Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

tter.

t of

ear,

by

tally

is of

med

the

gth,

are

diffi

m in

real

hese

the

idle

gies.

ty to

La

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

DIFFERENT METHODS OF HIRING LABOURERS.

71

cessary, in the view of preventing the labourers from overworking themselves, to limit the sums which they could earn in a given time. But this ultra zeal is not manifested, except in the case of parties engaged for a short period only, or when they first begin to work under the system. Regula task-work labourers, though distinguished by their industry and perseverance, do not overwork themselves. They are also, much more their own masters than those engaged for certain terms. They are, in truth, contractors as well as labourers. And provided they execute their work within the term stipulated (if such stipulation be made), they may choose their own time for working, and begin and leave off wher they please.

Piece work is also by far the most likely, if it be not the only means by which the mere labourer can expect to advance himself to a higher station. A man undertakes to cut down corn at so much an acre, to make roads and drains at so much a rood, to weave cloth at so much a yard, in short, to execut a certain amount of work for a certain price. Sometimes h restricts his undertaking to what he thinks he can execut himself, with perhaps the assistance of his family. Bu whether he do this, or employ others (sometimes in the way of sub-contractors) to assist him, it is his object to finish hi task as expeditiously as possible, and to employ his profits a a means of extending his business. In this way he graduall ises in the scale of society, till, having ceased to work wit his own hands, he becomes a contractor on a large scale, o engages in some other occupation. And it is plain that th training and experience he has had, and the habits he ha formed, must make him at once a vigilant and a discerning master. The foundations of thousands of middling, and o very many large fortunes, have been laid in the way nov stated. It is, in truth, the broadest, the easiest, and th safest of the various channels by which diligent, sagacious and frugal individuals emerge from poverty, and attain t respectability and opulence. Those who thus rise to dis tinction may be emphatically said to be the architects o

their own fortunes. They owe nothing to interest, to favour, or to any unworthy means. They stood originally on the same level with their fellow-workmen, and they owe their elevation to the judicious exercise of talents common to them all.

There cannot, therefore, as it appears to us, be any reasonable doubt that the introduction of the practice of piece-work, or of hiring by the job, has been, and that its further extension would be, a great advantage to all classes, but especially to the labourers. It appears to be the only plan by which a man's earnings are not only made to depend upon, but are exactly proportioned to his labour, skill, and ingenuity; while it has the further advantage of enabling prudent and enterprising individuals to advance themselves, by comparatively easy steps, to a superior condition, and, in the end, to merge the character of labourer in that of employer.

It has sometimes been said, that it would be good policy to endeavour to interest labourers in the zealous prosecution of the task in which they may be engaged, by making their wages depend, in part at least, on the result of their exertions. But except in a few limited and peculiar cases, this could not be done. The wages of sailors may be, and indeed usually are, made to depend on the successful termination of the voyage. But how could the wages of the work-people employed on a farm, in a foundry, or in a cotton-mill, be made to depend on the result of such speculative undertakings ? Very frequently, however, the workpeople now referred to, are paid by the piece; and, when such is the case, they have a plain and tangible motive, level to their capacities, and not depending on anything remote or contingent, to make every exertion.

But, though the practical difficulties in the way of making the wages of labourers dependent on the results of the employments in which they are engaged, were less formidable than they appear to be, we should not, in the great majority of cases, anticipate any advantages from the scheme being

[merged small][ocr errors]

advantage to be allowed to participate in a chance of thi the fixed portion of their wages would be proporti diminished, and at every failure of an enterprise, the lab engaged in it would be thrown upon the work-house, the contributions of the benevolent. It is nugatory t pose that the condition of the poor should be improv their engaging in such uncertain projects. Security, reward proportioned to their deserts, conduce most to well-being. And these, we have seen, are enjoyed i highest degree by the piece-work labourers. They are n dependent on the seasons, or on any one of the tho unforeseen contingencies that may occur to defeat the carefully conducted industrious speculation. They depe themselves only; and being sure of a commensurate re they invariably put forth all their energies.

It is further obvious that if work-people are to be rested in the result of an undertaking, they must have control over its conduct, and be authorized to inquire the accounts and proceedings of those by whom the u taking is managed. All the advantages of individual e prise and responsibility would, in consequence, be lost the most necessary and judicious steps, in the conduc business, might be objected to or censured by those incompetent to form a judgment upon such matters. present, when a capitalist engages in any undertakin knows beforehand that he will reap all the advantage if successful, and that, if otherwise, he will have to bear a loss. He is consequently determined, by the most pow

motives, to act discreetly, to proscribe all useless expense, and to avail himself of every means or incident that may present itself, to facilitate his projects. Except in a very few cases, all industrious undertakings are sure to be carried on most efficiently and economically by individuals. But of all sorts of interference, that of the workmen would be most objectionable. It would hardly, indeed, be more absurd for a general to take the opinion of the privates of his army on questions of strategy, than it would be for a capitalist to call his labourers to his councils, and mould them according to their opinions.

CHAPTER VII.

Law for repressing Combinations among Workmen repealed in 1824-Impolicy of that Law-Its real effect-Voluntary, Combinations should not be forcibly suppressed-Such combinations are often injurious to the Workmen-Necessity for preventing one set of Workmen from obstructing others in their Employments.

BESIDES the causes of variations in the rate of wages, specified in Chapter V., they are supposed to be materially affected by the strikes and combinations which frequently exist among workmen; and as this is a subject of much importance, and with respect to which there is a considerable difference of opinion, we shall shortly examine it.

It was the practice of the legislature, subsequently to the reign of Edward I., to interfere respecting the stipulations in the contract of wages between masters and servants. And, its deliberations being in most cases guided by the advice of the masters, it was natural that it should interfere, rather to promote their particular interests, than that it might treat both parties with the same even-handed and impartial justice. But the gradual though slow dissemina

COMBINATIONS.

tion of sounder and more enlarged principles of publi nomy having impressed all classes with a conviction a general impolicy of such interference, it was latterl rarely practised. The experience of nearly five hundred has shown that, while every attempt to set a maximum o price of labour is oppressive and injurious to the workm is of no real advantage to their employers; for it has found that workmen have invariably become more pers ing, sober, and industrious, according as their freedom been extended, and as they have been relieved from the tious restraints to which they were formerly subjected.

But though the legislature had long ceased to dictat precise terms on which masters should buy and wor sell their labour, a set of laws were of late much exte and were very frequently acted upon, by which wor were severely punished for combining together to their wages, or to oppose their reduction. These laws, were in no ordinary degree partial and unjust, had origin in a dark and barbarous period. The dreadful p that desolated England, in common with most other tries of Europe, in 1348 and 1349, having destroyed numbers of the labouring poor, a greater competition place for the services of those who survived, who, in c quence, obtained much higher wages.1 Parliament, how instead of leaving this temporary rise of wages, to whic poor had an unquestionable right, to be modified by tl crease of population it would have occasioned, passed, in the famous act (25 Edward III., c. 1) for regulating w By this statute, labourers were obliged to serve for wages as were common in the districts in which they re previously to the pestilence. But, as this gave rise to a deal of cavilling, a statute was passed two years after, the specific amount of the wages to be given to re mowers, haymakers, thrashers, &c., and to the more co and important classes of artificers.?

1 See ante, p. 21.

A variety of subse

2 See the Rates in Sir F. M. Eden's State of the Poor, vol. i. Į

« AnteriorContinuar »