ment in the report, for a part of which I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to a friend, was not approved unanimously by the committee, though all consented that it should be offered to the Senate. The following extracts from the report are sufficient to show its character; and I wish that the sentiments herein expressed may be known wherever my humble name may be repeated. There is not a word that I wish obliterated. The consciousness of its truth I shall enjoy while consciousness remains, and let my fidelity to its truth be "remembered in my epitaph."

All men owe absolute allegiance to the law of God, which is, in its nature, a universal rule of conduct for mankind, laid down by Him. It belongs to the nature of man and the nature of God, and derives its sanction and validity therefrom. It is, accordingly, the higher law, and so the standard of all other laws. Its design is to promote the welfare of all mankind in general, and of each man in particular.

Human law is, in its nature, a special rule of conduct for the people by whom it is enacted, and derives its origin and acquires its sanction solely from the consent of that people who are to be governed thereby. The just design of human law is, in general, to promote the welfare of the nation for which it is made, the welfare of all, and also of each. Its design, therefore, is in special, twofold; namely, its first and primary design is to protect the person in all his natural rights, with all that pertains to those rights; the next and secondary design is, to protect his property, with all that rightly pertains thereto. These two objects comprise all the functions of human law; for the protection of the substance of manhood and the attributes thereof, of person and property, necessarily involves the protection of the right to develop both.

In regard to the law of God, things may be distributed into three classes, namely: first, such as are absolutely right;

second, such as are absolutely wrong; and third, such as are neither absolutely right nor absolutely wrong, but morally indifferent. It is moral to do the first, immoral to do the second; to do the third is neither directly moral nor immoral, but only expedient or inexpedient.

It is plain that human law cannot alter the natural relations of things, nor make right wrong, or wrong right, or things indifferent either right or wrong. Laws, therefore, are only declaratory of the intentions of the law-makers, who therein lay down a practical rule of conduct, but can no more alter right and wrong, than the mariner can alter the position of the stars by which he steers his vessel. Of course, then, as it is the natural duty of man to do the right and avoid the wrong, it is plain that human law is, morally, valid and obligatory only so far as it declares the right to be the rule of conduct, and is, morally, invalid and of no obligation, just so far as it declares the wrong to be the rule of conduct. Otherwise, allegiance to the state would transcend allegiance to God, and the statutes of men be superior to the eternal law of the infinite God, -a proposition which is absurd in its substance and impious in its form. But if the human statute represents the right, then it is so far identical with the natural law of God, and is accordingly valid and obligatory. Thus human laws derive all their moral validity and obligation from their conformity to the natural law of God; so natural right or justice is, and ought to be, the ultimate standard-measure of all human laws in general, and to that standard all human laws are amenable.

The Constitution of the United States is, in its nature, a particular rule of conduct, to be observed in the governing of the people by their officers, legislative, judiciary, and executive; accordingly, it is a conventional and secondary standardmeasure of the laws made by the people. Accordingly, as it is a moral duty that all human laws be made conformable to the right, else they are morally invalid and void by nature,— so it is a constitutional obligation to make the laws of the United States conformable to the constitution, otherwise they are constitutionally invalid and void by agreement. Laws of the United States are therefore amenable to the constitution.

The design of the constitution is thus declared by the people of the United States in the preamble to that document, namely: "To form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

These words, which thus state the design, seem to be the constitutional standard-measure of all other provisions of the constitution itself; for the end aimed at is one thing, the means to obtain that end another. This design is identical with that of the law of God and of all just human law, only some of the particulars which belong to human welfare are distinctly specified in the preamble.

The constitution then proceeds to lay down certain particular rules of conduct for the nation in organizing its ideas into institutions, and for administering those institutions. Some of these provisions or particular rules conform to the law of God, and to the general design of human laws and the special design of the constitution. Some are inconsistent with all these. Your committee respectfully set forth, that they are decided in their conviction, that the institution of slavery, as it existed in the confederated colonies at the adoption of the constitution, and has ever since unhappily continued to survive, is utterly inconsistent with the natural law of God, with the general design of all just human laws, and with the special design of the constitution as set forth in the preamble thereto, as it is notorious that this institution is, and has ever been, inconsistent with the express words of the Declaration of Independence. But though the committee have no hesitation in declaring their conviction that the provisions in the constitution, sustaining slavery, directly conflict with the natural duty which men owe to their fellow-men, and with the natural allegiance which all men owe to the divine law, yet they do not forget their obligations to the constitution, and their allegiance to their country and the government which it has established. If these provisions sustaining slavery be complied with, and the compliance be enforced by penal laws, it should be distinctly stated that the compliance is rendered, not because it is morally right, but

because it is technically legal; nay, technically legal while it was absolutely wrong, and contrary to the avowed design of the constitution as set forth in the preamble. And though the citizen may, by the conventional rules of society, be excused for obedience to unjust laws; though individuals may believe it patriotic to assist in carrying into effect such laws, yet those who enact them, and enforce a compliance by penalties, from which no citizen who violates them can hope to escape, and those also who volunteer in the execution of them, will hardly be acquited before that Tribunal, which ultimately deals out retribution according to the law which every intelligent man feels to be divine, irrevocable, and eternal.

The Fugitive Slave Law is, in its nature, a special rule of conduct, to be followed in reducing to slavery certain persons alleged to have fled from it, and for punishing such as aid them in their escape. Its design is, primarily, to reduce men to slavery; that is, to remove them from the condition of MEN to the condition of mere CHATTELS; and, secondarily, to punish all such as aid them to remain in the condition of men, and hinder them from being forced into the condition of mere chattels.

Your committee cannot resist the conclusion that this law, in its nature and design, is, in general, plainly hostile to the law of God, and to the design of all just human law. We regard the Fugitive Slave Law, therefore, as morally, — not legally, but morally, invalid and void; and though binding on the conduct, no more binding on the conscience of any man than a law would be, which should command the people to enslave all the tall men or all the short men, and deliver them up on claims, to be held in bondage forever; for the committee can see no moral difference between enslaving a white man and a black one, or a fugitive and one always free.

But this law is also plainly at variance with the design of the constitution, as set forth in its own language before quoted. To us the whole statute appears unconstitutional, not merely technically and in its details, but unconstitutional universally and in the highest degree, as tending to defeat the purposes of the constitution itself. On this point, however, we will not dwell.

But the committee regard the Fugitive Slave Law, not only as unconstitutional in general, and with regard to its design, but specially, as compared with some of the provisions of the constitution itself.

I. It subjects the people to "unreasonable searches and seizures," and thus violates their "right to be secure in their persons; " for any man may be arrested on the affidavit of any other man swearing that he is a slave, and be sent into bondage by the act of a single commissioner. We have already seen free men thus seized and hurried off to slavery.

II. It annuls and makes useless "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." We learn from the opinion of the attorneygeneral that it does not do this in form, but it does it substantially, and in fact.

The

III. It takes away "the right of trial by jury" from the alleged fugitive, and that in a matter of the greatest importance, thus depriving him of liberty, which is of more value than property or life, "without due process of law." fugitive is not tried for his liberty "by his peers or the law of the land," but before a single commissioner, who does not, like the jury, represent the "country," the people with their human sympathy towards men and their personal duty towards God; but who is a mere official agent of government, representing only the will of the men in power, whose creature he is, and at whose caprice he may be removed.

Then, too, as if this were not enough, the trial must be conducted in a "summary manner." The committee will not undertake to point out what a "summary manner" is, but they submit that it is not "due process of law;" for, without repeating what they have before said, the trial of an issue so important is not necessarily a public one, but the commissioner may try the alleged fugitive in the cellar of his house and at midnight, allowing the miserable man no counsel to aid him, and with no witness but the slave-hunter and the officials and creatures of government. Even this is not all. For,

IV. The commissioner is not a man vested by the constitution, as cited above, with "the judicial power of the United