DOUGLAS, J., dissenting,. 347 U.S. of counsel to make oral argument and without any opinion by the Court. These appeals should not be added to that growing list. New York and New Jersey made a Compact, approved by Congress, for the regulation of employment on the waterfront of New York.* The agency through which the plan is effected is the Waterfront Commission, composed of one representative of New York and one of New Jersey. It has charge of the employment of all longshoremen. A longshoremen's register is established; and no one can be employed unless he is on the register. The Commission "may in its discretion" deny an applicant the right to register -if he has been convicted of treason, murder, manslaughter, illegal possession of firearms, possessing burglar's instruments, receiving stolen property, unlawful entry of a building, aiding an escape from prison, unlawfully possessing or distributing habitforming drugs, or -if he is a Communist or teaches the Communist creed, or -if in the judgment of the Commission, his presence on the waterfront would constitute "a danger to the public peace or safety." Two main questions are at once suggested. First, are the standards by which men are deprived of the right to work constitutional? This is a new question on which the Court has never ruled. May a state prescribe standards for employment that have no relevancy to the competency of the men to perform the work? Under this Compact a man who, in a reckless moment, runs over a person in his car and kills him and is convicted *See McKinney's N. Y. Unconsolidated Laws (Cum. Pamph. Jan. 1954), § 6700-aa et seq.; N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23; 67 Stat. 541. 439 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. of manslaughter, apparently stands disqualified for employment. So does a Communist, whether he be of the cloak-and-dagger variety or a paler type. Are those criteria constitutional? An individual who is deprived of employment for such a reason could raise the question. But if the standard itself has no relevancy to the competency of men to do the work, why may not the Compact be tested at the very threshold? This is a substantial question which our cases do not answer. We write here on a slate that is fairly clean, except for remote analogies. Second, are these provisions of the Compact which disqualify men from employment unconstitutional as a bill of attainder? A few years ago Congress struck certain federal employees from the payroll because Congress thought they were "subversives." We held that that disqualification for employment without a judicial trial was a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. Here the state legislatures, with the approval of Congress, have not done precisely that. But they have come close to it by defining a proscribed class and barring them from employment-again without a judicial trial. Cf. Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716. Perhaps a way could be found to sustain all the challenged provisions of the Compact. Perhaps they could be so construed as to save any and all individual rights. But the motion to dismiss or affirm (26 pages long) and the reply to it (51 pages long) in No. 557 only stir these profound questions and do not put them at rest. The right to work-which goes to the very heart of our way of life is at stake in these appeals. If we conclude that the Compact is constitutional, we should give our reasons so that all interests will be protected. Congress expected as much in all but frivolous cases coming here by appeal. BARSKY v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 69. Argued January 4, 1954. Decided April 26, 1954. Pursuant to §§ 6514 and 6515 of the New York State Education Law, authorizing disciplinary action against any physician "convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state, of a crime," appellant's license to practice as a physician was suspended for six months, because he had been convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, under 2 U. S. C. § 192, of failing to produce before a Congressional Committee certain papers subpoenaed by that Committee. Held: The New York law, on its face or as so construed and applied, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 443–456. (a) The decision of the highest state court that a violation of 2 U. S. C. § 192, though not a crime under New York law, was a "crime" within the meaning of § 6514-2 (b) of the State Education Law, is conclusive here. P. 448. (b) Section 6514-2 (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. P. 448. (c) The subsequent designation of certain other contempts of Congress as federal "crimes" (18 U. S. C. § 402) does not prevent a violation of 2 U. S. C. § 192 from being a "crime" within the meaning of the New York law. P. 449, n. 8. (d) The establishment and enforcement of standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of its people is a vital part of a state's police power. P. 449. (e) The practice of medicine is a privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary power to fix the terms of admission. P. 451. (f) A state's legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct extends beyond initial licensing. P. 451. (g) The suspension of appellant's license because of his conviction in a foreign jurisdiction, for an offense not involving moral turpitude and not criminal under New York law, does not so far transcend the State's legitimate concern in professional standards as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 451-452. 442 Opinion of the Court. (h) The provisions of § 6515 of the State Education Law prescribing the procedure for disciplinary action are, on their face, reasonable and satisfy the requirements of due process. Pp. 452-453. (i) The record in this case does not support a conclusion that the Board of Regents, in fixing the measure of discipline at a six months' suspension of appellant's license as a physician, made an arbitrary or capricious decision or relied upon irrelevant evidence. Pp. 453-456. 305 N. Y. 89, 691, 111 N. E. 2d 222, 112 N. E. 2d 773, affirmed. Abraham Fishbein argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Henry S. Manley, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General, and Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General. MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question here presented is whether the New York State Education Law,' on its face or as here construed and applied, violates the Constitution of the United States by authorizing the suspension from practice, for six months, of a physician because he has been convicted, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of failing to produce, before a Committee of the United States House of Representatives, certain papers subpoenaed by that Committee." For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it does not. 1 McKinney's N. Y. Laws, Education Law, §§ 6514, 6515. 2 The conviction was for violating R. S. § 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U. S. C. § 192: "SEC. 102. Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House Opinion of the Court. 3 347 U.S. In 1945, the Committee of the United States House of Representatives, known as the Committee on Un-American Activities, was authorized to make investigations of "the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States." In 1946, in the course of that investigation, the Committee subpoenaed Dr. Edward K. Barsky, appellant herein, who was then the national chairman and a member of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, to produce "all books, ledgers, records and papers relating to the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or any subcommittee thereof, together with all correspondence and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries for the period from January 1, 1945, to March 29, 1946." Similar subpoenas were served on the executive secretary and the other members of the executive board of the Refugee Committee. Appellant appeared before the Congressional Committee but, pursuant to advice of counsel and the action of his executive of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." 3 "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 91 Cong. Rec. 10, 15. This was carried into the Rules of the House as Rule XI (q)(2), 60 Stat. 823, 828. * United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 60. |