terrorizing a county; that the "steps" taken to crush—and which happily did crush-them were per se ignoble and wicked; and that the suspension of habeas corpus under the enactment referred to was permanent and not temporary. Reference, however, to the language of the statute of April 20, 1871, which is the law referred to, will make it clear to the student from original sources that the Presidential power in the suspension of habeas corpus was only when unlawful combinations to obstruct the laws became "organized and armed and so numerous and powerful as to be able by violence to either overthrow or set at defiance the constituted authority of such State and of the United States within such State, or when the constituted authorities are in complicity with it, or shall connive at the unlawful purposes of such powerful and armed combinations," or when the conviction of offenders and the preservation of the public safety should be locally impossible. Then and to that extent such combinations were to be deemed rebellion, during the continuance of which and within designated limits to be prescribed by proclamation it should be lawful to suspend "the writ of habeas corpus that such rebellion may be overthrown." These provisions of the statute it was expressly declared should "not be enforced after the end of the next regular session of Congress." It was obviously a temporary expedient to deal with a temporary emergency, leaving the future for further Congressional action.

When these laws are examined and the historical conditions they relate to are borne in mind, no impartial judge can properly conclude that the speaker's words in this respect present a faithful picture. Omissions and part-statements often mar a faithful presentation of facts.

c. Again, the speaker stated that the policy of "Thorough" inaugurated by Mr. Thaddeus Stevens had "stirred an intensity of feeling beside which that of the actual conflict of arms was like the calm of a summer day contrasted with a furious cyclone." The imagery may be beautiful, but what of its correctness?

One would suppose from the statement that the sagacious statesman named had impressed upon his party and the country at large the policies he eloquently advocated. Unfortunately he did not. If he had, much national woe might have been saved. If the speaker will consult-as he evidently had not done when he spoke the Congressional debates in which Mr. Stevens participated, and the compromises indicated in the Congressional Committee reports in accordance with which the party finally acted and Reconstruction measures were adopted, he would discover that Mr. Stevens' advice was not followed; and that the policies described as "Thorough,"

for which Mr. Stevens stood, were unfortunately not adopted by his party, the Republicans. In this connection it is noteworthy that Mr. Stevens is recorded on the final vote in the House of Representatives as having voted against both the acts of February 28, 1871, and April 20, 1871, referred to by the speaker. It may not be an uninstructive study for publicists, in the light of the history of the last forty years, to speculate how much wiser it might have been if the policies of Mr. Stevens had in fact been incorporated into statutes at the period referred to.

The speaker's allusion to the career of the "Alabama" as the "greyhound of the sea that swept away so much of American commerce," seemed to a casual listener to be in the nature of an unjustifiable tribute to a cruiser for which, on account of its career, practically as a pirate, a friendly nation had to pay damages to this country! It is to be hoped that the speaker did not intend such tribute; yet that was the impression made upon the minds of some of his hearers.

d. The speaker further stated, referring to 1872, that in the South “the whites were largely disfranchised," and that one political party had adopted a platform demanding "immediate and absolute removal of all disabilities imposed on account of the rebellion," and he implied a bitter opposition thereto from the other political party.

This statement of the political features of that time is so incomprehensive as to be misleading. The whites of the South were not "largely disfranchised." Political disabilities were limited to specified classes. Even among those who had been politically disabled pardons had been numerous and freely awarded. Moreover, Congress had passed a bill, approved May 22, 1872, removing disabilities "from all persons whatsoever except senators and representatives of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congress, officers in the judicial, military and naval service of the United States, heads of departments and foreign ministers of the United States." The inference from the speaker's statement leaves out the fact that the same political combination that was at that time clamoring for a so-called amnesty bill was opposing, and finally defeated, measures aimed to secure to the colored people "Civil Rights" guaranteed by the Constitution.

On May 15, 1872, at a convention of the Republicans of the State of New York there was adopted a platform plank aptly descriptive of the actual conditions. It read:

"That the cry about universal amnesty is calculated to deceive the people by concealment of the fact that those lately in rebellion are excluded by no Federal law from the same right to vote and to hold property which

the most loyal citizens enjoy; and intelligent people will remark that so unwilling were Liberal Republicans to grant common justice to the freedmen of the South, that recently, by their own votes in the Senate, they combined with Democrats, who alone were not sufficient, and sacrificed the amnesty law which had passed the House, rather than give to the colored people the common civil rights secured by Mr. Sumner's bill, to which the Senator so consistently and honorably adhered."

In paying tribute to "the great reputation of that peerless law teacher, Theodore W. Dwight," when the speaker said that it was under such auspices that he came to the North seeking the best instruction that could be got in the law, and that the conditions were such as he describes, it is a mild way of putting it to say that the speaker's description is uninstructive and unhistorical, if not, as some of his hearers deemed, deserving of more emphatic characterization. An imperfect statement of truth, or its substantial suppression actually or inferentially, is justifiable neither in a teacher of history nor in a jurist instructing a lay audience in law.

It is to be regretted that there should have been inadvertent allusions of an historical character at a prominent academic function, and all the more so because it might appear in this instance as if those statements bore the imprimatur of Columbia University on account of the LL.D. degree just then conferred upon the speaker.

APPENDIX I (CHAPTERS XII, XIV)

A CONTRACT LAW AND A VAGRANCY LAW.-STATUTES CITED IN THE TEXT AT CHAPTERS XII, p. 156; XIV, p. 185.

A provision of the Alabama Contract Law is as follows:

"Sect. 1.-Any person who has contracted in writing to labor for or serve another for any given time, or any person who has by written contract leased or rented land from another for any specified time, or any person who has contracted in writing with a party furnishing the lands, or the lands and teams to cultivate it, either to furnish the labor and the labor and teams, with stipulations, express or implied, to divide the crops between them in certain proportion, and who before the expiration of such contract and without the consent of the other party, and without sufficient excuse to be adjudged by the court, shall leave such other party or abandon said contract, or leave or abandon the leased premises, or the land furnished as aforesaid, and who shall also make a second contract, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction fined not exceeding fifty dollars or sentenced to hard labor not exceeding six months, one or both at discretion of court, and if not tried by a jury, or discretion of jury trying same. And when such contract is made by two or more such persons the same shall be considered and held a several as well as a joint contract on their part. Provided the provisions of this act do not apply to Blount, Cullman's, Winston, Jackson, Marshall, Calhoun, Lee, Lawrence, Dekalb, Morgan, Coosa, Jefferson, Mobile, Etowah, Baldwin, Butler, Escambia, Perry, Conecuh, Covington, Colbert, Franklin, Cherokee, Fayette, and Washington Cos."*

The Alabama Vagrancy Law passed in 1903 is as follows:

"Any person wandering or strolling about in idleness, who is able to work and has no property to support him; or any person leading an idle, immoral and known profligate life, who is able to work and does not work, who has no money to support him, or has no visible means of a fair, honest and reputable livelihood (construed to mean reason* Alabama, Contract Law, 1900-1, No. 483 act, S, 24.

able continuous employment at some lawful occupation for reasonable compensation, or a fixed and regular income from property or other investment, which income is sufficient for support and maintenance of such vagrant), or any person having a fixed abode who lives by stealing, trading or bartering stolen property, or a drunkard or professional gambler living in idleness; or able-bodied beggar, or one who leaves wife and children, or any person who does not work but hires out his minor children and lives upon their wages; or any person between sixteen and twenty-one not supported by parent or not at educational institute, or prostitute or keeper of house of prostitution, shall on conviction be fined not more than $500 or may be sentenced to the county jail for not more than 6 months' hard labor. Provided that it shall be sufficient defence to charge of vagrancy that defendant has made bona fide efforts to obtain employment at reasonable prices for his labor and has failed to obtain the same.

"The provisions of this Act shall not apply to persons idle through strikes and lockouts."

(This is much more severe than the Vagrancy Act of 1896 which gave a fine of from 10 to 50 dollars for a first offence.)