occupation; and therefore the question must be asked in good earnest, what ought we to do when at leisure. Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is inconceivable, and yet amid serious occupation amusement is needed more than at other times, at suitable times we should introduce amusements, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and from the pleasure we obtain rest. It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study with a view to enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education, for, as Odysseus says, there is no better way of passing life than when—

'Men's hearts are merry, and the banqueters in the hall, sitting in order, hear the voice of the minstrel.'

It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because it is liberal and noble. Further, it is clear that children should be instructed in some useful things-for example, reading and writing-not only for their usefulness, but also because many other sorts of knowledge are acquired through them. With a like view they must be taught drawing, not to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases, or in order that they may not be imposed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls." Politics, VIII. 3 (Jowett's Tr., condensed).

H (p. 182).
UNANIMITY.

THE author of Virginibus Puerisque puts this admirably when he writes: "Now this is where there should be community

between man and wife. They should be agreed on their catchword in 'facts of religion,' or 'facts of science, or 'society, my dear'; for without such an agreement all intercourse is a painful strain upon the mind.... For there are differences which no habit nor affection can reconcile, and the Bohemian must not intermarry with the Pharisee. Imagine Consuelo as Mrs. Samuel Budgett, the wife of the successful merchant! The best of men and the best of women may sometimes live together all their lives, and, for want of some consent on fundamental questions, hold each other lost spirits to the end.”

I (p. 147).

CHARACTER AND INTELLECT.

FROM the side of education and the training of the moral sentiment, Spencer has some excellent remarks in the spirit of the present passage: "Mere culture of the intellect (and education as usually conducted amounts to little more) is hardly at all operative upon conduct. Intellect is not a power but an instrument-not a thing which itself moves and works, but a thing which is moved and worked by forces behind it. To say that men are ruled by reason is as irrational as to say that men are ruled by their eyes. Reason is an eye-the eye through which the desires see their way to gratification. And educating it only makes it a better eye-gives it a vision more accurate and more comprehensive-does not at all alter the desires subserved by it. However far-seeing you make it, the passions will still determine the directions in which it shall be turned-the objects on which it shall dwell. Just those ends which the instincts or sentiments propose will the intellect be employed to accomplish; culture of it having done nothing but increase the ability to accomplish them. Probably some will urge that enlightening men enables them to discern the penalties which naturally attach to wrong-doing; and in a certain sense this is true. But it is only superficially true. Though they may learn that the grosser crimes commonly bring retribution in one shape or other, they will not learn that the subtler ones do.

Their sins will merely be made more Machiavellian. Did much knowledge and piercing intelligence suffice to make men good, then Bacon should have been honest and Napoleon should have been just. Where the character is defective, intellect, no matter how high, fails to regulate rightly, because predominant desires falsify its estimates. Nay, even a distinct foresight of evil consequences will not restrain when strong passions are at work. Whatever moral benefit can be effected by education must be effected by an education which is emotional rather than perceptive. If in making a child understand that this thing is right and the other is wrong, you make it feel that they are so-if you make virtue loved and vice loathed-if you arouse a noble desire, and make torpid an inferior one-if you bring into life a previously dormant sentiment-if you cause a sympathetic impulse to get the better of one that is selfish—if, in short, you produce a state of mind to which proper behaviour is natural, spontaneous, instinctive, you do some good. But no drilling in catechisms, no teaching of moral codes, can effect this. Only by repeatedly awakening the appropriate emotions can character be changed. Mere ideas received by the intellect, meeting no response from within-having no roots there-are quite inoperative upon conduct, and are quickly forgotten upon entering into life." Social Statics, p. 384 foll. (condensed).