SELF-LOVE AND VIRTUE

RECONCILED ONLY BY RELIGION;

OR, AN ARGUMENT,

TO PROVE THAT THE ONLY EFFECTUAL OBLIGATION OF MANKIND TO PRACTISE VIRTUE, DEPENDS ON THE EXISTENCE AND WILL OF GOD, &c,

SECTION I.

THE GENERAL PROPOSAL OF THE SUBJECT.

IT has been a great controversy, whether the rules of virtue, and our obligations to

practise them, be eternal and immutable in themselves, antecedent to our conceptions of the being of a God; or whether they depend on his will and appointment. In things which are merely speculative, it is very evident and certain, that there are many eternal and unchangeable truths; as, "two and two make four: a circle is most comprehensive of all figures, and a right angle is larger than an acute." Note, By eternal truths we can mean no more than this; that in whatsoever moment of the eternity, past or to come, these ideal truths were or shall be proposed to an intelligent being, they must be assented to, and acknowledged to be true: But any real, eternal existence of them, cannot be supposed, without a God, in whose mind alone they could exist.

And when we call them unchangeable, our meaning is this, that we cannot conceive it possible, that any circumstances, or situation of things, or even the will of a God, should ever alter the nature of these truths, or make them cease to be true. But the case is not quite so evident to us, and so indisputable with regard to moral or practical subjects, however these may be supposed to be as certain in themselves. It may admit of a doubt, whether all the rules of virtue, and more especially, whether the obligations of mankind to practise them, are eternal and unchangeable; and that even before the supposition of the existence of a God, or without any regard to such a supreme Governor.

It must be granted, that there are persons of known learning and piety who have chosen this side of the question: And yet it must be acknowledged too, that it grates a little upon some religious minds, to hear of eternal and unchangeable obligations lying on men, which are independent on the will or appointment of God; or even upon a supposition there were no God. I would not choose to see such sort of suppositions introduced, if it be possible to secure the rules and practice of virtue without them. I think that these eternal rules of virtue, whatsoever they be, and especially our obligations to practise them, stand in such a close connection with the being and the will of God, as Governor of the world, that if one could help it they should not be even divided and separated in thought.

But since these sort of suppositions are and will be made, I beg leave to examine, according to the best rules of my reason, how far this doctrine of eternal and unchangeable obligations to practise virtue may be supported; and I will endeavour it in these following positions:

SECTION II.

THERE ARE ETERNAL FITNESSES IN HUMAN ACTIONS AND IN DIVINÈ.

Ir is granted, there is an eternal fitness and unfitness of things in nature, or if I might so express it, in our ideas of the natural world, which do not depend on the will or appointment of God; and these are perfectly unchangeable. "A globe is not fit to fill up the space of a hollow cube; nor is a triangle fit to fill up the area of a circle." Note, By the eternal fitness of things, we must understand the same as before I said concerning eternal truths, viz. that in themselves they are mere abstracted ideas; and can have no real, eternal existence but in the mind of God. Let it be observed also that this eternal fitness of things does not require the actual existence of these things from eternity: If the mere ideas of these things have a necessary connection together, they may be called eternal fitnesses, in the sense I have explained. I think there can remain no reasonable doubt or contest upon this matter. The supposition of a God, or no God, seems to make no alteration in these abstracted ideas.

There seems also to be an eternal fitness or unfitness in the actions of single, rational and sensible beings. Note, Though we are here speaking chiefly of mankind, yet I call every rational being sensible, whether it be united to flesh or blood or no; because it is conscious and perceptive of pleasure or pain, happiness or misery. I say therefore, it is fit that every rational being should preserve itself, at least so far as it may be made happy; and it is unfit it should destroy itself, or permit its own destruction. It is fit a rational being should seek its own general, ultimate, or supreme happiness ;* and it is unfit that such a being should procure its own misery, or permit it, if he can avoid it. Nature, self-love, and reason, seem to dictate the same thing. This self-preservation and self-felicitation, are inwrought in our natural constitution; and our rational powers confirm it. These may be called single or personal duties of nature, or natural obligations, considering nature both as sensible and rational.

There seems also an eternal fitness and unfitness of things in the social life. It is fit that rational, social beings should make one another easy and happy, and preserve each other's life and peace; and it seems unfit that any of them should make their neighbours uneasy and unhappy, or that they should destroy them. It is fit therefore that social beings should keep their contracts, should do justice to all around them, should not rob or steal one another's property; and that they should love each other, and do good, and be grateful to their benefactors. This is properly called "social virtue."

* I use the words "general, ultimate and supreme happiness," to distinguish it from any particular present pleasures, which a man may and ought to deny or refuse by the mere rules of reason, when they stand in competition with his general and ultimate happiness.

+ These expressions are general indeed, and must include some limitation; but the reason and nature of things gives this plain limitation to them, viz. When men have not forfeited their life or their ease, by criminal actions, they are to be treated well by their fellow-beings,

All these seem to be rules derived from the very nature of things; that is, supposing such rational, and sensible, and social beings to exist, they are directed by the eternal reason of things to behave with justice and goodness towards each other. These rules seem to carry an obligation with them by the light of reason. Note, by the word obligation" in this place, we cannot mean any authoritative or suasive influence from the will, or law, or authority of a superior; since we are speaking of the eternal fitness of these things, without any consideration of the being of a God. Obligation, in this place therefore, can mean nothing but the mere reasonable fitness of our doing or not doing such or such a thing in social life; or that this is the dictate of our reasoning powers.

If there be a God, an universal Maker and supreme Lord of all, there are eternal truths and fitnesses which relate to himself, viz. that he must always act according to the perfections of his nature as a single, self-existent and supreme being. That he is not always bound by the same rules which bind social beings or fellow-creatures; for he is not bound to do all the good he can, or to hinder all the evil he can. Again; that God cannot alienate his own right to any thing, or give it irrevocably to a creature, but by his own express promise; and therefore his gifts, without an absolute promise, are but loans, resumable at pleasure. That he cannot originally make a creature sinful or miserable. That he has a right to the obedience of his creatures. That he cannot command his creatures to do any thing unfit to be done. That he will be just and true to all his creatures; and that he will not finally deal alike with the righteous and the wicked. There is therefore a reward for the righteous, &c. I mention all these here, though they are not all necessary to my present subject; yet it is good to keep them much in our view, in order to justify God in many parts of his divine conduct.

Now if there actually be a God, these eternal truths or fitnesses may be said, in some sense, to lay an obligation on God to act according to them, that is, his perfections are such that he will govern and regulate his own actions constantly and unchangeably by these eternal fitnesses or unfitnesses of things: For since he is self-sufficient for his own preservation and happiness; and since none of these eternal fitnesses or unfitnesses can possibly stand in opposition to his own eternal being or blessedness, nor can they bring any inconvenience on him, he can have no possible motive, or reason, or obligation to act contrary to this fitness or unfitness of things; and the rectitude of his own nature seems unchangeably to require such a conduct.

And if this be granted, then there is a sufficient foundation laid for the proof of all God's moral attributes by our ideas of his natural perfections, and our ideas of the eternal rules of justice, veracity and goodness; and there is sufficient assurance that he will act according to them.

SECTION III.

IN HUMAN ACTIONS THESE FITNESSES MAY CONTRADICT EACH OTHER.

BUT in beings of an inferior nature, before we consider whether there be a God or no, the case is not the same; for it is possible that some of these rules of reason, or at least, the obligations to practise them, may, seemingly, or really clash with each other. As for instance, in what we have called single or personal duties: Do we not all agree, that

a man is obliged to preserve his own life, and also to make himself happy by such a steady dictate of his own nature, as seems essential or eternal? Is not this piece of self-love inwrought into his very constitution and frame of nature? And do not his reasoning powers confirm it? But Miserino lies in extreme anguish of gout or stone, or broken limbs; and he seems to be encouraged, and even required, by his reasoning powers, to try to divest himself of all life, and of all possible happiness together; for he judges it better not to be, than to be miserable. In this case self-murder, or the destruction of his being, would be a dictate of reason; for it would be a sort of self-felicitation, though it stands directly contrary to self-preservation.

Again, in another case of single or personal duties. Philedon is a gentleman of good reason and learning, but of such strong and importunate passions and appetites, that every degree of restraint is a sensible pain to him. He sat down in a very calm and composed hour to judge whether he should pursue pleasure or virtue. His reason told him much of the eternal fitness of things, and what a noble victory it would be to deny his appetites and govern his passions; and that he was obliged, by the fitness of things, to follow the rules of strict virtue constantly. But on the other hand, self-love and nature, with their strong sensibilities represented to him the constant and intense toil, the uneasy fatigue and pain of contradicting the dictates of his nature and his appetite of pleasure; and that he never would have one easy day in the course of strict virtue. His reason balanced these things together, and finally resolved, that both his own rational powers, and the fitness of things, required that Philedon should pursue his highest happiness, and that was to indulge his sensual inclinations in the highest degree; for this was the ultimate happiness he could expect: And as soon as he found diseases, or pains, or poverty come upon him, he might finish them all at once by a dagger, or by opium, and thus enter into eternal ease and indolence. Now in this case all his obligations to personal virtue, as well as to self-preservation, seem to be out-reasoned and overcome by the dictates of self-felicitation.

And there are yet plainer instances of such contradictions between single and social duties, viz. Famelico, a strong man, lies starving; and he sees his weaker and hungry neighbour with one only piece of bread in his hand; reason dictates that the strong man should not rob his neighbour of his property, especially where this property is his very life: And yet reason, self-love and nature, join to dictate that Famelico should save his own life, and procure his own ease from the pain of hunger; which he can do no otherwise but by taking away the bread, and perhaps life from his neighbour. Again, Naufragus is just drowning; but he sees his neighbour supported by a little plank, which is just big enough to save one man's life; reason and virtue dictate that, though he be stronger, he should not drown his neighbour, by taking away the plank: Yet his reason and nature seem to dictate also, that Naufragus should save himself, though it be by taking the plank away from his weaker neighbour, and leave him to be drowned. Yet again, reason dictates that Irus should pay what he has borrowed, and that at the promised time; and yet, perhaps, this payment takes away all his subsistence, and exposes him to extreme hunger and death; and then both reason and nature at the same time dictate, that Irus should save himself from death, or secure himself from pinching hunger, whatever his neighbour loses or suffers.

Or suppose, in a common shipwreck, a drowning man sees another near him, who has three or four such planks as would each of them save a life: Reason dictates he should