associations. If by these means our native tongue has been rendered more unfit for some of the lighter species of writing, it has certainly gained immensely as an instrument of thought, and as a vehicle of knowledge. May I not also add, that the study of it has been greatly facilitated to foreigners; and that in proportion to its rejection of colloquial anomalies, more durable materials are supplied to the present generation for transmitting their intellectual acquisitions to posterity ? But granting the truth of these reflections, it may still be asked, what is the amount of the discoveries brought to light by the metaphysical speculations of the eighteenth century? Or rather, where are the principles to be found, of which it can be justly said, that they unite the suffrages, not of the whole, but even of the majority of our present philosophers? The question has been lately put and urged, with no common ability, by a foreign academician. "The diversity of doctrines (says M. de Bonald) has increased, from age to age, with the number of masters, and with the progress of knowledge; and Europe, which at present possesses libraries filled with philosophical works, and which reckons up almost as many philosophers as writers; poor in the midst of so much riches, and uncertain, with the aid of all its guides, which road it should follow; Europe, the centre and the focus of all the lights of the world, has yet its philosophy only in expectation.”1 In proof of this assertion, the author appeals to the Comparative History of Philosophical Systems relative to the Principles of Human Knowledge, by M. Degerando; and after a variety of acute strictures on the contradictory systems there described, sums up his argument in the following words :— Thus, the Comparative History of Philosophical Systems is nothing else than a History of the Variations of philosophical schools, leaving no other impression upon the reader than an insurmountable disgust at all philosophical researches; and a demonstrated conviction of the impossibility of raising an edifice on a soil so void of consistency, and so completely surrounded by the most frightful precipices. About what then are philosophers agreed? What single point have they placed beyond the reach of dispute? Plato and Aristotle inquired, What is science? What is knowledge? And we, so many ages after these fathers of philosophy; we, so proud of the progress of human reason, still continue to repeat the same questions, vainly pursuing the same phantoms which the Greeks pursued two thousand years ago."1 In reply to this bold attack 1 Recherches Philosophiques, &c., pp. 58, 59. Paris, 1818. On the other hand, may it not be asked, if the number of philosophical systems be greater than that of the sects which at present divide the Christian Church? The allusion here made to Bossuet's celebrated History of the Variations, shows plainly that the similarity of the two cases had not been overlooked by the ingenious writer; and that the only effectual remedy which, in his opinion, can be applied to either, is to subject once more the reason, both of philosophers and of divines, to the paramount authority of an infallible guide. The conclusion is such as might have been expected from a good Catholic; but I trust that, in this country, it is not likely to mislead many of my readers. Some recent conversions to Popery, however, which, in consequence of views similar to those of M. de Bonald, have taken place among the philosophers of Germany, afford a proof that, in the present political state of Europe, the danger of a temporary relapse into the superstitions of the on the evidence of the moral Church of Rome, how slight soever, ought not to be regarded as altogether visionary. See Lectures on the History of Literature, by Frederick Schlegel, vol. ii. pp. 65, 88, 89, 175, and 187. English Translation, Edinburgh. [* It is observed by Dr. Mosheim, that " notwithstanding the boasted unity of faith in the Church of Rome, and its ostentatious pretensions to harmony and concord, it was at the time of the Reformation, and is, at this day, divided and distracted with discussions and contests of various kinds. Franciscans and the Dominicans contend with vehemence about several points of doctrine and discipline. The Scotists and Thomists are at eternal war.... The .. Nor are the theological colleges and seminaries of learning more exempt from the flame of controversy than the clerical or monastic orders: on the contrary, debates concerning almost all the doctrines of Christianity are multiplied in them without number, and conducted with little moderation."Maclaine's Translation, vol. iii. pp. 462, 463, 2d edition.] * Restored.-Ed. sciences, it may suffice to recall to our recollection the state of physical science not more than two centuries ago. The argument of M. de Bonald against the former is, in fact, precisely the same with that ascribed by Xenophon to Socrates against those studies which have immortalized the names of Boyle and Newton; and which, in our own times, have revealed to us all the wonders of the modern chemistry. Whatever contradictions, therefore, may yet exist in our metaphysical doctrines, (and of these contradictions many more than is commonly suspected will be found to be merely verbal,) why should we despair of the success of future ages in tracing the laws of the intellectual world, which, though less obvious than those of the material world, are not less the natural and legitimate objects of human curiosity? Nor is it at all wonderful that the beneficial effects of metaphysical habits of thinking should have been first perceived in political economy, and some other sciences to which, on a superficial view, they may seem to have a very remote relation; and that the rise of the sap in the tree of knowledge should be indicated by the germs at the extremities of the branches, before any visible change is discernible in the trunk. The sciences, whose improvement during the last century has been generally acknowledged, are those which are most open to common observation; while the changes which have taken place in the state of metaphysics, have attracted the notice of the few alone who take a deep interest in these abstract pursuits. The swelling of the buds, however, affords a sufficient proof that the roots are sound, and encourages the hope that the growth of the trunk, though more slow, will, in process of time, be equally conspicuous with that of the leaves and blossoms.1 [* The analogy of which I have availed myself in the above paragraph, was suggested to me by the following passage in Descartes: "Ainsi, toute la philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la Métaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, et les branches qui sortent du tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se réduisent à trois principales, la Médecine, la Mécanique et le Morale: j'entends la plus haute et la plus parfaite Morale, qui, présupposant *Restored.-Ed. I shall close this part of my Dissertation with remarking, that the practical influence of such speculations as those of Locke and of Bacon is to be traced only by comparing, on a large scale, the state of the human mind at distant periods. Both these philosophers appear to have been fully aware, (and I know of no philosopher before them of whom the same thing can be said,) that the progressive improvement of the species is to be expected less from the culture of the reasoning powers, strictly so called, than from the prevention, in early life, of those artificial impressions and associations, by means of which, when once rivetted by habit, the strongest reason may be held in perpetual bondage. These impressions and associations may be likened to the slender threads which fastened Gulliver to the earth; and they are to be overcome, not by a sudden exertion of intellectual force, but by the gradual effect of good education, in breaking them asunder one by one. Since the revival of letters, seconded by the invention of printing, and by the Protestant Reformation, this process has been incessantly going on, all over the Christian world; but it is chiefly in the course of the last century that the result has become visible to common observers. How many are the threads which, even in Catholic countries, have been broken by the writings of Locke! How many still remain to be broken, before the mind of man can recover that moral liberty which, at some future period, it seems destined to enjoy! une entière connaissance des autres sciences, est le dernier dégré de la sagesse. Or, comme ce n'est pas des racines ni du tronc des arbres qu'on cueille les fruits, mais seulement des extrémités de leurs branches, ainsi la principale utilité de la philosophie dépend de celles de ses parties qu'on ne peut apprendre que les dernières.”— Préface des Principes de la Philosophic.] |