principles, Vol. I., Chap. XVII., §145. Ibid., $5. Mr. Spencer classifies them as external and internal: the former being the flora, fauna, climate, and other environments of primitive man, and the latter being primitive man's own physical emotional, and intellectual nature, experiences, and ideas. In dealing with this part of his subject Mr. Spencer lays down the principle that "the conception of primitive man and his history must be formed from those existing races of men which, as judged by their visible characters and their implements, approach most nearly to him."* What then follows shows that he here refers to the living human beings who are in the most savage and least civilized condition. "Observe what such men and their ideas and habits are," says he, "and you see as nearly as possible what primitive men and their ideas and habits were." Of course it was inevitable that in a professedly eminently scientific study of Sociology Mr. Spencer would come upon primitive man's religious ideas, institutions, and habits. Strangely enough, however, he nowhere defines religion, but appears to regard it as made up of men's ideas and sentiments relating to the supernatural, and resulting in certain ecclesiastical observances and institutions. He claims that there are some civilized and many savage men who have no religious ideas, sentiments, or institutions whatever! Hence he draws the remarkable conclusion that primitive man was entirely without religion.† But in the course of time it appeared, and has become all but universal. Whence did it come? His answer in brief is: "Comparative sociology discloses a common origin for each leading element of religious belief. The conception of the ghost, along with the multiplying and complicating ideas arising from it, we. find everywhere. Thus we have abundant proofs of the natural genesis of religions." I In this connection Mr. Spencer goes on to say: "Undeniably, a system of superstitions evolves after the same manner as all other things. By continuous integration and differentiation it is formed. into an aggregate which, while increasing, passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. This correspondence is indeed inevitable. The law which is conformed to by the evolving human being, and which is consequently conformed to by the evolving human intelligence, is of necessity conformed to by all products of that intelligence. Showing itself in structures, and by implication in the functions of those structures, this law cannot but show itself in the concrete manifestations of those functions. Just as language, considered as an objective product, bears the impress of the subjective process, so too does that system of ideas concerning the nature of things, which the mind gradually elaborates." § In support of each of his points Mr. Spencer brings forward many statements of travelers among savages, which he alleges to be satisfactory evidence of the truth of his argument. Much of this evi * Principles of Sociology, Chap. IV., §23. + Ecclesiastical Institutions, Chap. I., §983. § Principles of Sociology, Vol. I., Chap. XXVI., §207. Ibid., $585. dence, however, would seem to disprove rather than prove his position; but his ingenuity in trying to press them all into his service is exceedingly interesting. Moreover, Mr. Spencer is entitled to great credit for his industrious gathering together of interesting facts concerning the religions of the uncivilized portion of mankind; also for his strong testimony that the modern theory of evolution favors the belief of man in an "inscrutable existence everywhere manifested," even though he denies to this existence personality, and denies that it is knowable. Notwithstanding, however, the ingenuity and interest of the ghost theory of the origin of religion, it is marked by so many fatal defects that it has to be abandoned as a scientific, a true explanation of the phenomena of religion as a whole, and as to its origin. Under and back of all its charm and plausibility we find in it the following defects: First, the theory is not scientific in its method. To be such it should start with all that we have of religion at the present day, and by close and careful analysis, and painstaking historic investigation, following these facts as far back as they lead, and, standing on this ultima thule of facts, look still farther backward toward the primitive man, and thus get as distinct as possible a scientific view of his ideas and habits. This would be the inductive method of procedure in this matter, and not the deductive, the method of modern science and not of the middle ages. But so far from pursuing the scientific method, he assumes the point which he is to prove, namely, that primitive man had no religion at first. He assumes that the theory of evolution, which he says prevails in biology, prevails also in psychology and sociology, and then proceeds elaborately to bolster up his assumption by certain testimonies of travelers, archeologists, and ethnologists. To use his own language: "The doctrine of evolution will help us to delineate primitive ideas in some of their leading traits. Having inferred, a priori, the characters of these ideas, we shall be, as far as possible, prepared to realize them in imagination, and then to discern them as actually existing."* In other words, his method is first to conceive what primitive man must have been according to Mr. Spencer's theory of evolution, and then seek for facts in nature and the history of savages confirmatory of that conception. This method, is, of course, best adapted to the support of the theory of evolution which Mr. Spencer has adopted. But it is a striking illustration of special pleading a remarkable example of that philosophical bias which makes the construction of a science of sociology so exceedingly difficult. Another glaring and unpardonable defect in the ghost theory is its practical ignoring of the highest and most ancient and widespread religions which have influenced and to-day are molding to such a great degree large masses of men. Where pages are given to some crude * Principles of Sociology, Vol. I., p. 97. and obscure superstitions of small tribes of savages, only sentences are given to Buddhism, whose adherents are estimated at five millions, and whose authentic history goes back 2,500 years. The same is true with regard to Brahmanism, Confucianism, the religions of the Greeks. and Romans, and that of the Egyptians and Hebrews. It is true that Mr. Spencer says that our present lowest savages are more like primitive men than these other higher peoples. But this saying of his is assumption pure and simple. Again, Mr. Spencer complains that other treatises on religion do not go back far enough, since they go no further into the past than the classic ages of Greece and Rome, or the patriarchal period of the Jews. But the fact is that this very objection bears even more heavily on Mr. Spencer's ghost theory. It does not go back far enough and down deep enough. It tells us of matter, men's brains, and bodies; it tells us of force, the tool which touches matter and, in one sense, transforms the homogeneous into the heterogeneous; but it tells us not of the intelligence, consciousness, freedom, will-in a word, personalitywhich, using motion on matter, makes religion, as well as other similar things. It is as though he stood with us before Thorwaldsen's "Lion of Lucerne" and attempted to give a complete scientific and philosophic account of its origin and development by giving us an elaborate account of the chisels and mallets used in cutting it, and an interesting account of the rock out of which it was carved, and a few words of concession that there must have been some energy present when this impressive work of art was commenced and during the process of its carving. Such is really the so-called synthetic philosophy of the origin and growth of religion. But how lamentably inadequate is such a philosophy to account for the moral progress of mankind, or coherently to array the great facts of human life and human history, the great facts of the religion of our race! An account of the marble and the chisel, and even of muscular force, tells us not of the true origin of the statue; we must hear of the artist who conceived it. Even so must we hear, not only of matter and force, but of that personal Spirit back of them from which originally came the spirit of man with his religious ideas, if we would get at the origin and understand the development of that almost universal, that mighty influence among men which we know as religion. The fact that the ghost theory claims precedence for polytheism as the first form of human conceptions of God, rather than monotheism, is another serious objection to it in the light of religion as it is and religion in its past history. But this is one of the strong pillars of support for the theory. Mr. Spencer says that from shadows arise belief in ghosts, from belief in ghosts arises belief in many gods, which ends in belief in one Supreme Spirit-the first, the greatest ancestor of the race. His own language is: "Originally, the only distinctions of good or bad among the doubles of the dead are such as were shown by the living men, as are also the only unlikenesses of power. But there soon arise conceived contrasts in goodness between the ghosts of relatives and the ghosts of other persons, as well as stronger contrasts between friendly ghosts belonging to the tribe and malicious ghosts belonging to other tribes. When social ranks are established, there follow contrasts of rank and accompanying potency among supernatural beings which, as legends expand, grow more and more marked. Eventually there is formed in this way a hierarchy of partiality-deified ancestors, demi-gods, great gods, and among the great gods One Who is supreme." But I fail to find any such traceable connection between these different professed continuous stages of the evolution of the idea of God. On the contrary, all the great modern and ancient religions are monotheistic. The religion of the Hebrews, cherished by a goodly portion of the race, and reaching back unquestionably over three thousand years, has for the opening sentence of its sacred writings, "In the beginning God" [not the gods] "created the heaven and the earth." Again, their sacred writings say: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God" (Deut. vi. 4; Ps. lxxxvi. 10). Mohammedanism, with its two hundred millions of followers, and going back in history over a thousand years, ceases not day nor night from crying, "There is but one God, and Mohammed is His Prophet!" Christianity, an older religion than Mohammedanism, going back nearly 2,000 years, and being the religion of over 400,000,000 of the most intelligent, prosperous, and civilized of our race, teaches and believes in one God, not many.† Moreover, Buddhism, Brahmanism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, and the ancient religion of the East-the oldest and the greatest religions of the world were originally atheistic, or pantheistic, or monotheistic. They were certainly not polytheistic. Therefore, the ghost theory, that men worshiped first many gods and finally one God, while favored by some of the facts of the religion of some existing savage tribes, is discredited and exploded by the present ideas and past histories of all the great historic religions. Most unsatisfactory is this theory for another reason, namely, it makes no provision for and takes little or no account of such almost universal facts of religion as man's consciousnses of sin, and man's moral progress under the influence of religion. Even among the most degraded tribes, where the idea of God is so confused and obscure as to be almost, if not entirely, undiscoverable, a sense of imperfection-of being out of harmony with God or the gods, a sense of sin-is found. It is always found where religion exists. But so absorbed is Mr. Spencer in his preconceived scheme and ideas that he walks over it without seeing it. This defect is glaring in connection with his account of the origin of sacrifices. He uses, indeed, freely the words * Principles of Sociology, Vol. I., Chap. 26, §207. + John i. 1, et al. |