The Truth of Thought: Or, Material Logic: a Short Treatise on the Initial Philosophy, the Groundwork Necessary for the Consistent Pursuit of KnowledgeSilver, Burdett & Company, 1896 - 208 páginas |
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The Truth of Thought Or Material Logic: A Short Treatise on the Initial ... William Poland Sin vista previa disponible - 2009 |
The Truth of Thought Or Material Logic: A Short Treatise on the Initial ... William Poland Sin vista previa disponible - 2009 |
The Truth of Thought: Or, Material Logic, a Short Treatise on the Initial ... William Poland Sin vista previa disponible - 2018 |
Términos y frases comunes
absolute accept admit affirm analytic proposition appeal argument assent belief belongs called certitude CHAPTER cognition conclusion condition consciousness contradictory declaration dence denial deny Descartes doubt error event evidence of credibility existence experience expression external fact faculty false Fichte formal object Hegel Hence historical testimony hold human race idealist imagination individual intellect J. S. Mill James McCosh judg knowable knowing power known Laws of Thought logical truth material matter mean mediate witness ment mental act metaphysical mind moral motive nature Nominalists normal not-self objective truth objective value ontological truth organ ourselves papillæ perceived perception person philosophy physical law Positivism possess possible predicate present principle purely question reality reason recognize reflex regard scepticism scientific sense sense-perception sensus communis simply taste term testi testified theory thing thinking Thomas Reid tion touch treatise triangle truth of thought ultimate criterion ultra-realism universal idea veracity vision whilst word writers
Pasajes populares
Página 27 - If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Página 37 - ... and we should probably be as well able to conceive a round square as a hard square, or a heavy square, if it were not that, in our uniform. experience, at the instant when a thing begins to be round it ceases to be square, so that the beginning of the one impression is inseparably associated with the departure or cessation of the other. Thus our inability to form a conception always arises from our being compelled to form another contradictory to it.
Página 68 - For instance, the proposition that the square described on the hypothenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides...
Página 4 - ... a fact. And perhaps, to some unenlightened savages, the earth is flat is still a fact. A definition of fact that meets such requirements mutilates the term beyond recognition. Terminology of this sort has caused the following comment: The canons of language make it eminently unlawful that everyone who chooses to write on philosophy should be privileged to change the terminology as he pleases. The bewildering vagueness of philosophic thought, now so lamentably noticeable amongst us, is due to...
Página 59 - ... the same thing cannot both 'be' and 'not be' at the same time and in the same sense, and we are landed in utter and complete scepticism.
Página 38 - ... our inability to form a conception always arises from our being compelled to form another contradictory to it. We cannot conceive time or space as having an end, because the idea of any portion whatever of time or space is inseparably associated with the idea of a time or space beyond it. We cannot conceive two and two as five, because an inseparable association compels us to conceive it as four...
Página 54 - I can not rid myself; and I hold to it. The midnight glory of the stars presents itself to me as a something which excludes the element of myself. I have, thereupon, a conviction of that something, as strong as the conviction of my own thought; and simultaneously I have a conviction that that something is distinct from me. Of this conviction, certified in the perception of what is evident, I can not rid myself; and I hold to it.
Página 155 - ... charged with making the general and uniform consent of mankind the ultimate criterion of truth. William Poland 106 is careful to point out that this does not seem to be the real thought of Reid, however, and he cites the following passage from a manuscript still extant to substantiate his position: Evidence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and selfevidence is the strongest possible ground of belief, and he who desires reason for believing what is self-evident knows not what he means.
Página 37 - It belongs to metaphysics to treat of principles ; but the first principle of all, is, that the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time...
Página 154 - The Scottish school of philosophy, of which we may regard Thomas Reid as the proper exponent, has been charged with making the sensus communis (the general and uniform consent of the human race) the court of appeal for truth and certitude, to the extent that when we question the authority of this court we are thrown back upon the blind instinct of men to believe.