ural resources that make the island an attractive destination but it has not capitalized on these resources because of a lack of capital, lack of economic development expertise, and a desire by many residents of Vieques to forego development in favor of keeping their island relatively private.

Chairman WARNER. So despite the strong testimony, not with the Governor but with the distinguished colleague who represents Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives-I mean, I listened very carefully. I took a series of notes. I looked at the record of the Governor before the Rush commission, and I cannot find that window, that ray of light which says we can sit down and solve this. Did you hear it? Maybe you did and I did not. I am respectful.

Mr. DANZIG. Well, I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I think you're listening skills exceed mine. My sense is, though, that, as Secretary of the Navy, I have two obligations here. One is the obligation to protect the well-being and the readiness and the safety of the Sailors and Marines who are under my charge. You, as a former Secretary of the Navy, I know are very appreciative of that, and you as the chairman of this committee are.

My second is, when a community comes in with the kinds of concerns that the Puerto Ricans are now so intensely expressing, catalyzed by the death of David Sanes Rodríguez on the range, is to listen to them and to find a way to accommodate them.

Chairman WARNER. I understand the listening, and I understand the process, but you studied the Rush report, did you not?

Mr. DANZIG. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Did you know of the Governor's absolute— and I just do not think there is any equivocation in his statement, and he repeated it here. Were you aware of that?

Mr. DANZIG. I am aware that there have been a number of statements of that kind. I was not aware of this particular one that you quote, but I have talked with the Governor, and I have some sense of his intensity of feeling about this.

Chairman WARNER. I read from the meeting of the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, Room 400, Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia, Friday, July 9, and yet it was not mentioned by the commission. Did you have an opportunity to talk with the commission about this?

Mr. DANZIG. I have not talked with the commission about this, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. But do you find somewhere in that your job-and I respect you. I think you are a very able Secretary-you find some hope that this can be done in the next month-and-a-half? Mr. DANZIG. Mr. Chairman, my feeling is that I owe that the strongest try and, yes, I have some hope, because, like you, I have seen situations where people have been extremely hostile and adversarial, and yet a resolution is possible.

Chairman WARNER. Therefore, we come to the critical question which your two distinguished chiefs will address, and that is the deployment of the Eisenhower Group by the President as Commander-in-Chief, with or without that training, into harm's way, so we defer to our distinguished Chief of Naval Operations.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAY L. JOHNSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. If I could, sir, would you indulge me a brief oral statement that gets to the heart of what you have just spoken?

Chairman WARNER. Admiral, the chair has indulged a lot today. You take such time as you need.

Admiral JOHNSON. I would like to address to you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, briefly what Vieques means to us in terms of combat readiness. The vehicle I would like to use to express that succinctly is the passage, a quote from the comprehensive report submitted by Vice Admiral Fallon and Lieutenant General Peter Pace, United States Marine Corps.

I quote: "Vieques is an irreplaceable training asset, and is the centerpiece of the only integrated training facility available to the Navy and Marine Corps on the East Coast. It is the only ship-toshore firing range, and the only facility with open ocean access capable of supporting simultaneous live naval surface fire support, close air support, and an amphibious landing of Marines. "It is the only range on the East Coast permitting air-to-ground training using high altitude profiles required for aircraft and crew survivability in today's air defense environment.

"Less obvious, but critical, is the role of the Vieques inner range in providing fleet commanders the opportunity to evaluate the warfighting skills of battle groups preparing for combat overseas. Vieques provides the only venue where senior leadership can verify that our operational forces are truly prepared. "This evaluation provides a last measure of insurance against weaknesses and vulnerabilities that might otherwise result in unnecessary combat casualties. It is through Vieques alone that the final link in the training chain is closed."

I cannot say it any better than that, Mr. Chairman, and further, that report comes from the two men most directly responsible for the training and certification of our Atlantic Fleet combat forces and in readiness terms their statements are the most important and essential to the record.

A second brief point, if I may. The Navy can, indeed, improve the relationship we have with the citizens of Puerto Rico and the people of Vieques. When we disestablished the flag billet at Commander Air Fleet Caribbean in 1994, we lost a key linkage with the leadership and citizenry of Puerto Rico, and by so doing have not spent sufficient time and effort being attentive to their concerns, as you would expect from a good neighbor.

We can, should, and will do better. That is precisely why, in March of this year, before the tragic accident of 19 April, we committed to put a flag officer back in Roosevelt Roads by year's end as our on-site representative to the island leadership and people, and to serve as the Navy component to Commander, Southern Command.

We look forward to working with the Puerto Ricans to rebuild what should be a strong, mutually supportive relationship. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and General Jones follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. JAY L. JOHNSON AND GEN. JAMES L. JONES

Distinguished members of the Senate Armed Service Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role of the Vieques training ranges in our National Security. The public debate on this issue has been heated at times and we appreciate the opportunity to discuss the National Security imperatives of this important issue.

As you are well aware, on April 19th of this year, a Marine Corps F/A-18C "Hornet" was involved in a tragic accident at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. Flying in cloudy weather, the pilot mistook an observation building located within the range for a ground target. He dropped two 500-pound bombs on what he thought was the correct target, and the explosion of these bombs resulted in the death of Mr. David Sanes-Rodríguez, a civilian security guard at the facility, and injured four other military and civilian employees. The Navy and Marine Corps profoundly regret the tragic death of Mr. Sanes-Rodríguez and the injuries suffered by the other victims of this accident. Many sailors and Marines, over long careers, have lost friends and colleagues due to the hazardous nature of our profession, and we certainly understand the pain, suffering, and questions that this kind of accident leaves with families. We have studied this incident, discovered the factors that led to the tragedy, and have instituted procedures to prevent this type of incident from occurring again.

This tragic accident has prompted some to demand the outright closure of the Vieques facility and the departure of the United States Navy from the island. Before any decision is rendered with regard to these demands, it is important to understand the vital contribution that Vieques Island makes to our national security.

Hydrography, geography, and surrounding airspace make Vieques unique. It lies outside heavily used commercial air corridors and sea routes, providing uniquely unencroached sea and air space for training. It is a superior site for rehearsing amphibious operations, the only site for aerial mine warfare training, and is the only place on the East Coast where aircraft, naval surface ships, and ground forces can employ combined arms training with live ammunition expenditure under realistic conditions. Integral to that, it is the only range on the East Coast that allows Sailors and Marines to conduct naval gunfire training, one of our most important missions.

It is truly a world-class training facility. The price for a facility of this quality has been steep. Americans have invested more than three billion dollars on land, facilities, and equipment to support our training in the Puerto Rican Operating Area, of which the Vieques range and nearby Roosevelt Roads Naval Station are the centerpiece. Even if a suitable replacement site could be located, which we have not been able to do, land acquisition and construction costs make it almost certain that duplicating even a fraction of Vieques' capabilities would cost considerably more than the three billion dollars already spent.

The April 19 accident should not override the fact that the Vieques range has an enviable safety record over the course of its more than half century of use. This was the first loss of life on the ground from the release of ordnance. No bomb or round has ever fallen on the actual island of Vieques outside the confines of United States Government property. The live ordnance impact area is at the eastern end of the island; it comprises less than three per cent of the 33,000 acre island and is located nearly 10 miles from the island's population center, separated from the inhabitants by a range of hills.

These Vieques training areas provide essential training opportunities to the Navy and the Marine Corps. Within the limits of current technology, many weapons systems and techniques are still learned and perfected with the use of live ordnance under realistic conditions. Such experiences build the skills and confidence our Sailors and Marines need before undertaking their operational deployments.

While simulation and non-live-fire training certainly have value and are integral to our basic training programs, they do not provide an adequate substitute for livefire training. Live-fire training contains an element of realism that is absent from simulators and non-live-fire training. If we cannot train under this realism, Sailors and Marines, when placed in a combat situation, will not only face the certain chaos that comes with combat but will also face the uncertainty which comes from handling and expending live ordnance for the first time in a highly complex, time synchronized combat operation. The complexities are enormous and can not be simulated. Failing to provide for adequate live-fire training prior to combat will place our Nation in the position of risking needless casualties through unpreparedness.

Vieques is the only range along the Atlantic seaboard at which strike aircraft are afforded the use of air-to-ground live ordnance with tactically realistic and challenging targets in airspace which allows the use of high altitude profiles. The magazineto-target handling of live ordnance under these conditions is essential training. We have learned this truth painfully. The ordnance handling accidents which resulted in over 100 deaths on the carriers Forrestal and Oriskany underscore the critical value of this training.

Naval Surface Fire Support, i.e., surface gunnery for direct or indirect fires, can only be done on Vieques. Naval guns are unique weapons in that they are fired by the Navy but directed, spotted and adjusted by Marines ashore. Teamwork is the heart of this relationship-teamwork that can and does cross service boundaries. Live-fire practice brings the team together, providing the knowledge and confidence in each other's abilities that are necessary for success. While ships can physically fire naval gunfire in the open ocean, this does nothing to develop the naval gunfire team. While many of the individual pieces can certainly be trained in isolation, putting them all together at the Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group level can only be done by integrated training, and such training is only available on the Vieques range.

The impact of the current situation on readiness is such that naval gunfire qualifications and expenditure of air-to-ground ordnance have been put on hold while this issue is debated. It has already affected readiness of deployed units. Our experience in Operation DESERT FOX showed that pilots who participated in integrated training at Vieques were nearly twenty per cent more effective on target than those who did not. One surface combatant of the John F. Kennedy Battle Group deployed in late September unqualified for naval gunfire operations. The Marines of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, recently arrived in the Mediterranean, only received about half of the usual Vieques training. In February, the Eisenhower Battle Group will deploy to the Mediterranean. Originally scheduled to train at Vieques in September and December, if the current situation continues, three of the six naval gunfire capable ships of the Battle Group will be unqualified at departure; the fourth within 2 months of deploying. While physically capable of naval gunfire, these ships will not have been afforded the opportunity to develop the integration skills necessary to be an effective team. Additionally, the air wing will deploy marginally ready for combat operations. Within the Eisenhower Battle Group, 463 primary ordnance handlers aboard the carrier and 120 ordnance handlers in the surface combatants will not have exercised in magazine-to-target integration training. This puts lives at risk.

Given the unique nature of the Vieques ranges, it is essential that we understand that this issue is not limited to the interests of one region or locale. Communities throughout the United States and its territories share both the responsibilities and benefits associated with nearby bases and ranges that support our national military capabilities. Some of those bases perform purely administrative or logistical functions, and some host combat units which must train in the field on a regular basis with rifles, machineguns, mortars, artillery, and aircraft. Many have impact areas that are considerably closer to civilian population centers than those on Vieques. Some of these bases are under similar pressure to that faced by the Vieques training ranges today.

The responsibility of hosting defense facilities is not limited to American citizens alone. Around the world, every day, our Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines train with live ammunition on the territory of our allies. Some of our overseas bases have integrated live-fire and maneuver ranges, and they too are critical to the maintenance of essential warfighting skills. Our allies also have interest groups that would prefer that these activities not take place near their communities.

The "not in my backyard" movement is a phenomenon that, if applied at Vieques, could greatly undermine training opportunities for our sailors and marines elsewhere. In practical terms, the world is watching to see the direction we take on this issue.

Our responsibility to the American people extends beyond that of being ready to win our Nation's battles; it also includes being good neighbors to those citizens living near our bases. As good neighbors, our goal should be to have an ongoing dialogue which allows for the timely airing of grievances and, if required, appropriate corrective action. Our neighbors in Vieques have identified some deficiencies in the relationship which we have an obligation to correct or address. We can and will do better in this regard. Unfortunately, the lack of formal, on-going negotiations between the affected Puerto Rican interests and the Department of Defense has made this difficult in recent months.

In sum, the fundamental value of the Vieques facility is proven every day by our forward deployed naval forces. Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready

Groups, having trained at Vieques within the last year, conducted combat operations over Iraq and Kosovo within days of arrival in their theater of operations. They executed many of their attacks from high altitude, and their ability to do so successfully, without loss of American life, is directly related to the training they received at Vieques.

Four Commanders-In-Chief of Unified Commands, including CINCSOUTH, CINCCENT, CINCEUCOM and CINCJFCOM, have recognized the value of Vieques training. These unified chiefs, responsible for United States military operations covering over half of the globe, have written letters supporting the continued use of the facility. Faced with a daily need for forces on station and ready, they will inherit the outcome of any decision on the Vieques situation.

Amphibious operations are the most complex of military missions, requiring total coordination between Navy and Marine Corps forces, resulting in a high degree of expertise and confidence within the force. As history shows, it is not a question of whether they might be used, but when they will be used in support of our National policy.

Thank you for considering this statement in your deliberations of this important national security issue.

Chairman WARNER. That is very clear. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR. USMC,

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to just make a few opening comments, and would ask that my statement be submitted for the record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection, all statements will be printed in the record.

General JONES. I would like to begin by offering on behalf of the Marines our condolences to the family of Mr. David Sanes Rodríguez and those who were wounded in this unfortunate accident, this tragic accident in April.

Chairman WARNER. Those statements are appreciated. This hearing started on that note. This hearing will conclude on that note.

General JONES. I would like to emphasize three points by way of summary. The first one would be that amphibious operations are, by their nature, the most complex and challenging of virtually all military operations.

A solution to this particular problem must be found if we are to address very serious readiness implications, and failure to resolve the current impasse from the Marine Corps standpoint, and I think from the Navy as well, will result in degraded cohesion on the part of our battalions and our squadrons and our crews, decreased confidence in their ability to do their very dangerous jobs and missions, a decreased level of competence and the ability to fight and win on the battlefield-that requirement has been documented by four combatant CINCs-and, frankly, a probable impact on the morale of our Marines and Sailors, who will have a difficult time understanding why they cannot train to the levels that they know they must be trained to at home.

The impact domestically is, as has been discussed this morning, an issue, among other things, of fundamental fairness with regard to other sites where live fire is conducted in this Nation. Internationally, a failure to resolve this satisfactorily will also show that our own citizens do not support the training of our armed forces at home, and that will be cause, certainly, for evaluation.