483 Opinion of the Court. guage in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary questionthe constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.13 The Attorney General Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944). 12 See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 13 "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment "(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.1 It is so ordered. limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or "(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions? "5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b), "(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; "(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach; "(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees; "(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?" 14 See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954). Syllabus. BOLLING ET AL. v. SHARPE ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 8. Argued December 10-11, 1952.-Reargued December 8-9, 1953. Decided May 17, 1954. Racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial to Negro children of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 498-500. (a) Though the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the States, the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive. P. 499. (b) Discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. P. 499. (c) Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. Pp. 499-500. (d) In view of this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ante, p. 483, that the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. P. 500. (e) The case is restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the form of the decree. P. 500. George E. C. Hayes and James M. Nabrit, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners on the original argument and on the reargument. With them on the briefs were George M. Johnson and Herbert O. Reid, Jr. Charles W. Quick was also on the brief on the reargument. Milton D. Korman argued the cause for respondents on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs were Vernon E. West, Chester H. Gray and Lyman J. Umstead. Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause on the reargument for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip Elman filed a brief on the original argument for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae supporting petitioners were filed by S. Walter Shine, Sanford H. Bolz and Samuel B. Groner for the American Council on Human Rights et al.; by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American Federation of Teachers; and by Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia. The petitioners, minors of the Negro race, allege that such segregation deprives them of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused admission to a public school attended by white children solely because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court for the District of Columbia in obtaining admission. That court dismissed their complaint. The Court granted a writ of certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question presented. 344 U. S. 873. We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.' The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat 1 Brown v. Board of Education, ante, p. 483. 497 Opinion of the Court. different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle "that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race." And in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his property to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law. Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a 2 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 13-14; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 585. › Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 591. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 198-199. |