barding fleet must assume. The entire practice of all civilized nations is based on this principle, and every European coast may be cited in proof that this is an accepted and verified doctrine. As adjuncts, and in cases where adequate permanent batteries are excluded by the configuration of the locality, resort may or must be had to armed merchant ships, or steamers, floating batteries, gun-boats, etc., which, though very temporary in character, and costly in proportion to their efficiency, may be made to give a tolerable defense, if in sufficient force, and if prepared in time. We know of no respectable military authority, adverse to the principle of permanent sea-coast batteries, while we do know of very many testimonies, both military and naval, strongly commending their efficiency. Some persons, carried away by partial views, or lacking real knowledge of the case, have loudly proclaimed their skepticism. Others, advocates of pet schemes, hobby riders, maggot-brained inventors, charlatans, and paradox hunters, denounce to clear the ground for themselves. Some officers of the navy have written down their skepticism, in couth or uncouth style. Some of these have been mistaken, some ignorant, some rash, and some have wished to tear down the fortification system to substitute an infinite navy, and thus achieve astounding promotion. Tenfold more than an offset are the opinions of men like Com. Stewart, Com. Morris, Capt. Dupont, and, indeed, of all those most distinguished for professional skill and sound judgment.

From all that has now been advanced, we shall regard as established these general propositions: that wars must be expected in time to come as in times past; that the United States ought to anticipate the contingencies of collisions with the first class powers of Europe; that grand descents and bombardments along our sea-board are the chief dangers to be apprehended; that we cannot look to our navy for their vention; that we ought not to tie our own vessels to our own coasts; that foreign and American authorities and experience clearly indicate permanent defenses as the best security for an exposed sea-board; and that our true policy is, to provide such a system of heavy water batteries, or harbor forts, as will enable us to repel all probable

pre

attacks on our sea-ports, navy-yards, or dépôts, and also to secure our most important harbors and roadsteads as refuges for our own marine, while we, by the same means, close them against all enemies.

We will now present a brief statement of the history, character, progress, and armaments of our sea-coast fortifications.

Soon after the organization of our government, when the memory of war was fresh, and while the French revolution was convulsing the nations, the need of fortifications was strongly felt. The old revolutionary works were temporary and inadequate. Poor as our country then was, and extensive as was our coast, the best that could be done was, to throw up some imperfectly-planned and cheaply-built forts and batteries; this was done with hearty good will. After the attack on the Chesapeake, large appropriations were made, and so vigorously applied, that the war of 1812 found us with no small show of preparation. Every important town had its covering forts or earthen batteries, which, though small and weak in their profile, at least saved the towns from marauding and petty attacks. They served an excellent purpose, and at Baltimore, Mobile, and Stonington, fought British naval forces with distinguished success. Fort Washington was disgracefully abandoned, and its commander cashiered for cowardice; else Washington might not have been burn

ed.

The insufficiency of this system of hasty defenses was so strongly felt, both by our government and people, that no time was lost after the peace in undertaking its improvement. A board of our most distinguished naval and engineer officers was organized in 1816, and laid the foundation of our present system of sea-coast defenses. It was fortunate that our naval heroes were no less men of judgment, and that engineers of such eminent ability and professional skill were then to be found in our service as the brilliant and lamented Col. Wm. McRee, Col. J. G. Totten, our present Chief-Engineer, and Maj. (now Col.) S. Thayer-a rare and honored trio. The first two served on this board, as also did Gen. Bernard, one of Bonaparte's favorite engineers, who came to this country at Mr. Calhoun's special solicitation. His fresh

acquaintance with European defensive ideas was, doubtless, of some advantage, though it led to two of the most objectionable features of our existing system. To him Fort Monroe, at old Point Comfort, Va., owes all its essential features, and especially its great magnitude, which called forth the celebrated and misunderstood criticism of Gen. Cass. This board proceeded to a thorough study of our entire seacoast, in relation to its systematic defense. Its harbors, rivers, and bays were closely scrutinized for the selection of sites for the works required. Their relations to our commerce and to naval operations were specially canvassed, as well for the location of navy-yards and d pots as for their bearings in protecting our navigation, and in covering our interior waters. It was considered particularly desirable to keep an enemy as far off seaward as possible. By forcing him to combat at the greatest attainable distance from the towns to be covered, time would be gained for concentrating troops to oppose his land advance, and the towns themselves would be saved the injuries of a close contest. Indeed, every effort was made to introduce, in these studies, all the essential strategic elements of the problem.

The result was, a general selection of military and naval sites, and a determination of the proper strength and of the relative importance of all the proposed defensive works. These forts were classified according to their defensive importance, and this scale of gradation was assumed as the guide to indicate the proper order of succession in constructing the several works. This was rendered necessary by the number of works required, and by the limitation of our resources, which prohibited their simultaneous erection.

As to the style of work which should be adopted, some general principles were laid down and applied. The essential object in all cases was, to bring a certain number of heavy guns to bear, with the maximum advantage, on the channels to be closed, or the waters to be commanded. In determining this amount of fire, the importance of the locality, both commercial and strategic, had to be carefully considered. Each detail, of the site and of the waters to be commanded, had its influence. Then these guns had to be made secure from capture by parties sent on shore, as VOL. VII.-21

guns which could thus be spiked, with no serious obstruction, would be no secure defense. Hence the water batteries had to be inclosed, and brought within a scarp wall, of height sufficient to interdict escalade or a coup de main. To prevent the planting of scaling-ladders, or the establishment of breaching mines, along this scarp, such flanking arrangements had to be adopted as that the entire face and foot of this scarp should be seen from within, and commanded by an effective fire. Moreover, in such localities as were beyond the reach of speedy and overwhelming succor, it was necessary so to mask this scarp with covering banks of earth, that an enemy could not, by establishing batteries at a distance, effect a practicable breach through it, and so, in some two or three days, penetrate through the inclosure. Enough must be given an enemy to do, to afford full time for sending a succoring army against him; hence outworks, demi-lunes, mines, etc., must be so much accumulated on the points open to attack, as to compel at least an equal interval for the enemy's approaches, before he can breach the scarp. On the water fronts, it was desirable to accumulate as many guns as possible; hence arrangements were made to place them in two, three, or four tiers, or stories, according to the height of the scarp. Since the water fronts cannot, as a general thing, be breached by land batteries, or by the unsteady random fire of ships, no earthen covers along their scarps were thought necessary; hence these walls were pierced with embrasures for as many guns as they would conveniently cover, while a line of barbette guns was arranged to fire over their tops. Accommodations had to be provided for the garrisons, and for this bomb-proof arches, or casemates, were employed as a security in bombardments, both for men, stores, and

ness and a minimum cost of repairs would be insured.

On such principles the work for each site was determined. In some places, the danger of land attacks was small; then the earthen cover was omitted. In some instances, shoals were chosen as sites; then compact, castellated works were designed. In some, only a small fire was needed; then the works were restricted in proportion. Each locality had its peculiarities, and demanded a special solution; but in all cases there were distinct rational principles to be applied. Doubtless some mistakes, of greater or less magnitude, have been committed, but, as a whole, we think the system adopted was most excellent, and that its execution has been as faithful as possible. We believe it to be a fact, that our sea-coast fortifications, so far as they have been constructed, may claim a decided superiority, both in plan and in execution, over those of any other country, and that, when complete, and vitalized by garrisons, they will constitute the securest possible bulwark against bombardments, and a most important check on grand descents.

Several successive boards of engineers have continued and extended the studies of the first board, with no less talent and patriotic fidelity, applying all their skill in perfecting the plans and in regulating the important details of the several constructions. The corps of engineers, selected from the most distinguished graduates of the Military Academy, has had for its chief occupation the actual construction of these works; and there can be but one opinion as to the professional resources and sterling integrity with which this important trust has hitherto been discharged. It is certainly but a rational deference to concede respect to the deliberate and conscientious views which have been unanimously entertained by this accomplished body of men, so thoroughly and carefully trained in the highest military science-a body which contained, without being overshadowed by, such men as the Swifts, McRee, Armistead, Totten, Thayer, De Russey, Delafield, Brewerton, Courtenay, Mordecai, A. D. Bache, Brown, the Mansfields, Lee, Mahan, Bartlett, and many others, scarcely less distinguished for the highest grade of professional abilities and personal character.

The questions involved in our system

of fortifications are essentially questions of fact-pure, bold, absolute fact; not of poetry, not of speculation, not of eloquence, not of popularity, but, we repeat it, questions of downright fact. Now, in such a case, what are any man's opinions worth, who has not taken pains to inform himself thoroughly on all the essential and complex elements involved? Truly, they are so little worth, that their superabundance amounts to a bankruptcy of all sound judgment. What is the sense of taking, as leaders of opinion, men of gifted imagination and copious speech, who really know only just enough of the subject to thoroughly misunderstand it? It is a flagrant intellectual vice of our community, that we do not duly discriminate the relative value of opinions, except, indeed, where our personal interests are directly involved. The ad captandum philippics of the newspaper declaimer, and the conspicuous nonsense of Buncombe orators, are too often permitted to exercise a greater influence on the decision of our important questions of national policy than the deliberate conclusions of the true investigator, who has devoted the study of a lifetime to a calm examination of all the phases and bearings of a single great topic. In a complicated issue of natural or physical science, or of social and political fact, the deliberate opinion of one intelligent man, who has thoroughly studied the whole matter, is worth more than any possible aggregate of off-hand opinions from the uninformed. well understand the necessity for a subdivision of mechanical labor: we ought still more to appreciate the value of specializing the subdivisions of intellectual labor. We ought to understand that, on a question of fossil icthyology, the opinion of Agassiz or Hall is of more intrinsic value, to an impartial Owen or Miller, than would be the vote of twenty millions of freemen, whose knowledge might extend to every theme except palæontology.

We

The progress of our system of fortifications cannot be better exhibited than by giving a tabular statement of the individual works completed, or in progress; their respective appropriate war garrisons; their aggregate armaments when completed (not that fixed by the Board of 1854); their cost up to 1852; and the estimated cost, at that date, of completing those which were unfinished.

the very port whence war would send forth the most efficient privateers, has no protection worth mentioning. Eastport, Gloucester, Salem, Provincetown, Stonington, New Haven, Georgetown, S. C., Port Royal, Galveston, Brazos Santiago, San Diego, Columbia River, and many other points of kindred importance, may be specified as in the same undefended category. A single armed vessel could make a clean sweep of most of these ports. Such temporary works as could be thrown up in an emergency, would be so easily taken by boat parties, as to be thoroughly unreliable for sole securities. The rapidity with which the system should be pushed forward, and the extent to which it should be expanded over these points, are subjects on which some difference of opinion exists; but we are, by general consent, still far within the proper limits, both of rate and extent.

The necessity of strong defenses on our Pacific frontier, has been so clear, since the sudden development of California, that no reasonable person could question it. A special commission of army and navy officers, in 1850, examined our Pacific coast, for the selection of military and naval sites. This duty has been satisfactorily consummated, and liberal appropriations have already been made for the defenses of San Francisco.

The erection of strong works, to guard the Golden Gate, and on Alcatraz Island, has been pushed forward with vigor, during the last two years; and ere long, if Congress be not derelict, our Pacific metropolis, and its noble interior waters, will rest secure, behind batteries of tremendous power.

The works at Key West and Tortugas, for the refuge and protection of our immense Gulf commerce, have been steadily prosecuted since their commencement, and will soon afford secure harbors of refuge, on the very key points of our Gulf navigation. The few works demanded on our Canada frontier are of a simple and inexpensive character -their whole actual and estimated cost, including the work at Rouse's Point, on the outlet of Lake Champlain, being only $1,141,292. When we consider that the British naval strength on Lake Ontario decidedly exceeds our own, that England now has the entire command of the St. Lawrence, and that the strong fortifications of Quebec give her an almost impregnable strong-hold in

our very side, the importance of covering such towns as Buffalo and Oswego, and of securing to ourselves Lake Champlain and Niagara river, will be seen to demand, at least, this extent of preparation.

The aggregate influence of all recent improvements in cannon and projectiles has been, to give a decided augmentation of relative strength to forts compared with fleets. Our 8 and 10 inch Columbiads cannot, anywhere, be surpassed, in all the elements of an effective sea-coast gun. They are superior to the so-called Paixhan guns, as they were of prior invention-they involve the same principle better carried out. During the last winter, a special Board readjusted the armaments of our several fortifications, and, to a great extent, adopted Columbiads, and the heaviest calibres. It remains for Congress to do a duty which has been shamefully neglected, by granting the necessary appropriations for promptly preparing this new armament. The general introduction of the horizontal firing of large shells, has given a great advantage to forts; for, while these missiles crush, like eggshells, against heavy granite walls, doing no serious damage, they penetrate the wooden sides of vessels, and, there lodging, tear fearful chasms by their explosions. Now this explosion, in or between the sides of a man of war, can be absolutely insured, by adjusting the charge of the gun, or otherwise. It will be readily seen that wooden walls cannot survive, even for a few minutes, a brisk shelling of this kind; thus, they are wholly at the mercy of well-served Columbiad batteries, in case of attack. Though this position still wants a complete experimental verification, we suppose it will now hardly be questioned. When, to this, we add the effects of hot shot, in setting fire to ships' sides, the contest becomes hopelessly unequal.

It

The capacity of steamers, to resist a fire of artillery, is much smaller still, as they are so liable to derangement of machinery, from shot and shells. has been truly said: "Compared to a sailing ship, a steamer has twenty mortal parts to one." Bearing but small armaments, they can neither give nor endure a heavy fire, and are in no wise fitted to operate directly against forts. They are, in some respects, of very great military importance; for they will not only facilitate the transportation of