to the extent that discrimination based solely upon race or color of the applicant can be practiced and is being practiced without obvious reference thereto. (c) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional because of the proviso in both provisions which arbitrarily allows and requires the registration of certain classes of persons without submission to a literacy test and for the further reason that practically all of the classes of persons arbitrarily exempted from submission to a literacy test are persons of the Caucasian race, thus placing the burden of the literacy test, for the most part, totally on members of the plaintiff's race, to wit, the Negro race. (d) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional, in that as a citizen and resident of the United States, of North Carolina, of Northampton County, and of the Seaboard Precinct, plaintiff, through the said provisions, has been arbitrarily deprived of the privilege and right of the franchise and in that the normal expected and customary application and operation of these two provisions is to arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably deprive numerous citizens and residents otherwise entitled to the privilege and right of the franchise of such privilege and right.

(e) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments and to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional, in that both provisions permit discrimination based solely and only upon the race and color of the applicant for registration and both provisions in practical operation and application do effect immeasurable discrimination against plaintiff and members of his race, in that both provisions have resulted in the disfranchisement of large numbers of Negro citizens solely and only because of their race and color and in the disfranchisement of the plaintiff, in particular, because of his race and color.

(f) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional, in that the so-called literacy test which is provided for in both provisions is in and of itself an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable requirement, incapable of just and even application, and this is particularly true insofar as both provisions require the reading and writing of a legalistic and technical document such as is the Constitution of North Carolina; in that the two provisions set up an unreasonable classification of applicants for registration with applicants who can read and write any section of the Constitution in the English language being placed in one class and being eligible to vote and with applicants who cannot read and write all sections of the Constitution in the English language being placed in another class and being totally disfranchised.

(g) So much of North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 as reads: "and shall show to the satisfaction of the registrar his ability to read and write any such section when he applies for registration and before he is registered" is in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that the said section clothes the defendant administrative officer with unlimited discretionary and arbitrary power and provides no standard, guidance or restraints to guide the said defendant administrative officer, thus purportedly authorizing the defendant to arbitrarily and capriciously deprive plaintiff and others, at will, of the privileges and rights of the franchise. (h) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Due Process Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional, in that no provision of North Carolina law provides a literacy standard for voting registrars, in that the applicant for registration as a voter has no guarantee under North Carolina law that the registrar is a person qualified educationally and academically or who is otherwise qualified to decide the applicant's literacy according to the presumptive and purported literacy standards set up in the two provisions abovementioned; in that North Carolina General Statutes 163–14 (4), which authorizes

the appointment of registrars, does not even require that the registrars appointed be literate by any standard.

(i) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional, in that neither of the two abovementioned provisions provides for an appeal from or review of the registrar-administrative officer's finding that the applicant for registration is not able to meet the so-called literacy standard; in that the applicant has no appeal to any governmental body in North Carolina from the registrar's finding and decision that the applicant does not meet the so-called literacy standard; that an applicant's right to vote in North Carolina is made to hinge and depend upon the sole, unchecked and capricious discretion of a registrar whose findings and decisions on the applicant's literacy are not made subject to administrative or judicial review. Plaintiff further particularly alleges that both provisions are invalid and unconstitutional as applied to him because of the matter pointed out in this Paragraph.

(j) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and are unconstitutional, in that the term "shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution ***" is vague, indefinite, uncertain and does not apprise an applicant of what is expected of him before he meets the qualifications of a voter, in that the term in North Carolina General' Statutes 163-28 "shall show to the satisfaction of the registrar his ability to read and write any such section ***” is vague, indefinite, uncertain and does not apprise an applicant of what is expected of him before he meets the qualifications of a voter; in that neither provision is sufficiently explicit to give an applicant notice of what preparations he can and must make in order to qualify as a voter.

(k) North Carolina General Statute 163-28 is invalid and unconstitutional, by reason of the fact that the General Assembly of North Carolina had and has no authority or power under the Constitution of North Carolina or under any other provision of law to delegate to a registrar and to a registrar's sole and unappealable discretion the duty of deciding and passing upon an applicant's qualifications for exercise of the franchise, insofar as the qualifications pertained to and are concerned with the applicant's literacy; by reason of the fact that North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 is particularly repugnant to and in conflict with Article II, Section 1, of the North Carolina Constitution, in that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power; by reason of the fact that North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 is particularly repugnant to and in conflict with Article I, Sections 10 and 37, of the North Carolina Constitution; by reason of the fact the North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 is particularly repugnant to and in conflict with Article IV, Sections 1, 2, 8, 12, and 22 and Article I, Section 35, of the North Carolina Constitution, in that no effective procedure of judicial review is provided to an applicant who has been denied the privileges and rights of the franchise by a registrar; by reason of the fact that North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 is repugnant to and in conflict with the above-cited constitutional provisions for reasons other than those assigned and by further reason of the fact that North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 is repugnant to and in conflict with provisions of the North Carolina Constitution which are not herein cited or enumerated.

(1) Both Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are invalid and unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff by reason of the matter set out in subparagraph (a) through (k) of this Paragraph, both inclusive.

(m) Since the literacy test is unconstitutional by the standards of both the North Carolina Constitution and the United States Constitution and since plaintiff meets all other requirements for registration as a voter, plaintiff was and is entitled to be registered by the defendant as a voter without subjection to or reference to the so-called literacy test.

8. That plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter I, Article 26; that plaintiff seeks herein a declaration of his right to be registered as a voter without regard to the so-called literacy test; that plaintiff seeks a declaration declaring Article VI, Section 4 of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 unconstitutional and invalid, and unconstitutional and invalid as applied to him.

9. That many other persons who are members of plaintiff's race were de prived of the franchise through the application by the defendant of the so-called literacy test; that all of the persons so deprived of the franchise by the de fendant were otherwise qualified for registration as voters; that the question herein presented is of common or general interest to many persons who are so numerous that it is impractical to bring them all before the Court; that pisintiff brings this action for himself and all such others herein mentioned as are similarly situated, as provided by North Carolina General Statutes 1-70. Wherefore, plaintiff prays:

(1) That the Court declare Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution unconstitutional and invalid by reason of its conflict with the Lue Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

(2) That the Court declare Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution unconstitutional and invalid, by reason of its conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment and Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

(3) That the Court declare North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 unconstitutional and invalid, by reason of its conflict with the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges or Iminunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

(4) That the Court declare North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 unconstitutional and invalid, by reason of its conflict with the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;

(5) That the Court declare the so-called literacy test as provided by Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 unconstitutional and invalid, by reason of its conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the said constitutional and statutory provisions provide no standards, guidance or restraint to guide administrative officers in administering said so-called literacy test and in that the administrative officers are clothed with unlimited discretionary and arbitrary power to deprive applicants of the privileges and rights of the franchise;

(6) That the Court declare that Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are invalid and unconstitutional, by reason of their conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for the reason that neither provision is sufficiently clear and sufficiently free from ambiguity in order to appraise an applicant, more particularly the plaintiff, of what is expected of him by way of qualification as a voter or to give him such notice of requirements as to enable him to prepare for the so-called literacy test;

(7) That the Court declare that Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are invalid and unconstitutional, by reason of their conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for the reason that neither provision provides an administrative or judicial review of an applicant's denial of registration as a voter and of plaintiff's denial or registration as a voter, in particular;

(8) That the Court declare that Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are invalid and unconstitutional, by reason of their conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for the reason that neither provision provides a literacy standard for registrars who are presumably charged by law with administration of the so-called literacy test;

(9) That the Court declare that Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are invalid and unconstitutional, by reason of their conflict with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for the reason that both provisions readily permit of the administration of registration laws with uneven hands and evil eyes in a manner interdicted by the United States Supreme Court;

(10) That the Court declare that Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28 are invalid and unconstitutional, by reason of their conflict with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for the reason that both provisions arbitrarily allow and require the registration of certain classes of persons without submission to a literacy test;

(11) That the Court declare North Carolina General Statutes 163-28, the so-called literacy test therein provided and the administration of the so-called literacy test by registrars of the voting registration to be invalid and unconstitutional, by virtue of repugnance to and conflict with Article I, Sections 10, 35 and 37, Article II, Section 1, and Article IV, Sections 1, 2, 8, 12 and 22 and other provisions of the North Carolina Constitution;

(12) That the Court declare that plaintiff and others similarly situated are entitled to be registered by the defendant without submission to the so-called literacy test purportedly provided in Article VI, Section 4, of the North Carolina Constitution and North Carolina General Statutes 163-28;

(13) That a copy of this Complaint and Summons be served upon the Attorney General of the State of North Carolina as provided in North Carolina General Statutes I-260;

(14) That the costs of this action be taxed against the defendant; and (15) That the plaintiff be given such other and further relief as to the Court may appear just and proper.

This 16th day of June 1956.

NORTH CAROLINA,

Wake County:

JAMES R. WALKER, Jr.,

Weldon, N. C.
TAYLOR & MITCHELL,
Raleigh, N. C., Attorneys for Plaintiff.

VERIFICATION

Alexander Faison, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Plaintiff in the Foregoing Compaint; that he has read and knows the contents thereof; that the things stated therein are true of his own knowledge, except those things alleged upon information and belief, and as to those things he believes it to be true.

ALEXANDER FAISON, Affiant.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of June 1956. [SEAL] LAURA D. HARRIS, Notary Public.

My commission expires February 4, 1958.

STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY FRED D. GRAY AS COUNSEL FOR THE MONTGOMERY IMPROVE MENT ASSOCIATION AS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

My name is Fred D. Gray and I am a resident of Montgomery County, Ala., where I was born and have lived all my life except during the period when I was attending high school and law school. I am a member of the bar of the State of Alabama and also of Ohio. In addition to my profession as a lawyer, I am an ordained minister of the Church of Christ and serve as assistant minister of the Holt Street Church of Christ in Montgomery, Ala.

This statement is made in my capacity as counsel for the Montgomery Improvement Association, a nonprofit corporation, the general purposes of which are summarized in the following provisions of its certificate of incorporation: "To use effective legal means to secure and maintain civil rights in any situation where an individual or a group have been deprived of their civil rights; and "To do any and all other acts which will generally improve the city and county of Montgomery so that all of its citizens will receive all the rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitutions of the State of Alabama and the United States and to inform the citizens of their obligations, responsibilities, and duties which accompany these rights and privileges."

The Montgomery Improvement Association, now generally referred to as the MIA, came into being shortly after the arrest of Mrs. Rosa Parks for an alleged violation of the municipal and State ordinances and statutes requiring racial segregation of passengers on buses and the ensuing protest of the Negro citizens of Montgomery, with which this committee is no doubt familiar.

The MIA was used by the Negroes of Montgomery as an organization for providing directions to the protest movement and also for the purpose of educating themselves as to their rights and responsibilities as citizens.

As this committee no doubt also knows, the philosophy behind the protest movement has been one of nonviolence and observance of the laws as decided by

the highest court in the land. We believe that the MIA has served and is still şerving a most important and useful role and that in its effective insistence upon nonviolence in a period of great tension and provocation it has been of tremendous service to all citizens of Montgomery, white and colored alike.

The MIA gives its wholehearted support to the bill upon which this committee is now holding its hearings and earnestly urges its passage.

We believe the following account of the incidents in the city of Montgomery, arising out of the protest movement above referred to, will illustrate the impor tance of the bill for the protection and rights of all citizens, regardless of their race, religion, or color.

On December 1, 1955, Mrs. Rosa Parks, a Negro seamstress, employed by a downtown department store, was making a routine trip from work on a city bus. The bus was filled with passengers, carrying 14 whites and 24 Negroes, seated in the accustomed areas on the 36-seat vehicle. When more white people got on at the next corner, the bus driver requested Mrs. Parks to give up her seat and stand so that more white passengers could be seated. She refused and was arrested, tried, and convicted for violating the city ordinance and State statute requiring segregation on city buses.

The arrest of Rosa Parks was resented by the Negro population in general. The resentment seemed not to have been because of this one incident, but because of many previous similar incidents, and this particular incident was the "straw that broke the camel's back."

When the Negroes of Montgomery heard of Mrs. Parks' arrest, thousands of circulars were distributed urging Negroes not to ride the city buses on the following Monday in protest to the arrest. On Monday night about 5,000 Negroes met at the Holt Street Baptist Church and adopted a resolution which asked the citizens of Montgomery not to ride the buses until a satisfactory seating condi tion had been worked out. The resolution stated that no method of intimidations would be used to prevent anyone from riding the buses. A car pool was organized to aid in getting the people to and from work. In the meantime, more than a dozen motorcycle policemen were assigned to trail the buses to be sure no one was prevented from riding the buses if they wanted to.

On December 8, a group of Negro leaders met for 4 hours with representatives of the bus company and the city to discuss the issue. Rev. M. L. King was selected as spokesman for the Negro delegation. Reverend King is the 27-yearold pastor of the historical Dexter Avenue Baptist Church of Montgomery. He holds a degree from Morehouse College, Crozer Theological Seminary, and Boston University, where he earned his doctorate.

The Rev. M. L. King, speaking for the Negroes, proposed that patrons be seated on a first-come, first-served basis with no section reserved for either race. Negroes would continue to sit from the rear to the front and the whites from the front to the rear. He suggested that there would be no reassignment of seats once the bus was loaded. There were two other proposals presented by the Negroes; more courteous service by the bus drivers to Negroes and the hiring of Negro bus drivers on predominantly Negro routes. The boycott conference failed to find a solution to the problem.

On December 25, 1955, the Montgomery Advertiser carried in a paid ad the Negroes' declaration of grievances against the bus company, a copy of which is attached, made a part of this report, and marked "Exhibit 1."

The new year (1956) came in with little hope to ease the transportation problem. By this time the ministers of the city had been branded as the leaders of the protest. It was being suggested in the community that the Montgomery Improvement Association should be checked to see if they were violating any laws of the State. On December 13, 1955, the Montgomery Advertiser carried an editorial entitled, “Action and Reaction, a Two Edge Sword,” in which the editor declared that Negroes should reckon with the facts of life. First, the white man's economic artillery is far superior, and commanded by more experienced gunners; second, the white man holds all offices of government machinery. There would be white rule as far the eye can see. The Negroes were beginning to feel the sting of this whip. On January 9, a Montgomery attorney called attention to the press to the State law against boycott. He stated that title 14, section 54 of the Alabama Code provided that when two or more persons unlaw fully enter into an understanding for the purpose of preventing the operating of lawful business, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

On January 22, 1956, the city commissioners shocked the Negro population of Montgomery by stating that it had met with a group of prominent Negro ministers and had reached a solution to the problem. When it was learned that