individual in society to accommodate the amount of his purchases to his means or his wishes, was never before meddled with, so far as our knowledge has extended; and the Legislature, which assumes the power of interference in this matter, usurps a power which the people have never conferred upon it. We do not believe the principle has ever been adopted by the most despotic government in Europe.

"We are opposed to this Liquor Bill,' because it licenses the practice of what it virtually declares to be an offence. If the mere drinking of ardent spirits be a crime, which it is proper to suppress by law, what sort of morality must govern the action of those legislators who license it, and not only provide for the practice of a crime under the sanction of a license, but raise a revenue from the license? In what respect does this differ from the system of selling indulgences, once popular and universal, and still practised to some extent in Catholic countries? If it be proper to license the sale of spiritous liquors, and to raise a revenue from the sale of an article, the use of which is immoral, destructive to health, and productive of vice, pauperism, and crime, there are other vices and immoralities, which are equally entitled to legal indulgence. Why should not our legislative guardians of private morals pursue the system on which they have begun to act, and license brothels? Such things are done in some countries, and for reasons not altogether unlike some that have been offered in justification of the licensing of the sale of spiritous liquors. . . .

"We are opposed to the monopoly which this bill authorizes, and, in this respect, it is more objectionable

than the law of 1838, which it professes to modify and make more palatable.' Where does the Legislature get its power to grant exclusive privileges? The exercise of such a power is expressly forbidden in the Constitution. Yet the legislators, sworn to support the Constitution, give to A. a license to monopolize the entire sale of a certain article, in certain specified quantities, which will accommodate a certain portion of the people who wish to purchase, but they say to B. if he presumes to sell the same article, in quantities to accommodate the wants or the means of another portion of the people, he shall be subject to severe penalties and punishments. The very mockery of justice, a gross perversion of legislative prerogative.

"We opposed the bill, because it punishes, as a crime, an act harmless in itself, but, in consequence of that act, crime should be committed. This is neither more nor less than punishing innocence instead of guilt, a principle that has never, we believe, till now, been adopted in the legislation or jurisprudence of any age or nation. It is offering a premium, in this case, for drunkenness, and holding out indemnity to intemperance.. Those who support this bill must, if they would be consistent in their adherence to principle, prohibit the use of fire, lest an incendiary should burn up a city;- they should prohibit the sale of all sorts of drugs and medicines, for they are all poisons, (as was stated on oath, by a physician, before the committee,) and if used in sufficient quantities, will produce sickness, delirium, and death; they should prohibit the sale of every kind of useful or necessary

implement, because there is not one of them which may not, in the hands of the wicked and the vicious, be used to the injury of others.

"It is manifest that the bill was not the product of free, unshackled opinion; and this assertion needs no other proof than the declaration so often repeated by the chairman of the committee, that it was the result of a compromise, a bill of mutual concessions. We opposed the bill for this very reason. Had all the members of the committee acted solely under the influence of the doctrine involved in the quotations at the head of this article, a doctrine which pervades the whole Constitution, and is in perfect harmony with all the provisions of that instrument, what need would there have been of mutual concessions? What apology for a compromise? Concede one right to obtain possession of another? Make a compromise with usurped authority? Has not every free man, (and there ought to be no other than free men in Massachusetts,) the right to acquire, possess, and enjoy property,' without conceding any part of his right to the gratification of the caprices, the whims, the prejudices,ay, the honest prejudices,—of another? And has the Legislature the power to say, that a man shall not enjoy whatever he can purchase with a dollar, merely because he can purchase but little? Or has the Legislature any constitutional power to prescribe a minimum in respect to the sale of any article, so as to prevent the use of it by the

poorest man in the state?

Or

can

it

say, that a man (rich or poor) shall not have a copper's-worth,

unless he shall purchase as much as he can get for five dollars?

"We deny-peremptorily deny the power of the Legislature to do any such thing. We feel the responsibility of the oath we have repeatedly taken to support the Constitution, when we say, that, ‘as we understand it,' the Constitution confers upon the Legislature no such power."

March 25, 1839.

"The Fifteen-gallon Law goes into operation today. Several projects of modification have been and still are before the Legislature, but whether any of them will ever pass, is more than we would undertake to predict. We are not among the number of those who have declared that this law cannot be enforced. Such a declaration seems to indicate a distrust of the energy of the government and the integrity of the people, which we will not for a moment indulge. We do not believe that the law will be very rigidly enforced, and we are of opinion that it will be daily and openly disregarded. It is not consonant to the views and feelings of a majority of the people, or, if it be, it is not denied that a large and respectable minority are arrayed against it. It is offensively aristocratic in one of its principal features, - prohibiting the sale of certain liquors, which are used by one, and that not the wealthiest class of the community, and permitting the unrestrained sale and use of certain other liquors, which are chiefly used by the richer and more extravagant. It prohibits the sale of brandy, when called by that name; but permits it, when called wine. It is a

sumptuary law, of the most odious character. If its severe enforcement should not be attempted, it may remain on the statute-book a dead letter, like the law enforcing a penalty for observing Christmas, or for a woman to be seen in the public street in a silk dress; but if its ultra friends should undertake to prosecute all violations of it, we apprehend that there will be a fearful looking for of agitation and disturbance of the elements of society, such as will not be allayed without the production of social, political and moral evils, that have had no parallel among us. We look for legal and constitutional opposition to the law, from the friends of public order and private right; and from such persons no other than legal and constitutional opposition is to be expected."*

April 1, 1839.

The position thus taken in relation to the Fifteengallon Law, was not cordially approved by all the subscribers. The paper was denounced as an advocate of, or at least an apologist for, intemperance, at two or three meetings of temperance societies. Occasionally a subscriber ordered his paper to be discontinued. During the year 1839, constant and vigorous efforts were made in almost every part of the

* I am fully aware that the sentiments put forth in these extracts, and in numerous others which might be quoted from the Courier, in reference to the power of the Legislature to grant licenses, and to prohibit the free sale of spiritous liquors, will not find much favor at the present day. They were opposed as ridiculous and wicked when they were originally uttered. neither ridicule nor censure changed my opinion. The observation and experience of fourteen years have not changed it. It is not, however, the object of these extracts to frame, or introduce, an argument, but to give a specimen of the argument, as it was published.

But