on the teftimony of a foreigner, confined in one corner of France, as what he afferts from perfonal knowledge. The following ftatement coincides fo exactly with what we have heard from other quarters, that we cannot doubt the exactness of it. "One of the most formidable engines of tyranny in France is the military police, called the gendarmes; they excite the dread and hatred of the whole nation. Their employment is to fearch for murderers, thieves, confcripts; and they are alfo employed to execute the dreadful orders of Buonaparte. This increafes that fear, hatred, and contempt, fo univerfally felt. Unprincipled in general, of courfe corrupt and treacherous, they accept your bribe, and betray you afterwards. However their eftablishment is too important for the fafety of the tyrant's power to be put down; for it is chiefly this honourable corps that fecures him on his ufurped throne. In every town, city, village, or commune throughout the departments, thefe inftruments of tyranny are established, and being in general artful men and very poor, they exercife tyranny equal to their ruler. To every coffee-houfe, and every place of public amusement they have accefs, under the pretence of preferving peace and order; they establish idle and worthlefs people in every public house, and hotel, as fpies who make their reports, often from pique and malice, or to prove their zeal. The Tame fyftem is established by feducing the fervants of every family to report what is faid at table, of whatever nature; thefe reports, true or falfe, are fent to the minifter of police, who without notice, and even without enquiry, fends an order to arreft the whole family, often in the dead of night: this dreadful tyranny is exercised so instantaneously that the unhappy people are never aware of the blow until it is ftruck. If any obfervations have been made on Buonaparte of his government, or on his favourites, they never fee the light again, nor can a friend trace them out." P. 55. Mr. S. gives feveral atrocious inftances of extortion, practised upon the English detained in France, which fell under his own knowledge. He is of opinion that better treatment for the English can only be gained by retaliation, which therefore he ftrongly advises. The whole forms a very curious document. INDIA. ART. 18. A Letter from an Officer at Madras to a Friend formerly in that Service, now in England, exhibiting an unbiaffed Account, and fupported by authentic Documents, of the Rife, Progrefs, and actual State, of the late unfortunate Infurrection in the Indian Army. 8vo. 116 pp. 35. 6d. Murray. 1810. The late infurrection of a part of the Madras army having been happily terminated with little bloodshed, and the offenders in go neral having experienced the moft indulgent lenity from govern. ment, we could have wished that the caufes which produced it had alfo been buried in oblivion. The writer before us appears to be of a different opinion; and indeed his letter was manifeftly written before the ferment of paffions occafioned by this unhappy contest could have time to fubfide. Admitting therefore (as he does very fully) the guilt of refiitance to the civil authority, and declaring the guilty perfons to have juftly incurred "the extre mity of legal punishment," this officer proceeds to relate a number of tranfactions, which, if they do not palliate the conduct of the offenders, certainly throw great odium on the measures of the civil government. Thofe meafures (according to the reprefentations of this writer) were, generally fpeaking, injudicious, and, in fome inftances, illiberal and unjuft. Equal, if not greater blame, applies, we think, to the late commander in chief, if (as this author ftates) to maintain that influence of which he had been deprived by a change in the conftitution of the army, he courted popularity with the officers at large, lamented, without referve, his inability to fupport their interefts in council, commented on the degrada tion of the army in the perfon of their commander in chief, and, affuming the character of their representative, induced them, without reflecting on the abfolute abfurdity of the term, to confider the alteration which had been made in the conftitution of the local government as a real military grievance." If fuch was really his conduct, we cannot wonder at the difcontent of the army, but are rather furprifed that it did not produce more extenfive mifchief. The author proceeds to fhow the expediency of the commander in chief being (as formerly) admitted to a feat in the fupreme council: but his arguments, in our opinion, only prove that he fhould be confulted by that body in all matters of a military nature, and that his information and opinion fhould have confidera. ble weight. So far as we can judge, such a system would be preferable to that which made him, in all matters, civil as well as military, one of the fupreme government. But this is a question out of our province to decide. It would be painful, and is now, we tuft, unneceffary, to dwell on the mutual caufes of diffatisfaction, which from that period arose between the civil and military authorities in that coun try. They are detailed with great perfpicuity, and explained with confiderable ability in the letter before us. It is proper, however, to caution the reader against too implicit a reliance on the reprefentations of this writer. For, although he is decided, and even vehement, on the neceffity of enforcing the fubordination of the military to the civil powers, yet in reprefenting the conduct of the latter, he appears to us rather inclined to exaggerate fuch errors as were cominitted, and to impute motives which perhaps did not exift. This work therefore, though it may be read for information, should not be relied on as authority; as it proceeds proceeds from a quarter where it is not reasonable to expect perfect impartiality. NAVY. ART. 19. The Subftance of a Speech delivered by the Right. Hon. 1810. The fpeech before us is prefatory to a motion in the House of Peers, for an addrefs to his Majefty, praying that an account of fuch fteps if any, as had been taken, in addition to thofe already communicated, towards carrying into execution the propolals of the Commifioners of Naval Revifion, might be laid before that Houfe. It ftates the origin, objects, and fome of the proceedings of that Commiffion, in order to fhow that, inftead of merely adopting thofe parts of the Reports of the Com miffioners which appeared to claim immediate attention, and fuffering the remainder to wait for fubfequent confideration (which feems to have been the courfe purfued by the Admiralty and Privy Council) a complete revifal of the whole fhould take place in a committee of the Privy Council, for the purpose not only of making fuch alterations in the parts already put in force as experience may have pointed out, but of determining which of the remaining fuggeftions fhould be carried into effect.It is but juftice to fay that this fpeech, though neceffarily involving dry details, is not wanting in that perfpicuity and strength of reafoning which diftinguish the noble fpeaker. Although the propriety of giving the subject a further confideration was not, we believe, difputed, the motion was deemed, at the prefent period, unneceffary, and was therefore fet afide by the previous question. Акт. 20. A Letter from the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Melville to the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval, relative to the Establishment of a Naval Arfenal at Northfleet. 4to. PP. 48. Bagfter, 1810. 2s. 6d. From the nature and object of the Letter before us, it may not perhaps be deemed, ftrictly speaking, a fit fubject for literary criticifm; more efpecially as it is founded on one of the Reports of the Commiffioners of Naval Revifion; which, as P blic do. cuments, extending to a variety of official details, it would not perhaps have been decent, nor certainly (within our limits) prac ticable, to difcufs. Yet as, by the publication of this Letter, the noble author feems to appeal, not only to the judgment of the Minifter whom he addresses, but also to that of the nation, we deem it our duty to give a view, however imperfect, of its important contents. This addrefs to the Chancellor of the Exchequer states (in friendly and refpectful terms) the urgent neceffity of establishing an extenfive naval arfenal at Northfleet, on the river Thames, grounded on the Fifteenth Report of the Commiffioners for revifing and digefting the Civil Concerns of the Navy. That Report has not yet been printed, nor indeed laid before Parlia. ment; but the noble author of this Letter, after premifing that nothing contained in it is of a nature to require fecrecy, enters fully into the reafons for the measure therein propofed, The first establishment of a royal dock-yard was, it feems, that of Deptford, in the reign of Henry VIII. who alfo formed two other of our fix naval arfenals, thofe at Woolwich and Portsmouth. That of Chatham, it is ftated, was founded by Queen Elizabeth, Sheernefs in the reign of Charles II. and Ply. mouth by King William III. The progreffive advance of our navy, from the earlieft of thofe periods, is next adverted to; and it appears, that its tonnage, at the death of Henry VIII. in 1547, amounted to about 12,400 tons; that it gradually increafed till, in 1809, it was eftimated at 800,000 tons; and that, notwithstanding this vaft increafe of our navy, not a fingle dock. yard has been added fince the reign of William III. when the tonnage of the royal navy amounted to no more than 160,000 tons. The noble writer, indeed, admits that fome few docks and flips have been added, and fome ftorehouses built; but thefe additions, he infifts, have by no means kept pace with the augmentation of the British navy. The Letter now calls our attention to the material defects in our prefent dock-yards, in order to prove the necefity of a new and extenfive naval arfenal. The firft of thefe defects is, the want of a fufficient depth of water in the vicinity of the prefent dock-yards. This, it ap pears, has been afcertained by the reports of very able engineers, and applies peculiarly to three of the four eaftern yards, namely thofe of Deptford, Woolwich, and Chatham, The causes to which it is (according to all appearance juftly) afcribed, fhow that it is muft unavoidably increafe, and that it threatens speedily to render these three yards totally unfit for large fhips of war. The fame defect appears to exift at Portfmouth; but there it admits of a remedy, fo far at leaft as to prevent its increafe. In confequence of this defect, the fhips fitted at each of the four yards enumerated, are obliged to proceed to a confiderable dif tance before they can receive their guns and fores. The delay, inconvenience, expence, and loffes, arifing from this circumftance, are fully detailed and forcibly urged by the noble author. Similar inconveniences, and an additional expence, arife from the fame caufe when ships are ordered into dock to be repaired, or paid off; and (what feems to us of great moment) this confi deration deration appears to have influenced the fyftem of building large men of war, and to have induced the Navy Board to give them lefs depth of hold than would otherwife have been directed, and confequently deprived them of the great advantage of carrying their ports high, and giving them lefs ftability. At Sheernefs, it appears, the fame defect does not occur; but that yard is faid to be on too confined a fcale, and, from the nature of the fubfoil, not capable of being enlarged. The want of room in our prefent dock-yards, their inadequacy to perform the work required, and the difficulty (if not impoffibility) of introducing the modern mechanical improvements, conftructed as they are at prefent, are alfo urged as forcible motives for the fcheme propofed; and a ftrong paffage to that effect is cited from the Report alluded to. From that paffage it appears, that the new dock-yard is not meant to fuperfede the utility of the western yards of Portsmouth and Plymouth, but to fupply the place of* fuch of the eastern as are even now unfit for most of the purpofes required, and are daily becoming lefs adequate than they were formerly to ferve the purpofes of the navy. To the objections above mentioned another is added; which we conceive to be of great importance, namely, the fituation of four + of our dock-yards; which, instead of being fo placed as that the moft frequent winds fhould blow off hore, are placed in the very oppofite fituation, with the prevailing winds on fhore. The other two yards, though not objectionable in this respect, are of little utility, from being fo far inland, and confequently being unable to dispatch yeffels to fea, unless the wind happens to blow from one out of a very few points of the compass." The noble author then points out the circumftances which render Northfleet a moft eligible fituation for the naval arfenal propofed, which it appears obvious from what has been before stated, fhould be in the eastern part of the kingdom, in order to fupply the places of Deptford and Woolwich. These advantages are, that, without being, like thofe yards, too far up the river, it is far enough to be sheltered from ftormy weather; that it is on a weather fhore with regard to the prevailing winds; that there is fufficient depth of water for fhips of the largest fize to fail with all their ftores on board; that an excellent ftream of water flows through the land; that there will be plenty of good brick earth for building, and the fubfoil of the most defirable kind; that the fituation is extremely healthy; that the ground is capable of a ftrong defence; and that the extent of the level ground will admit of the arfenal being made on as large a scale as can be required. * Deptford and Woolwich. +Chatham, Sheernefs, Portfmouth, and Plymouth. Dd 4 The |