2 An action at law cannot be maintained upon a lost negotiable note, whether not due or overdue at the time of the loss. Moses v. Trice, 556 3. But if at the time of the trial a recovery upon the lost note would be barred by the statute of limitations, the action may be maintained. Idem, 556 4. An action at law may be maintained upon a note that has been destroyed. The evidence should, however, satisfy the jury beyond any reasonable doubt that the note has been destroyed. Idem, 556 5. Where a note has been given for a loan of money, and there have been renewals of it, the holder may sue on the first note, or for Idem, 556 the mony loaned. PURCHASER FOR VALUE. 1. A purchaser of land for value without notice, actual or constructive, having obtained a conveyance, will not be affected by a latent equity, whether by lien or incumbrance, or trust, or fraud, or any other claim. Carter v. Allan & als., 241 2. See Pleadings in Equity, No. 2, and Idem, 241 3. When purchaser for value will be affected Vendor and notice. See by constructive Purchaser, No. 6, 7, and Burwell's adm'r v. Fauber & als., 446 RAILROAD COMPANIES. The charter of the R. & D. Railroad company provides that "all machines, wagons, vehicles or carriages, belonging to the com pany, with all their works, and all profits which may accrue from the same, shall be vested in the respective shareholders forever, in proportion to their respective shares, shall be deemed personal estate, and exempt from any charge or tax whatever." HELD: 1. The real estate owned and used by the company for the purposes of their business 2. All the said property, real and personal, is exempt from taxation, both State and municipal. Idem, 604 3. The exemption from taxation of the real estate of the company in the city of Richmond, is not unconstitutional as being in conflict with the charter of the city, previously granted, giving the city the power to tax real estate for the purposes stated in the city charter; the city having ample means of taxation left for the payment of her expenses and debts. Idem, 604 4. The Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. is the Virginia Central R. R. Co. under another name; and is liable upon any contract, or for the negligence of the Virginia Central R. R. Co. Wilson v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. 654 5. A railroad company is liable as a common carrier, for the baggage of a passenger, to the same extent, if the passenger is travelling with his baggage, as if it was carried without him. Idem, 654 6. Under the contract between the Virginia Central R. R. Co. and Trotter & Bro., stage proprietors, for the carriage, by the latter, of passengers from the terminus of the railroad to White Sulphur Springs, Trotter & Bro. are the agents of the railroad company, and the company is liable for the loss of the baggage of a passenger Idem, by Trotter & Bro. 654 7. Though the contract stipulates that each party shall be responsible for losses occurring on their part of the line, the railroad company is responsible for the loss of a passenger's baggage by the stage line. Idem, 654 8. Through passengers from Richmond to the White Sulphur Springs are allowed to stay all night at the terminus of the road, and go on in the stages the next morning. Though a passenger takes her baggage with her to a hotel, where she 947 stays, yet, if she, the next morning, brings it with her *to the stage, and commits it to the agent of the line, and it is lost, the railroad company is liable for Idem, the loss. 654 9. Though the through ticket given to a passenger at Richmond, specifies on its face that each party to the contract is only liable for losses on their part of the line, the railroad company is liable for the loss Idem, on the stage line. 654 10. To restrict the liability of a railroad company as a common carrier, for the loss of the baggage of a passenger, there must be proof of actual notice to the passenger of such restriction, before the cars are started; and an endorsement on the ticket given to the passenger, is not enough, unless it is shown that he knew its purport before the cars started Idem, 654 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. 1. How the offence may be charged in the indictment, and what proofs will sustain the charge. See Larceny, No. 1, 2, and Price's case, 846 4. The writ of ad quod damnum, issued in such a case, is defective for not directing an enquiry as to "damage to the residue of the tract, beyond the peculiar benefits which will be derived in respect to such residue from the road." And the inquest taken on such writ, for this defect, both the writ and the inquest not making this enquiry, is defective. And will be quashed, if the motion to quash is made at the proper time. Idem, 164 948 2. If property be stolen, and recently thereafter it be found in the exclusive possession of the prisoner, then such possession of itself affords sufficient grounds for a presumption of fact, that he was the thief; and in order to 5. In such a case, the defendant not repel the presumption, makes it incumbent *having made any motion to quash the on him, on being called on for the purpose, writ and inquest in the County court, to account for such possession consistently but going to trial on the merits, he waived with his innocence. If he gives a reasonable the objections to the writ and inquest; and account of it, then it devolves on the Commonwealth to prove that such account is other of the proceedings, in the Circuit court. it is too late to move to quash them, or any untrue. If he gives an unreasonable account Idem, of it, then it devolves on the prisoner to sustain such account by other evidence. What is such a recent possession as raises a presumption against a prisoner, in the meaning of the rule, is a question for the jury, and depends upon the nature of the property and other circumstances of the particular case. Idem, 846 REMOVAL OF CAUSES. 1. Both plaintiffs and defendants being present in court by their counsel, the court makes an order removing a cause to the court of another county, assigning as a reason for making it, that it appears that the cause had been improperly brought in the court. If this reason was unfounded in fact, it would not invalidate the order which the court had power to make under the statute, Code, ch. 174, § 3, p. 719; and to which there was no exception. Muller, &c. v. Bayly & al., 521 164 6. Although in such cases there is an appeal as of right, and viva voce testimony is heard in the Circuit court on such appeal, yet, as a general rule, a party must make any the court of original jurisdiction; and if he objections he may have to the proceedings in permits such proceedings to progress to the final hearing of the case, without making the objections, he will be held to have waived them, and cannot make them for the first time in the appellate court. Idem, 164 7. In such a case on appeal by the defendant, it is his right and duty to begin; the judgment of the County court being prima facie right. Idem, 164 8. The regular mode of objecting to the inquest of the jury, on account of the small amount of the damages assessed, is, by motion, to quash the inquest; on which motion, evidence will be heard to prove the damage assessed is insufficient. Until this is done the inquest is conclusive on the question of damages. Idem, 164 9. The objection may, however, be made on the hearing; and evidence may be then introduced by either party, to show the damages assessed are either adequate or inadeIdem, 164 quate. 10. So in such case, upon appeal by the defendant, he is entitled to introduce evidence in the Circuit court to prove the inadequacy of the damages assessed by the inquest. Idem, 164 11. In assessing the damages in such a case, the defendant is entitled to have the value of the land taken for the road without deduction, and such further damage as the residue of his tract will sustain beyond the peculiar benefits which will be derived to said residue from the road. Idem, 164 SCALING CONFEDERATE DEBTS. 1. See Confederate Contracts, No. 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 26. 2. By the act of March 3d, 1866, and that of February 28th, 1867, two modes of adjusting Confederate contracts are provided: 1st. By reducing the nominal amount contracted to be paid to its gold value; 2d. In cases of sales of property, or renting or hiring, giving the value of the property sold, or the value of the rent or hire, at the time of such sale, renting or hiring. Pharis v. Dice, 303 3. It is for the jury to fix the time when the sale of depreciation shall be applied to a Confederate debt; and it is error for the court to instruct the jury as to the time when the sale shall be applied. Moses v. Trice, 556 4. How payments made in Confederate currency are to be scaled. See Lunatics, No. 5, and Bird's committee v. Bird, SHERIFFS. 2. In such a case, where a different contract is stated in the answer, and sustained by the evidence, the bill will be dismissed, or the court may, in a proper case, give to the plaintiff the election to have the contract as proved enforced, or to have it rescinded. Idem, 23 3. Where one contract is made for the sale of both real and personal property, and a 712 lumping price is to be paid for both, the whole sum is a charge upon the real estate, and a conveyance of the real estate will only be decreed upon the payment of the whole amount. Idem, 23 1. Upon a motion against a high sheriff, for the failure of his deputy to collect and account for the county levies which went into his hands, of which motion the deputy has notice, it is the duty of the deputy to defend the suit, and show, if he can, that he has accounted for them. Lee county justices v. Fulkerson, 182 2. In such a case, judgment having been rendered against the high sheriff, he is entitled to recover a judgment for the same amount against his deputy; and the deputy cannot show upon such motion against him that he has paid the levies to the parties entitled. Idem, 182 3. The judgment recovered against the high sheriff, is, by the ereditor of the county, for money lent; the deputy sustains no such relation to the creditor as will entitle him to be substituted to the rights of the creditor against the justices of the county, to enforce the payment of so much of the debt as had not been levied for. Idem, 182 4. The deputy pays the judgment recovered against him in 1847, and he does not institute his suit against the justices of the county until 1858. The statute of limitations is a Idem, 182 5. QUÆRE: Whether, under any circumstances, the deputy sheriff could maintain a suit against the justices of a county for their failure to lay the levy? Idem, 182 bar to the claim. 949 6. When deputy estopped by proceed*ing in equity against the high sheriff, in which he failed, from proceeding against the justices. See Practice in Chancery, No. 7, and Idem, 182 7. There is a judgment against a high sheriff for a fine for the failure of one of his deputies to return an execution, which, the record showed, had come into the hands of the deputy; and the high sheriff satisfies the judgment. In fact, the execution had been delivered to another deputy who farmed the shrievealty, who collected the money and failed to pay it over and to return the execution. The high sheriff may sue the last mentioned deputy and his sureties on his bond, and recover the amount he has paid. Ramsey's adm'rs v. McCue & als., 144 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 1. In a bill by the purchaser for the specific performance of a parol contract for the sale of land, the contract as stated in the bill must be sustained by the evidence, or the bill will be dismissed. McComas v. Easly, 6. The inadequacy of price which will operate to prevent the specific performance of a contract must be inadequacy at the time of the sale. Idem, 75 7. In August 1863, H sold S certain real estate for $10,000, payable in Confederate money, at three and six months. S did not pay the money when it fell due, but he paid it in November 1863, and during the year 1864 and January 1865, H accepting the money and giving receipts for it. The land was estimated to be worth at the time, and since Confederate money, when paid, was in gold the war, $6,000 in gold; and the value of the $385. Upon a bill by S for a specific perform ance of the contract, filed since the war, the only objection to it being that of inadequacy of price, S is entitled to the specific performance of the contract. Idem, 75 8. On a contract for the purchase of land, where payment is to be made in Confederate currency, time is of the essence of the contract, though it is not generally, unless injustice is thereby done to the vendor. Booten v. Scheffer, 474 9. In 1863, B sells S one moiety of real estate, and agrees that S may elect within the year to take the other half on the same terms. If S elects to take the other half, he does not pay the purchase money when it fell due. He is not entitled to have specific execution of the contract. Idem, 474 10. Equity will not decree a specific execution of a contract where the applicant for relief has been in default, and by force of subsequent events, or a change of circumstances, the execution of the contract would entail great loss and hardship on the adverse Idem, 474 party. 11. Where a party who applies for a specific performance has omitted to execute his 23 part of the contract by the time appointed for that purpose without being able to assign any sufficient justification or excuse for his delay, and where there is nothing in the conduct of the other party that amounts to acquiescence in that delay, the court will not compel a specific performance. 950 Kent, Ch. in Benedict v. Lynch, 19 John Ch. 370. Idem, 474 *12. Though S sets up his demand for specific performance, by answer to a bill by B asking for partition, it is still an application for equitable aid, and is to be governed by settled rules appropriate to bills for specific performance; and the court will not leave S to bring his suit, but will terminate the controversy by adjudicating the rights of the parties, and administering such relief as may be appropriate to the equity forum. STATUTES. Idem, 474 4. The act of May 28, 1870, Sess. Acts 186970, p. 162, to prevent the sacrifice of property at forced sales, construed in Goolsby & als. v. Strother, comm'r, 107 5. The act, Code, ch. 135, § 31, p. 612, construed in Hale v. Horne & als., 112 6. The act, Code, ch. 52, §§ 2, 4, 6, construed in Mitchell v. Thornton & al., 164 1. The proceeding to be relieved of a double tax, is a civil proceeding. 511 Neal & others v. Commonwealth, 2. H has taken out a license as a storager, and also as a tobacco auctioneer. But if H receives tobacco from the grower on consignment, sells it at auction, makes advances to the owner, charges him storage, an auction fee, and a commission on the amount of sales, independent of his charge as auctioneer, and accounts with him for the balance, he is bound to obtain a license as a commission merchant, and pay the tax assessed thereon according to law. Idem, 511 required to take out a license, and pay a tax 3. The keepers of a billiard saloon may be thereon. 7. The act, Code, ch. 177, § 19, p. 733, in relations to judgments in actions against 951 two or more defendants, construed in Moffett v. Bickle, 280 8. The act of March 3, 1866, and that of February 28, 1867, for adjusting Confederate debts considered and sustained in Pharis v. Dice, 303 1. When creditors or sureties of the debtor paying the debt entitled to be subrogated to the right of legatees whose legacies are charged upon land in the hands of a purchaser. See Vendor and Purchaser, No. 7, 8, and Burwell's adm'rs v. Fauber & als., 446 1. When sureties of an adm'r paying the debts, will be substituted to the rights of creditors against land in the hands of a purchaser. See Vendor and Purchaser, No. 7, 8, and Burwell's adm'rs v. Fauber & als., 446 City of Richmond v. Richmond and Danville R. R. Co., 604 6. A city charter is not a contract *between the State and the city, securing to the city the absolute power of taxation, beyond the control or modification of the Legislature. Idem, 604 7. The power of exemption, as well as the power of taxation, is an essential element of sovereignty; and can only be surrendered or diminished in plain and explicit terms. Idem, 604 8. Municipal corporations are mere auxiliaries of the government, established for the more effective administration of justice; and the power of taxation confided to them is a delegated trust. Idem, 604 9. Under the act of June 29, 1870, Sess. Acts 1869-'70, ch. 174, § 6, p. 232, a regular merchant, paying the tax on him as such, must take out the license required by the act, to authorize him to deal in junk and secondhand articles at his store. law and equity, though the trustee has not | wife may subject the property to pay the Hale v. Horne & als., 112 2. M conveys land to H in trust to secure 1. The payment by H to M was in his 3. Though the bill seeks to set aside the 3. For the principles upon which trustees See opinion of Christian, J. Davis, comm'r v. Harman & als., 952 521 attended with great if not irreparable loss to 9. See Contracts, No. 8, and · 619 1. In an action against the maker and four 2. When bond and deed of trust not usuri- 3. What a contract of hazard, and not usury. Hilb, for, &c. v. Peyton &als., VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 386 By a contract in writing, R C sells to NC 4. A commissioner who, under the direc- 5. It is the duty of a trustee in a deed to 15, and 7. Real estate is conveyed to a trustee for reserves. 3. RC having sued N C at law upon the 4. A purchaser of land for value without |