VERDICT OF JURY We, the jury summoned to diligently inquire and true presentment make how or in what manner J. E. Evanston, came to his death, and of such other matters relating to the same, find that the said J. E. Evanston came to his death by selfinflicted suicide, having jumped from Long Lake Bridge into the water and drowned. Witness our signatures on this the 24th day of December 1955. RALPH NOLAN. HOWARD GRITTMAN, Jr. BILL CUMMINS. JIM MILES. P. T. VEASEY. Sworn to and subscribed before me this the 24th day of December 1955 M. B. GUESS, Justice of Peace, Beat No. 5, Sunflower County, Miss. Mrs. J. E. EVANSTON, Tutwiler, Miss. DECEMBER 24, 1955. Dear MRS. EVANSTON: It is with regret that I inform you of your husband's death. His body was discovered this morning by Mr. Howard Grittman and his son, Bo Grittman. I reported the matter to the sheriff of Sunflower County; a coroner's jury was summoned, who returned a verdict of suicide. Your husband left the following note which is in my office. "DEAR: I hate to do this but I can't stand my sickness and worries any longer. Take care of Junior and pray for my soul. Friends, please notify my wife M. L. Evanston, a schoolteacher who lives in Tutwiler, Miss. Help her and my son all you can. This is her car. Tell Mr. Howard Grittman to see that my wife gets this car. She lives in Tutwiler, Miss. I thank you. "J. E. EVANSTON "The keys are in my pocket in the lake." Your car is at Mr. Howard Grittman's headquarters about 3 miles northwest of Drew, Miss. The body was delivered to the Tutwiler Funeral Home. Please come by my office and verify that the note was written by your husband. A Negro woman on Smith-Murphy place related that your husband came by her house, Monday, and was acting strange. Yours truly, P. J. TOWNSEND. Jr. BOULDER, COLO., August 22, 1956. SHERIFF OR CHIEF OF POLICE, Sunflower County, Clarksdale, Miss. DEAR SIR: As a graduate student at Colorado University and conducting a research project, I would appreciate the following information: On Christmas Eve 1955, the body of School Principal James Edward Evanston was discovered in Long Lake. His death was, I understand, ruled as suicide although there were some facts which indicated foul play may have occurred. Was there any investigation, et cetera, and, if so, what was the outcome? Thanking you in advance for your kind cooperation, I am, Very sincerely yours, (Mrs.) MARGARET TURNER. SEPTEMBER 14, 1956. Mrs. MARGARET TURNER, Boulder, Colo. DEAR MRS. TURNER: Your letter of August 22, addressed to the sheriff or chief of police, Sunflower County, Clarksdale, Miss., was delivered to my office in Indianola. The car belonging to James Edward Evanston, about whom you write, was found on Long Lake Road, with doors locked. His hat was on the seat of the car. There follows the contents of a note found on the seat of his car, which information I copy from a photostatic copy of the note, the original having been given to Evanston's wife: "DEAR: I hate to do this but I can't stand my sickness and worries any longer. Take care of Jr. and pray for my soul. "Friends, please notify my wife, M. L. Evanston, a schoolteacher who lives in Tutwiler, Miss. Help her and my son all you can. This is her car. Tell Mr. Howard Gritman to see that my wife gets this car. She live in Tutwiler, Miss. "I thank you. J. E. EVANSTON.” On the reverse side of the paper is written "The keys are in my pocket in the lake." A coroner's jury ruled the death a suicide. The handwriting in the note was identified as Evanston's writing, and both white and colored people were numbered among his friends. The Mr. Grittman mentioned in the note is a white farmer who lives near Long Lake. I apologize for not answering your letter sooner, but it was misplaced in my files and has just come to my attention. Yours very truly, E. W. WILLIAMS, Sheriff. TALLAHATCHIE COUNTY, 17TH CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT, Sumner, Miss., March 2, 1957. Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND, United States Senate, Washington, D. O. DEAR SIR: This is to verify the fact that a certain Negro, J. E. Evanston, has never offered or been refused to register for voting in the Second Judicial District of Tallahatchie County. I do not know and never heard of him until recently. Yours very truly, CHARLIE COX, Circuit Clerk and Registrar. By MRS. D. R. ROGERS, D. C. Senator ERVIN. Acting at the request of Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, I ask that the following statement by the Honorable Leverett Saltonstall, United States Senator from Massachusetts, be inserted in the record at this point. (The statement referred to follows:) HON. THOMAS C. HENNINGS, UNITED STATES SENATE, Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. March 5, 1957. DEAR SENATOR HENNINGS: Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights completes its study of S. 83, I, as cosponsor of the proposal, would like to submit for the consideration of the subcommittee a brief statement in support of the bill I would very much appreciate its inclusion in the record of the hearings of the subcommittee. I believe that S. 83 constitutes a major step forward in the creation of an effective civil-rights program. S. 83 is the bill which contains in substance the President's recommendations for the initiation of the program he believes necessary. No one can deny that the right to vote is a fundamental, inalienable right of all people in a democracy. Every other constitutional right depends upon it. Without this, we have only an illusion of true democracy; history has shown us that when this basic right is abrogated, democracy and freedom fail. The essence of this bill is to strengthen the mechanism which the Department of Justice should have at its disposal to maintain effectively its authority in an area already assigned to it. It should be remembered that the Federal Government is now empowered to act in this jurisdiction under existing statutes. This bill provides the Attorney General with civil remedies to aid individuals in the enforcement of constitutional rights. 8. 83 will give increased protection to litigants in a court of law. The protection of the individual before the bar of Justice has long been one of our proudest bulwarks in our democratic system. The Civil Rights Commission and the additional Assistant Attorney General, established by this bill, would provide the responsible leadership to which the people of the country can look with confidence for the protection of their constitutional rights. In such critical times as these when we, as the leader of the free nations of the world, must show to the enslaved world as well as to the free world the strength and character of our form of government, it seems to me to be a matter of great national concern that we guarantee to all our people those rights which have made our country so strong. S. 83 will help to affirm the traditions and Heritages of our Republic in the eyes of a world torn with strife and with an uncertain peace. Sincerely yours, LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, SENATOR ERVIN. Acting at the request of Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, I ask that the following statement by the Honorable John Stennis, United States Senator from Mississippi, be inserted in the record at. this point. (The statement referred to follows:) Hon. THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., UNITED STATES SENATE, Washington, D. O., March 8, 1957. Chairman, Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D. C., DEAR SENATOR: In addition to my statement before your subcommittee on February 15 regarding pending civil rights bills, I have the additional views as expressed in the enclosed statements which I shall appreciate your inserting in the official record of your hearings. These statements deal with specific provisions of S. 83, as well as S. 506 and S. 507. Thank you for your consideration. Sincerely yours, S. 83 JOHN STENNIS. In the views presented at my earlier appearance before this distinguished subcommittee I sought to alert the members, the Congress and the Nation to the inherent dangers of S. 83 to our whole form of government under law. This bill has the approval and backing of the present administration and was supported by the advocacy of the present Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Brownell. The clearest and most obviously present danger to the administration of Justice throughout the Nation is contained in section 121 in the new paragraph numbered "Fifth," and in section 131 in the subparagraph identified as "(d)," which purport to confer jurisdiction on the district courts of the United States for proceedings instituted under the authority conferred in these sections and existing law without regard to whether the party aggrieved shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law. This quoted language is identical in both sections, section 131 relating primarily to voting rights, but section 121 relates to the more general category of constitutional rights. These would be amendments to that part of the ill-considered civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction days which still remains on our books as the remnant of a dark, bygone era of military control of a defeated and impoverished South when wholesale disenfranchisement of white voters was the policy of government. Thus the language is baldly laid out in this bill that jurisdiction of the United States district courts shall be exercised without regard to whether the aggrieved party shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law, regardless of whether such remedies are sound, reasonable, or adequate to protect the rights of the petitioner. 27714 O-58-50 I am aware, of course, that the general legal principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to resort to the courts is not immutable and inviolate. I recall several cases in recent years where the court determined as a matter of law that the administrative remedies fitted to the particular facts and circumstances of the case then under consideration were not and could not be adequate. But this was a judicial determination on the individual case, and the decision made as a matter of law. But by the quoted language of this bill conferring jurisdiction on district courts of the United States, the court itself would be bound to accept any pleading, affidavit, or other matter brought before it under this section, assume jurisdiction of the case, and determine the rights of the parties, even thought it might be apparent on the fact of the pleading that the remedies were both adequate and just, that the relief sought was fictitious, and the action of the Attorney General in instituting the proceeding was arbitrary and perhaps politically inspired. Remedies established by State law would not even be considered by the courts and the specific language of the Constitution relating to the power of the States to qualify their electors under article I, section 2, and under the 17th Amendment would be effectively repealed. Gone are the 9th and 10th Amendments. The Federal judiciary, at the expense of the reserved powers and rights of the State and local government, has discovered new constitutional rights with alarming frequency in recent years. No man alive today could name the rights to be protected by this legislation. 42 U. S. C. 1971 is too vague and indefinite for any limit to be placed on the power sought to be conferred by tais bill when the Federal courts of this country are continuously pronouncing new rights under the Constitution and beyond the legislative power of Congress to correct. The quoted provisions of this bill are repugnant to the whole concept of equity jurisdiction. The distinguished lawyers serving on this committee will recall the history of the equity jurisprudence in the English law, and its deep-rooted traditions and maxims in American law at the time the Constitution was adopted. Important limitations were earlier adopted in the equity courts by the discipline of the chancellor himself. One was that equity would not interfere where there was an adequate remedy at common law. Senators will recall the rigidity of the forms of action and almost fanatical technicality observed by early common law judges which created areas in which relief could not be obtained through the law courts. This, of course, led to appeal to the sovereign, and later, the chancellor in order that justice might be achieved. This was the foundation of equity to secure justice where the law was inadequate. Here the whole history of equity is disregarded and reversed so that government by injunction will replace government by law. The distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina has done a magnificent job of alerting the country to the summary proceedings involved in the application and issuance of a temporary restraining order. He has already pointed out that this may be done by affidavit without the person so enjoined-under the penalties of criminal contempt-having an opportunity to cross-examine or even confront the petitioners for such an injunction. They could appear, presenting only an affidavit, probably prepared here in Washington, and possibly bearing a government form number. Should a local election official or school board member decide to obey the State and local laws creating his office and prescribing his duties, and ignore such injunction or restraining order, he could be imprisoned for an indefinite period without any reliance on this fundamental concept of American justice of his constitutional right to a trial by jury. The evil is that this may be done even though adequate remedies existed for the petitioner. The local officer or other person may be honest and entirely right in his opinion that the existing administrative or other lawful remedies provided would have been sufficient for the orderly administration of the controversy in accordance with due process of law. In recent weeks an injunction issued by a district court in Tennessee was so broad and sweeping in its terms and application that even the most liberal groups in the country are belatedly becoming aware of the inherent danger of this type of government. With regard to this type of procedure, an injunction against the world must he void. Except in the most extreme cases, almost beyond the power of imagination, an injunction against criticism of a court deceision is a violation of the first amendment. But the fact that such an order has even been promulgated in a district court of the United States should convince even the most ardent proponent of S. 83 that no greater lingering damage to our Government as we know it could be effected I than by the wholly indefensible extension of this summary power to situations where adequate administrative and legal remedies have long existed. No longrange good can come from empowering the Federal Government to disregard due process of law. S. 506 Mr. Chairman, I regret to see in title 8 of S. 510 and in S. 506 the re-emergence of the old and discredited FEPC bill for consideration by the Congress of the United States. This discredited approach to the problem of employment of all segments of our population at levels commensurate with their ability is endorsed by those who are often heard to praise free private enterprise in an economically competitive environment. This system of free enterprise has, of course, been the basis for our country's growth since it was founded. It does not appear that the contradiction between this bill and that system is apparent to its proponents, and such a fundamental inconsistency-should be pointed out so that this paradox will be seen in the light of its effect both on American society and on our free enterprise system. An economic system of free enterprise depends upon efficient operation. Success in this set of conditions depends upon efficient operation, and the economic motives for which all business enterprises are operating depend upon efficiency and selectivity in materials, methods, and in personnel. While the system we believe in has, in years long past, been criticized as subordinating the individual, much has been done in the way of general regulatory legislation to meet this objection. Minimum wage laws and other laborlegislation have been enacted on the ground that the individual worker is at a disadvantage in the contracting process because of his limited financial resources as compared with those of the other contracting party and established industrial organizations. However, I do not find any legislation which purports to create a contract between a party aspiring to a specific job and an unwilling employer. This would be the effect of the pending bill. Its foundation in economic fact and realities are highly dubious, its legal justification is even more specious. The legal basis cited in the bill employs a scattergun approach of the commerce clause; constitutional rights, and privileges and immunities. These individual legal bases are all inadequate to justify this monstrous butchery of our laws of contract and agency and, taken together, provide no more justification for such an undertaking. It is true that the overburdened commerce clause has been relied on to justify a great deal of legislation having little or no casual relation to the free flow of commerce between the Staes, and certainly no one would seriously attempt to justify this legislation on the grounds of regulation of commerce. It is an established legal principle that that which may not be done directly cannot be done indirectly. It would, therefore, appear that this bill, undertaking as it does to establish a commission with the power to create contracts between private individuals relating to employment and other serious and close personal associations, would be empowered to effect a result which Congress itself could not legally accomplish. This principle is as abhorrent to free enterprise as it is to the constitutional law of this country. The objections to such an iniquitous procedure are apparent and obvious: First, there is no meeting of the minds, which is elementary in the contracting process. The scrap of paper resulting, investing substantial rights in one party alone would not deserve the dignity of being called a contract. The repugnance to involuntary servitude, which is so fundamental in America, is by this bill turned around and by law a new concept of involuntary private employment and association takes its place. A second objection is that there is no constitutional provision on which this right may be based. Perhaps Congress could create in individuals a right to a Government job, but it has never seen fit to do so. Certain rights inure to people who have Government jobs, but the right to a specific job in the executive branch of the Government involves the interplay of two branches of Government, (1) the legislative branch in creating the job, and the rules and regulations under which the employee's future rights may be determined, and (2) the executive branch through the appointive power defined in the Constitution or in the statutes or by our civil-service laws. Under this bill, an individual fortunate enough to be identified with an active minority group would in effect have a preemptive right to a specific job by a private employer in the conduct of his business under existing laws and in a com |