somewhat obscure passage which follows deals with the problem of the kind of knowledge or experience on which an ethical theory must be built. Every science starts from some previous knowledge of the student. What we discover is a continuation of, or, rather, is a development out of, what we know already. But if we ask what we mean by "knowing," we see that there are two senses in which we may be said to know a thing. We may know it simply as an object of sense-perception or "matter of fact." In this sense a child, or a savage, or any of us in ordinary moments may know a house. Or, secondly, we may know it as an illustration of a law or principle. In this sense an architect may know a house as illustrating certain principles of mechanics or of art. In the first of these cases we may say the house is "known to the individual." The knowledge differs according to the individual point of view. We might even say each individual sees a different house. In the second case we have knowledge "in the strict sense of the term ; knowledge, that is, of something which is the same for all, and is independent of time and circumstances. Now, there is no doubt a sense in which this latter kind of knowledge is "nearer to us," and may be said to come first. Laws and principles touch us on the side most characteristic of us as men, viz. our thought.* Moreover, they come first in that they represent the controlling factors in the process whereby the thing comes to be what it is. On the other hand, the

* "Principles," says one of the commentators, "are more intimately known because they are of the inner essence of mind."

particular thing may be said to be nearer to us in the sense that it is an object of sense-perception rather than of thought. For the same reason it also may be said to come first, seeing we know through sense before we know through intelligence. While, then, knowledge of the principle may be said to be first in importance -whether looked at from the point of view of nature, which produces, or mind, which understands things— the knowledge of the "fact" is first in time.

All this being so, the answer to the question with which we started becomes clear. In the study of ethics and politics, as in other concrete sciences, we must begin with the actual facts of social life-the moral judgments of the citizens and the actual form which civil life takes, as represented by its laws and institutions. It is true that these judgments and institutions have come to be what they are by the more or less conscious effort of individuals to realize a social good. In this sense the Good may be said to be nearer to us and come first. The ideal towards which society is developing is that which makes us what we most truly are. On the other hand, in the process of realizing in consciousness what the nature of this ideal is, as in knowledge in general, we must begin with the facts of ordinary sense experience. As Professor Stewart puts it: "Happiness is the Final Cause of Life. The various 'virtues' are naturally subsequent to it as being its effects, i.e. as being what they are in virtue of it, just as the hand is a hand. in virtue of the body; but they are more evident to us than it is, ie. we learn (under the influence of

moral training) to discriminate practically, or in our habitual conduct between good and bad actions, before we can form a 'notion of life as a great whole, and understand why and how they are good and bad; accordingly, we must begin our study of moral science with this merely empirical 'knowledge of the virtues,' and rise from it to the knowledge of their causehappiness."

But here a difficulty suggests itself: "How," it may be asked, " from the merely empirical knowledge of the facts of the moral life, e.g. acts of courage, can we rise to a knowledge of their cause or principle? These facts are, or appear to be, merely particular physical events happening here and now, whereas the end or good is ex hypothesi a principle of conscious direction, ideal and therefore universal. What is the connexion between fact and principle by which we may ascend from the one to the other?" The answer is that the facts we spoke of as forming the starting-point are not merely particular physical events. As the outcome of "character," i.e. a general habit of the will, they are something far more. Thus the acts of courage, temperance, etc., which form the starting-point of moral science, are not mere isolated events, but represent a fixed character or habit of acting in a particular way, which has been acquired either under the unconscious pressure of social opinion or the influence of teachers conscious of the end they wish to promote. Through habit or character, therefore, the

*Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics, vol. i. p. 54. In this and in other quotations I have substituted the English for Greek terms.

facts are already more than mere facts. They are facts that embody a principle, and may thus form the starting-point of an inquiry which is to issue in the knowledge of a principle.

This explains why at the outset (I. iii. 5 foll.) so much emphasis was laid upon character as a condition of the profitable study of ethics. Apart from character moral judgments are sounding phrases— mere physical facts-coming home to a man with as little conviction as verses of poetry to one who is drunk.* The man of good character, on the other hand, is already well on the way to a true moral philosophy. Aristotle seems, indeed, to go even further, and to say he does not require one. This, of course, is true, in a sense, of ordinary life; but if taken generally would contradict what has already been said about the practical value of philosophy. What is meant is that while a knowledge of the reason or principle is not necessary for ordinary life (men would not, as a rule, understand it-habit, and the accompanying opinion that the things habitually done are good, being in this case sufficient), for the teacher and the politician such a knowledge is essential. They are concerned with the genesis of the citizen, and you might as well expect an architect to build good houses without a knowledge of the principles of his profession, as a teacher or a law-giver to produce good citizens without a knowledge of the principles which underlie our actions and judgments.

* Cp. Ethics, VII. c. iii. § 13.

§ 3. Character and Opinion.

[I. c. v. § 1.]

The next section contains a further illustration of the relation between character and opinion. The order of thought may be put as follows. In chap. iv. § 3, Aristotle has reminded us that a man's opinions are frequently influenced by the circumstances in which he finds himself-the state of his health, his purse, or his mind, at the time. In chap. v. he goes further, and traces the origin of definite theories of the chief end of life to the habitual preferences of those who hold them. The common order is not, he tells us, first to seek for a true theory of conduct and then proceed to order one's life in accordance with it. On the contrary, a man's choice of life comes first, and reflects itself in any theory he may have occasion afterwards to formulate. Some, "influenced by the lives they lead," "like the slaves that they are," hold that pleasure is the good. Others, again, "with a practical turn," prefer to make honour the end. But after what has been said in the intermediate sections, this is only what we might expect to find. "Show me a man," Aristotle there seems to have said, "who is accustomed to do what is right, and I will show you one who is on the road to a right conclusion as to the meaning of what he does-the principle of life in general." Here we have the complementary truth, "Show me a man whose actions are habitually wrong,

* Not “to judge, as we reasonably may, from their lives,” as in Peters' translation.