§ 6. Egoism and Altruism.

[IX. c. viii.]

In no passage, however, is Aristotle more convincing than in his application of the above doctrine to current.moral problems. The first he deals with (IX. c. vii.) has comparatively little interest for us, since it has become generally accepted-in theory, at least--"that it is more blessed to give than to receive." The philosophical gloss which he puts upon it-"The man who confers a benefit sees his own handiwork in the man who receives it; he therefore loves it more than the work loves its maker "-is chiefly interesting as an illustration of his general doctrine. The second, however, is one that has never ceased to exercise philosophers and practical men alike, viz. the relation of self-love to love of others (IX. c. viii.). The answer that is here given amounts to a criticism of the popular antithesis between self and others, with the view of showing that the self which it is man's duty to love and seek to realize is the self which includes others, and in which therefore the prima facie opposition has disappeared. This cannot be otherwise if, as already proved, the end of man consists in a system of activities which presupposes not merely an aggregate of individuals, but an organized society.

The value of this solution will become apparent if we compare it with that of current Utilitarianism.

Starting with the popular antithesis, English ethical writers have asked whether virtue consists in regard for self, or regard for others. Various replies have been given in the past. Thus the earlier school led by Hobbes tended to resolve all conduct into a form of self-regard. The later doctrine of Utilitarianism resolved virtue into regard for others.* More recently Mr. Herbert Spencer's attempt to "conciliate" these two views has met with wide acceptance. The "conciliation" amounts to showing that, as a matter of fact, there is a large and ever-widening area of conduct in which a man can only attain what he must needs desire, viz. the greatest pleasure, by taking into account the similar desires of others. It need hardly be pointed out at this stage that this is no real solution of the problem. It is merely a conspicuous case of what the logicians call ignoratio elenchi. That the way to the greatest happiness of individuals interpreted in terms of pleasure lies de facto through consideration of the happiness (in the same sense) of others, is no answer to the question whether the larger life has de jure a claim upon us. This question can only be truly answered when we have come to see that the self which includes others is a truer or more "natural" self than the self which excludes them. But this involves just such a criticism of the accepted antithesis as the teaching of Aristotle supplies. So long as the popular English philosophy refuses this better way, the problem must be for

See Mill's Utilitarianism, c. ii. † Data of Ethics, cc. xi.-xiv.

Uor M

Ethics, as Mr. L. Stephen says, what the squaring of the circle is for Mathematics.

§ 7. Friendship in Modern Education.

Returning to the main function assigned by Plato and Aristotle to Friendship in the development of character, and comparing their view of it with our modern ideas on the same subject, the contrast is at first sight almost startling. It is not only that in modern states there is no attempt such as was not uncommon among the Greeks, and was advocated by Plato, to regulate friendship in the interest of society in general, but the subject is almost totally neglected by teachers and educational writers. It is hardly going too far to say that the element of personal attachment, especially among young people, has come to be regarded in some quarters with suspicion.* Even so enlightened a writer as Professor Baldwin seems to suggest that parents and teachers should do their best to prevent the formation of permanent friendships among children. The reader of Aristotle's Ethics will be inclined to regard this neglect as a great loss to the theory of education, and to agree with Mr. Edward Carpenter that those who carry it into practice "fling on the dust-heap one of the noblest and most precious elements in human nature." In contrast to the prevailing apathy (or worse) it is refreshing to read the same writer's bold statement of his belief that "the more

* See Mr. Edward Carpenter's protest, "Affection in Education," International Journal of Ethics, July, 1899.

the matter is thought of, the clearer will it appear that a healthy affection must in the end be the basis of education." We may be permitted to add that if what has already been said is true, the recognition of this fact may be expected to open a way out of other modern difficulties besides those of the schoolroom, to which Mr. Carpenter particularly refers.

Meantime it may help in some degree to bring this recognition about if, in conclusion, we note from the side of theory that there is one line of thought, familiar enough to the student of recent psychology, which may form a meeting-ground of ancient and modern ideas.

In tracing the development of consciousness, modern text-books lay stress on the growth of the idea of self as one of the most important ideas which a child acquires. Various "factors" are mentioned as entering into its formation-among others the social factor. The child, it is pointed out, does not grow up by itself, but as one among other selves, who re-act upon it in two ways. In the first place, the persons who surround it are a mirror in which it sees itself; and in the second, the actions of others, and especially those of intimate friends, offer a copy by means of which, under pressure of the dominant instinct of imitation, the child's consciousness of its own powers are developed. Without going further we may see that there is much in this doctrine that reminds us of Aristotle. It might indeed appear that we have here only an extension to the consciousness of self in general of the

See, for example, Professor Baldwin's Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, Bk. I. c. i.

principle which Aristotle confines to the consciousness of the moral self. There is, however, more in the Aristotelian doctrine than a partial anticipation of a popular modern view. It contains suggestions which go beyond and correct it in two essential particulars. In the first place the self-consciousness Aristotle is thinking of is not one among other forms of consciousness, the "idea" of self not one among other ideas. It is consciousness at its fullest development, the idea which includes and gives their place to all other ideas. It is thus the end of all individual development, not merely one of the elements in that development. But, secondly, in emphasizing "community of life and the intercourse of word and thought as a factor in the development of self-consciousness, Aristotle is thinking of something far more important than imitation, conscious or unconscious. Imitation is the mere reproduction of the actions of another. Whether there is in normal human conduct any such thing as imitation in this sense, or whether in any action that can be properly called voluntary, there is not normally an element of adaptation, i.e. a real attempt to express one's self, accompanying the effort to reproduce, we need not further discuss.* If there be any such thing as imitation pure and simple, it is of comparatively little educational importance, and is certainly not what Aristotle has in view. He is thinking throughout of the power of friendship to stimulate reciprocity of services rather than imitation of the actions of another. It is in respect of their * See what has already been said on this subject, chapter vi.