پیام Barr v. Essex Trades Council. ing for, him, the courts have, with nearly equal unanimity, interposed by injunction. In the one case, it is an injury to a man's business by libeling it; in the other, by force, threats and other like means, he is prevented from pursuing it; and, while the damage might be as great in the one case as in the other-but most likely with different consequences to the good order and peace of the community-the courts have determined upon different remedies. What constitute such actionable threats or intimidations must be determined in each case from all the circumstances attending it. If the things done or the words. spoken are such that they will excite fear or a reasonable apprehension of damages, and so influence those for whom designed as to prevent them from freely doing what they desire, and the law permits, they may be restrained, and the courts will look beyond the mere letter of the act or word into its spirit and. intent." Blindell v. Hogan, 54 Fed. Rep. 40, affirmed on appeal, 56 ́ Fed. Rep. 696, was a suit to enjoin further interference with complainants in their business as shippers. Mr. Justice Billings. says: "The foundation of this jurisdiction of equity is the probability of irreparable mischief, the inadequacy of a pecuniarycompensation, and the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.. Fonb. Eq. by Lausat, p. 3: "When there is a large combination of persons to interfere with a party's business by violence, the equity jurisdiction, if maintainable at all, is maintainable on either of two grounds-the nature of the injury, including the dif ficulty of establishing, in a suit at law, the amount of actual damage sustained, or the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.'" After referring to several cases, he continues, quoting from In Toledo, A. A. & New Mexico Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania Barr v. Essex Trades Council. irreparable and continuing injury is threatened to private property and business rights, equity will generally enjoin on behalf of the person whose rights are to be invaded, even though an indictment on behalf of the public will also lie." In Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, in the supreme court of Indiana, on appeal from the circuit court of St. Joseph county, the case was this: "The Retail Lumber Dealers' Association," by its by-laws, gave an active member a claim against a wholesaler for selling to a person not a "regular dealer" in such member's community, provided for a hearing of the claim by a committee, and required members to refuse to patronize a wholesaler who ignored the committee's decision. Plaintiff, who was not a "regular dealer," underbid defendant on a contract, but wholesalers refused to sell to him, and he was obliged to abandon the contract, because defendant, an active member of the association, had previously enforced a claim against a wholesaler who had sold to plaintiff, and expressed an intention of continuing to enforce such claims. Suit was for damages and an injunction, and judgment in the circuit was for defendants. On appeal, this was reversed, and judgment directed to be entered for plaintiffs for the damages found, "and with the further instruction to render a judgment perpetually enjoining the defendants from in any way, other than fair, open competition, interfering with the plaintiffs in their business, and from demanding a penalty or making a claim against anyone under the by-laws of the association who may sell to the plaintiffs or through them to a consumer." In Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, a boycott was being made effective by parties parading up and down in front of plaintiff's place of business with banners, advising workmen to keep away, an injunction was granted, the court saying: "The wrong is not, as argued by the defendant's counsel, a libel upon the plaintiff's business. It is not found that the inscriptions upon the banner were false, nor do they appear to have been in disparagement of the plaintiff's business. The scheme, in pursuance of which the banners were displayed or maintained, was to injure plaintiff's business, not by defaming it to the public, л Barr v. Essex Trades Council. but by intimidating workmen so as to deter them from keeping or making engagements with the plaintiff. The banner was a standing menace to all who were or wished to be in the employment of the plaintiff, to deter them from entering the plaintiff's premises, maintaining it was a continuous unlawful act, injurious to plaintiff's business and property, and was a nuisance such as a court of equity will grant relief against.” Olive v. Van Patten, 25 S. W. Rep. 428: A petition alleging that defendants (wholesale lumber dealers) formed an association, agreeing not to sell to others than dealers; that, because of the refusal by the plaintiff (another dealer) to join such association, they had maliciously distributed circulars, asking that patronage be withdrawn from the plaintiff till he agreed not to sell to others than dealers, thereby influencing others not to deal with plaintiff, to his injury-held, to state a good cause of action for damages and injunction. Since the foregoing was prepared, my attention has been called to the instructive opinion of Mr. Justice Taft, in the case of Thomas v. Cincinnati, O. & T. R. Railway Co., Re Phelan, 62 Fed. Rep. 803, in support of some of the positions taken herein. The order to show cause, so far as relates to the Cigar Makers' Union, No. 117, Orange; the Clothing Cutters' Assembly, No. 6224, K. of L.; the German Typographical Union, No. 8; the Clothing Salesmen's Association; the Bag Makers' Union; the Musical Protective Union; the National Brewers' Union and the Malsters' Union, they having all disclaimed any participation in the acts complained of, must be discharged, with costs. The said order to show cause, so far as relates to the other defendants, must be made absolute, with costs, and an injunction may issue against them, restraining them from distributing or circulating any circulars, printed resolutions, bulletins or other publications containing appeals or threats against the "Newark Times," or the complainants, its publishers, with the design and tending to interfere with their business in publishing said paper, and from making any threats or using any intimidation to the dealers or advertisers in such newspaper tending to cause them to withdraw their business from such newspaper. CASES ADJUDGED IN THE PREROGATIVE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. OCTOBER TERM, 1894. ALEXANDER T. MCGILL, ORDINARY. ABRAHAM V. VAN FLEET, VICE-ORDINARY. ELLIE J. MOORE, JULIA J. ROGERS and MATTIE BRANDT v. LISCOMB T. ROBBINS, surviving executor of the will of Wil liam D. Jewell, deceased, and EDWARD JEWELL. Where a testator orders his lands to be sold, the conversion will, unless a contrary intention distinctly appears, be deemed to have been directed merely for the purposes of the will, and consequently if those purposes fail or do not require it, it will, in equity, be considered land and be given to the heir. Moore v. Robbins. On appeal from a decree of distribution made by the orphans court of Mercer county. Mr. William M. Lanning, for the appellants. Mr. James E. Hayes, for Edward Jewell, who is one of the next of kin of William D. Jewell, deceased. THE ORDINARY. The decree appealed from distributes among thirteen surviv ing nephews and nieces of William D. Jewell, deceased, who are his next of kin, some $63,000 surplus of his estate over that portion thereof which his will disposed of. The appeal is taken by the three children of a deceased' nephew, because they claim that the sum distributed consists inpart of $15,183.39, proceeds of the sale of real estate, which should have been regarded as realty, and, in part, apportioned to them. The will of Mr. Jewell, after directing that his debts and funeral expenses should be paid by the executors thereof, con-tinues in this language: "Article II. It is my will and I do order and direct that all my real estate shall be sold by my executors within one year after my decease, or as soon thereafter as to them shall seem wise and in any manner that to them shall seem best, and I do hereby authorize and empower them to execute therefor good and sufficient titles." It then proceeds, by Article III., to bequeath general money legacies aggregating $16,300 and a specific legacy of a silverwatch, and to devise a wood-lot of land. Then, by Article IV., it continues: "I give and bequeath the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000),. to be divided by my executors into five equal parts, and the same to be distributed by them as follows, viz." Then follows a specification of the way in which the $100,000 is to be distributed, the result of which is that one of the parts. |