Mr. SLAYMAN. Excuse me, Mr. Attorney General, how many of those were there? Mr. BROWNELL. 3,420. Mr. SLAYMAN. 3,000? Mr. SLAYMAN. Thank you. Mr. BROWNELL. In each purported affidavit it was alleged that the affiant had examined the records on file with the registrar, that the registrant named therein was believed to be illegally registered and that the purported affidavit was made for the purpose of challenging the registrant's right to remain on the roll of registered voters. Such affidavits were filed challenging every one of the 2,389 Negro voters in ward 10. None of the 4,054 white voters in that ward were challenged. Senator HENNINGS. General, in what part of the State is that parish? Mr. BROWNELL. Near Monroe, La. Senator HENNINGS. Near Monroe? Mr. BROWNELL. Yes. With respect to another ward, ward 3, such affidavits were filed challenging 1,008 of the 1,523 Negro voters. Only 23 of the white voters in ward 3 were challenged. The registrar accepted their affidavits even though she knew that each affiant had not examined the registration cards of each registered voter he was challenging. On the basis of these affidavits, citations were mailed out in large groups requiring the challenged voters to appear within 10 days to prove their qualifications. Registrants of the Negro race responded to these citations in large numbers. During the months of April and May large lines of Negro registrants seeking to prove their qualifications formed before the registrar's office, starting as early as 5 a. m. The registrar and her deputy refused to hear offers of proof of qualifications on behalf of any more than 50 challenged registrants per day. Consequently, most of the Negro registrants were turned away from the registrar's office and were denied any opportunity to establish their proper registration. Thereafter, the registrar struck the names of such registrants from the rolls. With respect to those registrants who were lucky enough to gain admission to the registrar's office, the registrar imposed requirements in connection with meeting the challenge which were in violation of Louisiana law. The registrar refused to accept as witnesses, on behalf of challenged voters, registered voters of the parish who resided in a precinct other than the challenged voter or who had themselves been challenged or had already acted as witnesses for any other challenged voter. By these means the number of registered Negro voters in Ouachita Parish was reduced by October 6, 1956, from approximately 4,000 to 694. On October 10, 1956, Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney III, who is here with me today, testified concerning the facts regarding Ouachita Parish before the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and recommended that the subcommittee hold public hearings in advance of the general election. The subcommittee took no action with respect to the situation. The point I would like to make now is that, had the administration's program been in effect, the Department would have been able to initiate a civil action for the purpose of restoring the Negro voters to the rolls of registered voters in time to vote in the November election. Our investigation has revealed similar situations in several other Louisiana parishes. Related problems have developed in other States. For example, our investigations disclosed the following situations in North Carolina just prior to the North Carolina primary elections of May 1956. The North Carolina constitution (art. VI, sec. 4) and statutes (General Statutes 1943, ch. 163, art. 6, sec. 28) provide that a person, to become a registered voter, must be able to read and write any section of the North Carolina constitution to the satisfaction of the registrar. The constitution and statutes also contain a "grandfather clause" exempting any male person (or his lineal descendent), entitled to vote January 1, 1867, from this requirement if such person registered prior to December 1908. What happened under these provisions? 1. Camden County (Courthouse Township precinct): In this precinct, the registrar gave the reading and writing tests to Negro applicants, but not to white applicants. The latter were permitted to register upon showing the necessary residence, and so forth. In giving the reading and writing tests to Negroes, the registrar demanded that they write the preamble to the constitution from her dictation. She required in this connection that all spelling, punctuation, and capitalization be correct. The complainants, 4 Negro high-school graduates, failed the test, although 2 were very determined and went back and memorized the whole preamble and passed another test. The registrar recently resigned. During the 2 years she was in office (1954-56), she registered a total of 4 Negroes. During the same period, she registered 55 white persons. The population of the precinct is roughly 2 to 1-about 1,200 whites and 600 Negroes. 2. Brunswick County (Bolivia precinct), N. C.: In this precinct, the practice of the registrar, according to his own statement, is to qualify Negroes under the educational tests (reading and writing a section of the constitution), and to register whites under the "grandfather clause." 3. Greene County (Snow Hill precinct): In this precinct, the registrar omitted as to both races the requirement pertaining to reading and writing a part of the constitution. However, as to Negro registrants, he demanded that they answer a list of 20 questions. The questions required them to name all candidates running for office. in the county, to define primary and general elections, to state whether they were members of the NAACP, and whether they would support. the NAACP should that organization attack the United States Government, and so forth. White applicants were required to answer no such questions. The reason I give these example, of course, is to be able to point out that in most of these situations civil remedies would enable the Government to take affirmative action to deal with attempts at what amounts to mass disenfranchisement of Negroes in time to be effective, In a civil proceeding for preventive relief or for a declaratory judgment, the constitutionality of the election practice could be quickly determined and appropriate relief awarded. Criminal remedies at best come after the harm has been done. Furthermore, we all know that jurors are reluctant Senator HENNINGS. General, if I may interrupt, isn't that true of our entire philosophy of criminal prosecution? Mr. BROWNELL. Oh, yes; no doubt about that. Senator HENNINGS. We indict and convict after the act? Mr. BROWNELL. That is right; and it is a very important factor in this situation. Jurors are reluctant to indict and convict local officials in a criminal prosecution even though they recognize the illegality of what has been done. As a result, not only are the election officials freed, but also the Government is not able to get an authoritative determination regarding the constitutionality of what was done. The proposals of the administration would, of course, go beyond the voting cases, important as they are, and give to the Department the authority to invoke civil remedies in other cases of civil-rights violations. Here, as in the voting situation, private persons have long been able to bring civil suits where civil-rights violations have occurred. Much of the large body of judicial precedent and decision which has been built up in the courts defining constitutionally protected rights has been handed down in such suits. Yet, while the private persons can bring these suits, the Federal Government is limited to criminal prosecutions which, as in voting cases, are cumbersome, difficult, and in situations not involving brutality and violence, often unduly harsh. Our experience over the years in civil-rights cases demonstrates that in many situations civil remedies would go far toward permitting the Government to arrive at the most rational and fair solution of the problems presented. Let me give you an example of what I mean. The United States Supreme Court recently reversed the conviction of a Negro sentenced to death by a State court because of a showing that Negroes had been systematically excluded from the panels of the grand and petit juries that had indicted and tried him. Senator ERVIN. Mr. Attorney General, I wish you would state what case that is. Mr. BROWNELL. In Georgia. I think I come to that in a moment or two in my prepared text. In so doing, the Supreme Court stated that, according to the undisputed evidence in the record before it, systematic discrimination against Negroes in the selection of jury panels had persisted for many years past in the county where the case had been tried. In its opinion the Court mentioned, parenthetically, but we thought pointedly, that such discrimination was a denial of equal protection of the laws, and it would follow that it was a violation of the Federal civil-rights laws. Accordingly, the Department of Justice had no reasonable alternative except to institute an investigation to determine whether in the selection of jury panels in the county in question the civil-rights laws of the United States were being violated, as suggested by the record before the Supreme Court. I think it must be clear to you that the mere institution of this inquiry aroused a storm of indigation in the county and State in question. This is understandable since, if such violations were continuing, the only course left open to the Government under the laws as they stand now was criminal prosecution of those responsible. That might well have meant the indictment in the Federal court of the local court attachés and others responsible under the circumstances. Fortunately, in this case the Department was never faced with that disagreeable duty. The investigation showed that, whatever the practice may have been during the earlier years with which the Supreme Court's record was concerned, in recent years there had been no discrimination against Negroes in the selection of juries in that county. Supposing, however, that on investigation, the facts had proved otherwise. The necessarily resulting prosecution would have stirred up such dissension and ill-will in the community that it might well have done more harm than good. Such unfortunate collisions in the criminal courts between Federal and State officials can be avoided, certainly minimized, if the Congress would authorize the Attorney General to apply to the civil courts for preventive relief in civil-rights cases. In such a proceeding the facts can be determined, the rights of the parties adjudicated and future violations of the law prevented by proper order of the court without having to subject State officials to the indignity, hazards, and personal expense of a criminal prosecution in the Federal courts. I should like to add a few words regarding the relationship of these proposals to the school segregation situation. As you all know, the Supreme Court recognized the many difficulties involved in making the transition from segregated to nonsegregated education. The Court said that School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing. and solving these problems: courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Civil suits brought by private individuals are at the present time as a matter of common knowledge bringing the school situation before the Federal courts in increasing numbers of areas where segregation has been practiced. Because of the discretion vested in the district courts in solving these questions the Department has not become aware of any case in which the exercise of its existing criminal jurisdiction is warranted. For similar reasons we should not expect often to be faced with the necessity of taking affirmative action in civil suits were the legislation now advocated by us enacted by the Congress. There is, however, one type of situation in which these civil remedies might be useful in the school segregation area, illustrated perhaps by a case that arose in Hoxie, Ark. There you will remember that the school board, in compliance with the United States Supreme Court ruling and without waiting for a lawsuit to be brought to compel them to do so, went ahead and desegregated the school. They were proceeding peacefully with an unsegregated school, as is the case, of course, in overwhelming areas of our country. Then outside individuals came in and, as the court record shows, threatened the superintendent and the members of the school board with violence, and threatened some of the parents with violence, in case the unsegregated school proceeded. In that case the school superintendent and the members of the board filed a suit in the Federal district court seeking to restrain the defendants from interfering with the operation of the school in the district on an unsegregated basis. An injunction was issued and on the appeal the Department of Justice came in as a friend of the court and filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals upheld the district court and the school is now back on an unsegregated basis with everything proceeding peacefully. The school board in the Hoxie case was courageous and forthright in taking the case into court. There may well develop other situations in which, after voluntary desegration, the pressures placed upon the local school authorities are so great as to prevent their taking the initiative in instituting legal action. In this type of situation the Department under this legislation would be authorized to take the initiative in filing a suit for an injunction against any individuals seeking to interfere with the school authorities in their attempt to comply with the ruling of the Supreme Court. There is another area related to the school segregation issue in which the Department has been involved and may be involved in future cases--but for reasons unrelated to the legislative proposals now before you. But to anticipate any questions on the subject, I would like to discuss it briefly at this point. That is the Clinton, Tenn., situation, the Federal district judge after much litigation entering an order in a civil suit brought by private individuals ordering the school officials to admit Negro students. This order became final and the school officials admitted the Negro children. Thereafter, various private individuals sought by threats of force to compel the school authorities to violate the court order and exclude the Negro children. In this situation, the school authorities appealed to the Federal judge and he issued an order charging a number of private individuals with contempt of court. Trial of this action is now pending. The Department, through the local United States attorney, will handle the prosecution in which it will be determined if the acts charged actually constituted contempt. I wish to say to you at this time that the court in the Clinton situation already had full power to proceed and that the pending legislation will have no bearing on such cases. I want also to say to you that the problem of the Clinton case extends beyond civil-rights cases into all areas of Federal law enforcement. Ours is a government of laws. The remedy for disagreement with an order of the Federal district court is an appeal, not resistance. Once such an order becomes final the Federal Government must have authority to protect persons acting pursuant to the order from outside interference. This protective power has long been recognized |