I want to thank you for this opportunity to talk to you, but I do hope you folks will invite me back again on a more pleasant occasion, an occasion when maybe I can tell a few jokes and we all can have a good time together. [Loud, prolonged applause.]

Mr. BRITTAIN. The purpose of this was to make it perfectly clear where we all stand.

Now, then, we are starting a new period, and I hope that we can all forget our differences here in school, and we can go about this thing in an orderly manner. Our purpose is to educate you. We cannot do so unless you want to be educated. That is perfectly clear. We hope that you will go into this thing with that spirit.

Now, to get you out of here, I would like for someone to play. Do we have any students who want to play? Where are they? Here is a chance for you to appear on TV.

[Luke Clark, a senior, closed the assembly meeting with a medley of tunes on the piano. Whereupon, at 9: 15 a. m., the meeting was concluded.]

Senator ERVIN. I would also like to put this in the record: On February 22, 1957 I sent to the Attorney General of the United States the following letter:

Dear Mr. ATTORNEY GENERAL: After you gave your testimony concerning the incidents in Court House Township precinct in Camden County, Bolivia precinct in Brunswick County, and Snow Hill precinct in Greene County, N. C., I contacted the North Carolina State Board of Elections and made inquiry concerning these incidents.

I was informed by the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections that these instances were called to the attention of the North Carolina State Board of Elections by the field secretary of the NAACP in North Carolina, immediately after their alleged occurrence; that the North Carolina State Board of Elections immediately directed the chairman of the county boards of elections in Camden, Brunswick, and Greene Counties to investigate these complants; that pursuant to such directions the chairman of the county boards of elections in these counties investigated the complaints and caused proper corrective action to be taken; and that no further complaints were made to the North Carolina State Board of Elections in respect to such precincts either in the primary election of 1956, when these complaints arose, or the general election of 1956.

When you made your statement before the Subcommitte on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, you stated that you based your statement concerning these three precincts on FBI reports. The purpose of this letter is to request that you review the FBI reports relating to these three precincts and advise me by letter whether such FBI reports contradict or corroborate the information given me by the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections..

I mailed that letter to the Attorney General on February 22, 1957 and thus far have received no reply from the Attorney General. For that reason I desire to make this statement:

In presenting his prepared statement to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Attorney General cited incidents in 3 of North Carolina's 2,400 precincts to justify his assertion that Congress should adopt his recommendations for legislation in the so-called civil rights field-legislation which would empower the Attorney General to strike down at his arbitrary discretion statutes of States prescribing administrative remedies in registration and voting matters.

The precincts mentioned by the Attorney General were Court House Township in Camden County, Bolivia Township in Brunswick County, and Snow Hill Township in Greene County.

The Attorney General based his statement as to the incidents in these precincts upon reports allegedly made by FBI agents to the Department of Justice.

Upon hearing the statement of the Attorney General, I contacted the office of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, which board, incidentally, is composed of 5 of North Carolina's finest citizens, 3 of them being Democrats and 2 being Republicans.

I have been advised by the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections that the alleged incidents occurred in May 1956, in connection with registration for the 1956 primary; that the alleged incidents were called to the attention of the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections by the field secretary for the NAACP; that the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections immediately called upon the chairmen of the county boards of elections in the 3 counties including these precincts for investigation and action; that the chairmen of the country boards of elections in the 3 counties concerned investigated these alleged incidents and caused corrections conforming to law to be made in all cases where correction was required; and that no further complaint of any kind was received from anyone concerning the 3 precincts in question at any time thereafter.

If the information furnished me by the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections be correct, then the situation of which the Attorney General made complaint on the basis of alleged FBI reports was corrected under State administrative laws within a few days after the incidents arose, and the incidents in question afford no factual foundation whatsoever for the assertion of the Attorney General that they justify the enactment of a law which will enable the Attorney General to strike down at his arbitrary discretion statutes prescribing State administrative remedies in such cases.

While the Attorney General was before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, I requested him to make available to the subcommittee all of the data collected by the FBI in its investigation of these three incidents. I recognize that FBI reports should be kept confidential when the officials of the Department of Justice confine their use to their proper scope, namely, the determination of whether or not proceedings should be instituted against the persons who are the subjects of such reports. In my opinion, however, an official of the Department of Justice who gives his interpretation of FBI reports to a congressional committee for the purpose of inducing it to approve legislation advocated by him cannot justify withholding the original reports from the congressional committee in question. Such committee ought to inspect the original of such reports so that its members may determine for themselves the inferences rightfully to be drawn from such reports.

For this reason, I renew my request of the Attorney General that he present to the committee the full FBI reports relating to the incidents in these three North Carolina precincts.

The subcommittee is entitled to know whether the full FBI reports relating to these three precincts contradict or corroborate the information furnished me by the executive secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections to the effect that where needed correction was made in each of these precincts within a few days after the complaints arose by the North Carolina election officials under the administrative laws of North Carolina-laws which the Attorney General wishes to have the power to destroy at his election, I just want to make one further observation.

When the Attorney General was testifying he stated in substance that perhaps there were statutes of the United States which authorized the Attorney General of the United States to institute suits similar in character to those which he would be authorized to institute by sections 3 and 4 of S. 83.

The Attorney General stated that he would attempt to point out such statutes to the subcommittee.

Since that time neither the Attorney General nor any other official of the Department of Justice has pointed out to the subcommittee any similar statutes whatever.

During such spare time as I have had at my disposal, I have attempted to find some such statute, and I have been unable to find any statute which reasonably approximates the provisions of the bill which the Attorney General recommends that Congress should enact into law. I believe that I have been unable to find any such statutes because no such statutes exist. I here and now challenge the Department of Justice to point out to this subcommittee, any statutes similar to the provisions which the Attorney General urges us to enact into law by adopting S. 83.

Is there any further statement by anybody?

Senator Thomas C. Hennings, the chairman of this subcommittee, has asked me to make the following announcement:

*** for public notice and for the record that the record will be kept open until noon eastern standard time, Friday, March 8, 1957, for the receipt of statements filed for printing in the record of these hearings.

Senator Hennings advises me that he knows of at least two United States Senators who have prepared statements which they desire to insert in the record. I make this announcement of the fact that the record will be kept open until noon on Friday, March 8, 1957, so that any persons interested in the matter may govern themselves accordingly.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE, DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, March 5, 1957.

Hon. SAM. J. ERVIN, Jr.,

United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SAM: If I am not able to be present at the hearing of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in room 457, Senate Office Building at 10 a. m., on Tuesday, March 5, 1957 (the last day for scheduled witnesses in current public hearings on pending civil rights legislation), I would appreciate it if you would announce for public notice and for the record that the record will be kept open until noon eastern standard time, Friday, March 8, 1957, for the receipt of statements filed for printing in the record of these hearings.

I know of at least two United States Senators who have prepared statements but have not submitted them to the subcommittee as yet, although I am quite sure the Senators desire to have these statements printed in our record. I am told this is true, also, for one or two Members of the United States House of Representatives.

Again I want to thank you, Sam, for your cooperation in holding these hearings and especially for your courtesy in acting as chairman at times I have not been able to be present due to the demands of other Senate duties.

Cordially yours,

THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr. Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.

Mr. SLAYMAN. And we also hope we can receive this report from the Department of Justice.

Senator ERVIN. We also hope that we will receive any report that the Department of Justice may make in reference to any matters mentioned or any other matters the Department may wish to call our attention to.

Acting at the request of the American Civil Liberties Union, I ask that the following statement concerning the injunction issued in the school integration case at Clinton, Tenn., be printed in the record of the hearings on the civil rights bill.

(The statement referred to follows:)

PUBLIC STATEMENT ON LEGAL PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM INTEGRATION CONFLICT IN CLINTON, TENN,, BY AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NEW YORK, N. Y. The conflict in Clinton, Tenn., concerning enforcement of the United States Supreme Court decision that segregation in public school education is unconstitutional has caused many persons to question whether civil liberties were violated.

The American Civil Liberties Union, a national nonpartisan organization, has been asked by the press, our members, and other people to comment on the legal developments from our special point of interest, civil liberties. This analysis should be read against the following background:

(1) The ACLU believes that equality before the law is a vital part of our civil liberties structure and this constitutional guaranty should be fully observed. We support the Supreme Court's decision on school integration as constitutionally correct, and we urge all citizens to obey the Court's ruling; (2) the ACLU protects the civil liberties-free speech, due process and equality-of all Americans, regardless of their opinions. Our interest lies only in defense of civil liberties, not in the views or the philosophy of the individual or group whose rights may be under attack; (3) the ACLU does not believe in the use of force to achieve a social objective, and has never conceived civil liberties defense to embrace overt acts of violence. We abhor and condemn the use of force by those who oppose integration, in the original incident last fall and the more recent outbreak of bombings.

The Clinton, Tenn., problem originated with the Federal court order of January 4, 1956, that the Anderson County school authorities should integrate the high school by the fall of 1956, an order implementing the Supreme Court's decision. The school board complied with the order but opposition developed, centered around John Kaspar. When Kaspar and his followers sought to prevent the order from being carried out, the school board and law enforcement officials requested an injunction from the Federal court to enjoin interference with its order. Kaspar continued to defy the injunction, was cited for contempt of court and found guilty. He has appealed to the United States court of appeals, contesting the validity of the injunction itself and his contempt conviction. Subsequent to Kaspar's arrest and conviction, 16 other persons were arrested on a contempt charge for interfering with the injunction and are now free on bail awaiting trial.

Three major civil liberties questions have been raised by these events: (1) Does the injunction itself interfere with the rights of free speech and association; (2) can citizens who disagree with an injunction and oppose it be charged with contempt of court; (3) was the right to trial by jury denied in the contempt proceedings.

THE INJUNCTION

Before discussing the free speech aspects of the injunction, we emphasize our belief that the school officials charged with the responsibility for carrying out the Supreme Court's decision had the right and duty to seek aid from the Federal court when, in their opinion, they were prevented from discharging their responsibility. They were only complying with the law of the land, which must be upheld. Technical arguments that the request for injunctive relief should have been filed as a separate case, rather than as supplemental petition to McSwain et al. v. County Board of Education, in our view are without merit. The petition for injunctive relief referred to "scurrilous literature," advo

cating the ignoring of court orders, painting of signs, anonymous telephone calls. actively advising the crowd and urging disregard of the orders.

The injunction issued by Judge Robert Taylor enjoins Kaspar and five other persons, "their agents, servants, representatives, attorneys and all other persons who are acting or may act in concert with them *** from further hindering, obstructing, or in any wise interfering with the carrying out of the aforesaid order of this Court, or from picketing Clinton High School, either by words or acts or otherwise."

The key section of the prohibition is "by words or acts or otherwise," and the acts prohibited are "hindering, obstructing, or in any wise interfering with the aforesaid order," and "picketing."

Before freedom of speech and association, guaranteed by the first amendment, can be curbed, it must be examined to see if it will directly cause an actual breach of the peace or if it will create a clear and present danger that the peace will be broken. This standard has guided the ACLU in other free speech cases far removed from the integration controversy, such as alleged subversion and mass picketing by labor unions and other groups.

We recognize that in tense social situations, it is difficult to determine exactly where the line of clear and present danger is, where speech goes outside the area of opinion and incites to violence. But the first amendment requires that such a line be drawn. For the sake of our free society, whose freedom is preserved by the free exchange of all kinds and shades of opinion, curbs on the first amendment guaranties should be allowed only when the danger is clear. Mere advocacy, in the Clinton case urging the ignoring of the law or judicial orders, should not be prohibited. As we said at the beginning of this statement, the ACLU supports the Supreme Court decision and urges all citizens to obey it. But if some citizens choose to oppose the decision by peaceful means, through speech, they have the constitutional right to do so. Mere picketing to express a point of view, in the absence of intimidation, should not be enjoined. So we believe the blanket prohibition against picketing of the Clinton High School is invalid. Without direct incitement to definite acts of individual or joint obstructiveness or interference, coupled with a clear and present danger that these acts will take place immediately, the injunction is too broad and interferes with free speech.

However, the prohibition in the injunction as to overt acts of "hindering" or "obstructing" the integration order is different. Such overt acts cannot claim the protection of free speech. Whether or not such acts have occurred is a matter of proof to be determined at the contempt hearing. But because a contempt conviction can result in a criminal penalty, we believe the acts prohibited must be reasonably spelled out so that the persons enjoined will know in advance what they cannot do. We believe that this criterion can be applied to the acts of "hindering" or "obstructing," but not to acts of "otherwise interfering with" the court order.

The argument also has been advanced that the injunction is defective because it covers too wide a range of persons; for example, the reading of the injunction before the Clinton High School assembly by law enforcement officials was interpreted as applying the injunction to all of the students. We do not agree. While the officials had the right to point out what the law is, the injunction enjoins only persons "who are acting or may act in concert" with the persons specifically named. This activity is to be judged, by evidence, at the contempt hearing.

To sum up our conclusions concerning the injunction, we believe it is too broad in its scope to be constitutionally valid. To the extent that it enjoins overt acts of hindering and obstructing the enforcement of the integration order, it is valid. To the extent that it enjoins speech in opposition to or advocating ignoring of the order, or peaceful picketing for these purposes, it is invalid.

CONTEMPT OF COURT ACTION

Under our democratic system of government the courts have an assigned role to interpret the law under which the people live. To fulfill this function, the authority of court decisions, the law, must be preserved, and the Congress by statute has laid down the procedure by which the Federal courts may punish contempt of its authority. For this reason a court injunction, the law, must be obeyed until its validity can be decided by higher courts, even though the individual or group believes the injunction is wrong. This principle is not new. It has been applied in many other situations, for example, in labor disputes