Count Nesselrode to intimidate the Porte by addressing an autograph letter to Redschid Pasha on the 31st of May, declaring that if the Russian demands were not at once complied with, the Russian troops would immediately cross the Turkish frontier, "not," he said, "to make war, but to secure a material guarantee for the rights claimed by the emperor." In reply, the Porte announced the promulgation of the "Hatti Sheriffe," confirming the rights, privileges, and immunities which the clergy and the Churches of the Greek faith had enjoyed "ab antiquo."

On the 12th of June Count Nesselrode addressed a long circular to the diplomatic agents of the Czar at the different foreign courts. This document was published in the "St. Petersburgh Gazette," and we place extracts from it on the record, that the reader may compare the Russian descriptions of the demands of Prince Menschikoff with the real history of his mission, and form some estimate of the cool assurance, to use a mild expression, of this distinguished diplomatist.

"You are sufficiently aware," he says, "of the policy of the emperor to know that His Majesty does not aim at the ruin and destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which he himself on two occasions has saved from dissolution; but that on the contrary he has always regarded the existing status quo as the best possible combination to interpose between all the European interests, which would necessarily clash in the East if a void were declared. The mission of Prince Menschikoff never had any other object than the arrangement of the affair of the holy places."

The Emperor of Russia having solemnly declared, on the 30th of May, that if the ultimatum of Prince Menschikoff was not accepted within eight days he would occupy the Principalities, the allied fleets were ordered to repair to Besika Bay, at the mouth of the Dardanelles, where they anchored on the 15th of June, 1853. On the 26th of the same month the Czar issued the following manifesto, in which he gives his own version of the causes of the war, and his reason for occupying the Danubian provinces :

"PETERHOFF, June 14, 1853.

"It is known to our faithful subjects that the defence of our faith has always been the sacred duty of our ancestors. From the day that it pleased the Almighty to place us on the throne of our fathers, the maintenance of the holy obligations with which it is inseparably connected has been the object of our earliest care and attention. These, acting on the groundwork of the famous treaty of Kiarnardji, which subsequent treaties with the Ottoman Porte have fully confirmed, have ever been directed to upholding the rights of our Church. All our efforts to prevent the Porte from continuing in this course proved fruitless, and even the oath of the Sultan himself solemnly given to us was perfidiously broken. Having exhausted all means of conviction, and having in vain tried all the means by which our just claims could be possibly

adjusted, we have deemed it indispensable to move our armies into the provinces on the Danube, in order that the Porte may see to what her stubbornness may lead.

"But even now we have no intention of commencing war. In occupying these provinces we wish to hold a sufficient pledge to guarantee for ourselves the reestablishment of our rights, under any circumstances whatever.

"We do not seek for conquests. Russia does not require them. We seek the justification of those rights which have been so openly violated. We are still ready to stop the movement of our troops, if the Ottoman Porte will bind itself to observe solemnly the inviolability of the orthodox (Pravoslavan) Church; but if, from stubbornness and blindness, it decrees the contrary, then, calling God to our aid, we shall leave him to decide between us, and, with a full assurance in the arm of the Almighty, we shall go forth to fight for the orthodox faith."

On the twelfth of July Count Nesselrode issued another circular to the Russian representatives at foreign courts, in which he attempted to show that Russia was only acting on the defensive, and that the occupation of the Principalities was justified by the threatening demonstration of the Allies in sending their fleets to Besika Bay. "The position," he says, "taken up by the two powers in the ports and waters of the Ottoman Empire, within sight of the capital, is a species of maritime occupation which gives Russia occasion to restore the balance between their relative situations by taking up a military position."

But this is plainly an afterthought; the intention of occupying the Principalities in a certain contingency was officially announced in the Russian capital on the thirtieth of May, and the Allies decided, two days afterward, to despatch their naval forces to Besika Bay; but this intention of the allied powers could not have been known at St. Petersburgh until nearly ten days after the Russian decision respecting the Principalities had been formally declared to the Ottoman Porte. While Russia was thus endeavouring to convince the different cabinets of Europe of her pacific intentions, she was rapidly and silently concentrating an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men on the Pruth, and the first corps, under the command of General Luders, passed that river at Levad on the twenty-first of June, and seven days afterward the entire army of occupation, under the command of Prince Michael Gortschakoff, had entered the Principalities.

That this movement on the part of Russia was an infraction of the treaties of Adrianople and Balta Liman cannot admit of a doubt.

It must be confessed that the relation in which the Principalities stood to both Russia and Turkey was peculiar and unprecedented. To Turkey was guaranteed the prerogative of sovereignty; and

Russia had, with her, a right to a sort of joint occupancy under certain clearly-described circumstances, while the people possessed many of the privileges of self-government. These apparently conflicting and irreconcilable stipulations are contained in the fifth article of the treaty of Adrianople, which declares that "the Principalities, being placed under the suzeraineté of the Porte, shall possess all the privileges and immunities which shall have been accorded "to them, whether by treaties between the two imperial courts, or by 'Hatti Sheriffes' promulgated at different epochs, and that they shall enjoy the free exercise of their religion in perfect security; a national and independent administration, and complete freedom of commerce." The treaty of Adrianople was ratified in 1828; and in 1849 the convention or treaty of Balta Liman, fixing the cases in which a mutual occupation of the Principalities could legally take place, was negotiated and signed.

By the stipulations of this treaty nothing but "grave events occurring in the Principalities themselves" can justify the interposition of either power. And when the necessity shall have arisen, the treaty stipulates that the occupation shall be a mutual one, and shall be made simultaneously by Russia and Turkey. It is, moreover, expressly provided that the maximum number of troops that shall be sent into the Principalities "shall not exceed thirty-five thousand men on each side, to be regularly counted, regiment by regiment, and battalion by battalion." By "grave events" is meant any serious difficulty occurring within the described territory which might prove too formidable to be controlled without foreign assistance. But at the moment when Russia chose to cross the frontier, no disturbance of any kind furnished a pretext for the movement. Hence Turkey protested against the invasion of a territory secured by treaty, and persisted in refusing to treat with Russia until her armies were withdrawn.

The Turkish protest had no effect whatever on the Russian government; on the contrary, Prince Gortschakoff proceeded to establish himself in the Principalities, and to sever entirely their connexion with the Porte. Still, though the tribute due the Sultan was stopped and turned into the Russian military chest, and the Hospodars appointed by the Porte were driven out of the country, Russia continued to declare that her occupation of the Danubian Principalities was not intended as a declaration of war.

This affirmation of the Czar encouraged the allied powers seriously to occupy themselves in the attempt to avert the threatened conflict. As early as the twenty-fourth of June the French government had proposed the plan of settlement on which was afterward based the

celebrated "Vienna note," but the conference did not assemble until a month later. On the twenty-fourth of July, however, the representatives of the four powers, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia, met at Vienna, and proceeded to discuss propositions to be submitted to Russia and Turkey. In this conference, it will be observed, Russia was represented but Turkey was not. A few hours were spent in drawing up the terms of settlement, which were then transmitted to London and Paris by telegraph. The assent of France and England was immediately given, and, with their signatures appended, the terms were transmitted to St. Petersburgh, where, without hesitation, they received the approval of the Czar. In signifying his approval, however, the Czar stated to the British ambassador at St. Petersburgh "that he would accept the terms recommended to him by the conference of Vienna if the Porte would accept the note such as it stands, sans variation, and that he would then receive the Ottoman ambassador."

The signature of the Porte was now all that was needed to secure the pacific settlement of the difficulties between Russia and Turkey, and the document was forwarded for that purpose; but, to the utter astonishment of all parties except perhaps of Austria and Russia, the Porte refused to accept the note unless certain alterations were introduced into the form of it. This determination was announced to the representatives of the "powers" at Constantinople by Redschid Pasha on the twentieth of August, expressing the regret of the Sultan that the Vienna note "should contain certain superfluous paragraphs incompatible with the sacred rights of the government of His Majesty." "The note as it now stands," said the Pasha, "seems to us to be open to certain interpretations not intended by the powers, but against which we think it necessary to guard more distinctly. With this view we propose certain alterations in the wording of the note; if these be admitted we are willing to adopt it."

It is somewhat surprising to discover in this "note," under the flimsy disguise of words, the same stipulations in substance which occasioned the rejection of Prince Menschikoff's ultimatum. This doubtless escaped the penetration of the Vienna diplomatists, who, it must be admitted, were guilty of a great political blunder in adopting a note capable of different and conflicting interpretations. The ministers of the Sultan perceived at once that it could be construed in a manner highly injurious to the Porte, and the four powers were frank enough to confess that their objections to it were well founded.

The modifications suggested by the Porte were not, however,

acceptable to the Czar; and on the receipt of his answer, giving notice of their rejection, nothing remained for the western powers but to abandon the note which had been drawn with such studied The Vienna conference, however, continued in session, and its members laboured assiduously to reach some harmonious conclusion; and on the twenty-second of November the Austrian and Prussian governments agreed with those of England and France upon a basis for negotiation, and a collective note to the following effect was drawn up and signed by the four powers:

"The existence of Turkey in the limits assigned to her by treaty is one of the necessary conditions of the balance of power in Europe, and the undersigned plenipotentiaries record with satisfaction that the existing war cannot, in any case, lead to modifications in the territorial boundaries of the two empires which might be calculated to alter the state of possession in the East which has been established for a length of time, and which is equally necessary for the tranquillity of all the other powers."

A careful attention to the points actually in issue between Russia and Turkey will convince the impartial observer that the former government from the first aimed not to preserve rights already possessed, but to enlarge her power by extending her control over several millions of the subjects of the Porte.

The "Vienna note," accepted so readily by the Czar, contained this passage:

"That the Sultan would cause the Greek Christians to participate equally in the advantages granted or hereafter to be granted to other Christians by conventions or special ordinances."

The modifications required by the Sultan were as follows:

"That the Sultan would make the Greek Christians participate equitably in the advantages granted to other Christian communities, being Ottoman subjects."

The fact already stated, that in many places in Turkey the followers of the Latin Church, by virtue of ancient compacts, are exempt from Turkish control, and are governed by superiors of their own, shows the vital importance of this modification. The members of the "Vienna Conference" readily admitted the justness and importance of the objections made to their note by the Porte, and, having approved the modifications suggested, they earnestly, though vainly, pressed their acceptance upon the emperor of Russia.

Meanwhile both Russia and Turkey were preparing to submit their disputes to the arbitrament of the sword. The Russians occupied the Principalities, and the Turkish forces, under Omar Pasha, had advanced to the right bank of the Danube, so that an encounter was apprehended, although war had not been formally declared by either party.