other, but with error, sin, and evil of every kind. We are one in our hatred of evil and in our desire for the triumph of the kingdom of God, but we are only partially agreed as to what is Truth, or under what banner the triumph of God's kingdom is to be won.

No true Moslem or Christian believes that these two great religions are essentially the same, or that they can be merged by compromise in a common eclectic faith. We know that they are mutually exclusive, and it is only by a fair and honest comparison of differences that we can work together for the many ends which we have in common, or judge of the truth in those things in which we differ.

ON THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY.

BY PROF. C. P. TIELE, THEol.D., Litt.D., Leiden UniVERSITY.

I greatly regret that official work of various kinds as well as the peculiar organization of our University system, prevents me from attending one of the Congresses at Chicago. But for this reason I am the more willing to comply, if possible, with the request which the Committee of this Congress did me the honor to address to me, viz., to send in a paper on the history and study of Comparative Theology, to be read at one of the meetings of the Congress. When I was ready to enter upon the performing of this task, the first question which presented itself before me was this: What is to be understood by Comparative Theology? I find that English speaking authors use the appellation promiscuously with Comparative Religion, but if we wish the words to convey a sound meaning, we should at least beware of using these terms as convertible ones. Theology is not the same as religion; and, to me, Comparative Theology signifies nothing but a comparative study of religious dogmas, Comparative Religion is nothing but a comparative study of the various religions in all their branches. I suppose, however, I am not expected to make this distinction, but Comparative Theology is to be understood to mean what is now generally called the Science of Religion, the word "science" not being taken in the limited sense it commonly has in English, but in the general signification of the Dutch Wetenschap (H. G. Wissenschaft) which it has assumed more and more even in the Romance languages.

So the history and the study of this science would have to form the subject of my paper, a subject vast enough to devote to it one or more volumes. It is still in its infancy. Although in former centuries its advent was heralded by a few forerunners, as Selden in "De Diis Syriis," de Brosses in "Le Culte des Dieux Fetiches," the tasteful Herder and others, as a science it reaches back not much further than to the middle of the nineteenth century. Dupuis' "Origine de tous les Cultes," which appeared in the opening years of the century, is a gigantic pamphlet, not an impartial historical research. Nor can Creuzer's and Baur's "Symbolik und Mythologie" lay claim to the latter appellation but are dominated by an a priori and long refuted theory. Meiner's "Allgemeine kritische Geschichte der Religionen (1806-7), only just came up to the low standard which, at that time, historical scholars were expected to reach. Much higher stood Benjamin Constant, in whose work, "La Religion considerée dans sa source, ses formes et ses developpments” (1824 suiv.), written with French lucidity, for the first time a distinction was made between the essence and the forms Coypright, 1893, by J. H. B.

of religion, to which the writer also applied the theory of development. From that time the science of religion began to assume a more sharply defined character, and comparative studies on an ever growing scale were entered. upon, and this was done no longer chiefly with prejudice, either by the enemies of Christianity in order to combat it and to point out that it differed little or nothing from all the superstitions one was now getting acquainted with, or by the apologists in order to defend it against these attacks, and to prove its high excellence when compared with all other religions. The impulse came from two sides. On one side it was due to philosophy. Philosophy had, for centuries past, been speculating upon religion, but only about the beginning of our century it had become aware of the fact that the great religious problem cannot be solved without the aid of history; that, in order to define the nature and the origin of religion, one must first of all know its development. Already before Benjamin Constant this was felt by others, of whom we will only mention Hegel and Schelling. The "Religious Philosophie" (Phil. of Rel.) of one of them, the "Philosophie der Mytholo gie "of the other, are cast in the mould of a sketch of the history of the development of religious ideas. It may even be said that the right method for philosophical inquiry into religion was defined by Schelling, at least from a theoretical point of view, more accurately than by any one else; though we should add that he, more than anyone else, fell short in the applying of it. Hegel even endeavored to give a classification of religions, which, it is true, hits the right nail on the head, here and there, but as a whole, distinctly proves that he lacked a clear conception of the real historical development of religion. Nor could this be otherwise. Even if the one had not confined within the narrow bounds of an a priori system the historical data which were at his disposal, even if the other had not been led astray by his unbridled fancy, both wanted the means to trace religion in the course of its development. Most of the relig ions of antiquity, especially those of the East, were at that time known but superficially, and critical research into the newer forms of religion had as yet hardly been entered upon. One instance out of many: Hegel characterized the so-called Syriac (Aramaic) religions as "die Religion des Schmerzens" (Religion of Suffering). In doing this he of course thought of the myth and the worship of Thammuz-Adonis. He did not know that these are by no means of Aramaic origin, but were borrowed by the peoples of Western Asia from their eastern neighbors, and are in fact a survival of a much older, highly sensual naturism. Even at the time he might have known that Adonis was far from being an ethical ideal, that his worship was far from being the glorification of a voluntarily suffering deity. In short it was known that only the comparative method could conduce to the desired end, but the means of comparing, though not wholly wanting, were inadequate.

Meanwhile material was being supplied from another quarter. Phil

ological and historical science, cultivated after strict methods, archæology, anthropology, ethnology, no longer a prey to superficial theorists and fashionable dilettanti only, but also subjected to the laws of critical research, began to yield a rich harvest. I need but hint at the many important discoveries of the last hundred years, the number of which is continually increasing. You know them full well, and you also know that they are not confined to a single province nor to a single period. They reach back as far as the remotest antiquity, and show us, in those ages long gone by, a civilization postulating a long previous development; they also draw our attention to many conceptions, manners and customs, among several backward or degenerate tribes of our own time, giving evidence of the greatest rudeness and barbarousness. They thus enable us to study religion as it appears among all sorts of peoples and in the most diversified degrees of development. They have at least supplied the sources to draw from, among which are the original records of religions, concerning which people formerly had to be content with very scanty, very recent and very untrustworthy information. You will not expect me to give you an enumeration of them. Let me mention only Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, India and Persia, and of their sacred books only the Book of the Dead, the so-called Chaldean Genesis, the Babylonian penitential psalms and mythological texts, the Veda and the Avesta. These form but a small part of the acquired treasures, but if we had nothing else it would be much. I know quite well that at first, even after having deciphered the writing of the two first named, and having learned in some degree to understand the languages of all, people seemed not to be fully aware of what was to be done with these treasures, and that the translations, hurriedly put together, failed to lead to an adequate perception of the contents. I know also that even now, after we have learned how to apply to the study of these records the universally admitted, sound philological principles, much of what was believed to be known has been rejected as being valueless, and that the questions and problems, which have to be solved, have not decreased in number, but are daily increasing. I cannot deny that scholars of high repute and indisputable authority are much divided in opinion concerning the explanation of those texts, and that it is not easy to make a choice out of so many conflicting opinions.

How much does Brugsch differ in his representation of the Egyptian Mythology from Edward Meyer and Erman; how great a division among the Assyriologists between the Accadists, or Sumerists and the Anti-Sumerists or Anti-Accadists; how much differs the explanation of the Veda by Roth, Müller, Grassman, from that by Ludwig, and how different is Barth's explanation from Bergaigne's and Regnaud's; how violent was the controversy between Spiegel and Haupt about the explanation of the most ancient pieces in the Avesta; and now, in this year of grace, while the younger generation, as Bartholomæ and Geldner on the one hand, Geiger, Wilhelm, Hubschmann, Mills, on the other hand, are following different