SELECTED PASSAGES

FROM THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.*

I.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

[NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.-I. i.] NOT only all arts and I sciences but all actions directed by choice aim at some good. And so the Good has been well defined as the end at which all things aim. But there is a distinction among the ends 2 themselves. Some consist in the activities, others in some ulterior result, and where the latter is the case the results are of greater value than the activities which produce them. Now, as there are numerous kinds of actions and numerous 3 arts and sciences, there are also numerous ends. Thus the

* Three works associated with Aristotle's name and entitled Ethics have come down to us: known respectively as the "Nicomachean," the "Eudemian" and the "Greater." The older view was that the last, which, in spite of its name, is much the shortest of the three, was the original work of which the others were later expansions. This is now given up and the first accepted as probably in great part actually written by Aristotle, the two latter being restatements of the Aristotelian doctrine by other hands. It derives its title from the son to whom the task of editing his father's notes was assigned.

end of the healing art is health, of shipbuilding ships, 4 of strategy victory, of economy-wealth. But when a number of them fall under some single art or science, as the manufacture of bridles and other accoutrements falls under horsemanship, this again, together with all warlike accomplishments, under generalship, and so on, the end of the master art is more desirable than those of the subordinate faculties, as it is that for the sake of which the others are 5 pursued. And this is equally true whether we suppose the end to consist in the mere exercise of faculty or in some ulterior result as in the cases just mentioned.

I [ii.] If, then, in the field of conduct there is some one end which we desire for its own sake, other things being desired because they contribute to it, and if we do not choose everything on account of something else, for this would go on to infinity and leave our desires without point or purpose, clearly this must be the Chief Good, being 2 the best of all things. And surely to know what this Good is, is of some practical importance, for in that case we shall be as archers shooting at a definite mark, and shall be more 3 likely to do what is right. This being so, we must try to indicate roughly what it is and to which of the sciences it belongs.

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Now, it would seem to belong to the science which is supreme over all the others and best corresponds to our 5 idea of a master science. But the science of politics or citizenship clearly answers to this description, for it 6 prescribes what sciences are needed by a state, which of them each of the citizens shall be taught, and up to what point. Moreover, we find that even the studies that are held in highest repute, such as economics and oratory, are 7 subordinate to it. Seeing, then, that it employs the services of all the other sciences, and, furthermore, defines what the

citizens are to do and what they are to refrain from doing, the end which this science sets itself will embrace all other ends and will be, in fact, the Good of Man. And even 8 though this is the same for individuals and communities, yet the good of the community is grander and more sufficing to lay hold of and to keep. For though we may often rest satisfied with merely individual good, yet the good of a nation or a state is nobler and more divine. This, then, is the scope of our study which we shall best describe as the science of politics.

[iii.] In pursuing this study we shall have done enough if I we attain such precision as the subject permits of. For it is a mistake to look for the same exactness in all kinds of reasoning, just as it would be in all kinds of manufacture. Nobility 2 and justice, which are the subject-matter of the science of politics, appear in many forms, and are the subject of much uncertainty. So much is this the case that they are sometimes thought to be only conventional and not natural distinctions. There is a similar uncertainty about things 3 which are good in themselves because of the harm they sometimes do. For some men have been ruined by riches; others have lost their lives by courage. We must be satisfied, 4 therefore, in reasoning upon these subjects, to give only a rough sketch of the truth, and when our premises are not universal laws but statements of what generally or probably occurs, to draw only probable conclusions. In the same spirit the reader must accept all that is here stated, for no one who pretends to education will look for more exactness in the treatment of any subject than the nature of the subject admits of. To ask mathematical demonstrations from an orator is as absurd as to accept probable reasoning from at mathematician. As a matter of fact, a man has a fine sense 5 for subjects with which he is familiar, and in these he is a

good critic. This is true of the man of special culture in respect to his speciality, and in respect to things in general of the man of general culture. Hence it is that young men are not as a rule good students of moral philosophy. For here the foundation as well as our subject-matter is moral experience, which is precisely what is wanting in youth. 6 Young men, moreover, are apt to be swayed by passion, and to reap little profit from a study the object of which 7 is not merely knowledge but conduct. And this holds of those who are young in character as well as in years. For the defect is not a matter of time, but consists in their living according to passion and following the objects which passion suggests. In the case of such persons, as in the case of the intemperate man, knowledge is of little avail. Those, on the other hand, whose actions and desires are under the control of reason, may expect to benefit considerably from the theoretic study of these subjects.

II.

OPINIONS AS TO THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS.

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[1. iv.] To return: inasmuch as all science and action aims at I some good, what is it that is the aim of the science of politics? in other words, what is the highest good? About the name there is no disagreement. Both educated and uneducated alike declare that it is Happiness, taking Happiness as equivalent to living and doing well. But here agreement ends, for when they come to define happiness the multitude say one thing, philosophers another. The mass of mankind 3 take it to be some palpable and obvious good, such as pleasure, wealth, and honour, though they are not agreed as to which. You will find even the same man of a different mind at different times. After an illness he will say it is health, when in poverty, riches; at other times, conscious how little he knows, he is ready to defer to those who declare it to be some splendid quality which passes their understanding. Some philosophers, again, think that besides the several good things there is some absolute good which is the cause of their goodness.

As it would serve no purpose to examine all the various 4 views that have been held on the subject, it will be sufficient to select those theories of life which are most popular, or recommend themselves to thinkers.

We must, however, recollect that there is a

distinction 5