The theory that an autocratic system of government exists in Egypt having thus been disproved, some other explanation is required of the reason why the situation has become more acute after a long period of quiescence and as to the cause of the rumours of unrest and discontent which have lately been rife. A comparison of the conditions of to-day with those that prevailed at the commencement of the occupation will, we think, show that the problem to be solved has greatly changed its character. The programme of reforms undertaken in 1883 is, doubtless, unfinished, and there are many political and administrative questions still outstanding, but the main issues to which attention must now be paid differ from those formerly presented not merely in degree but in kind. Latterly the situation has been imperceptibly changing and it is just beginning to be seen that we are face to face with a new problem in Egypt, a problem which is accompanied by new difficulties and which may require a new method of treatment. The transition from the one phase to the other has, of course, been gradual, like all movements due to the operation of natural causes, and it is not possible to lay down an exact date when the first period ended and the second began. The best landmark that can be suggested is the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement concerning Egypt and Morocco in 1904, for that instrument happily determined the greatest of our original Egyptian difficulties and left the field open to the play of new and more recondite forces.

The moment appears, then, opportune to take stock of the situation, to survey briefly what has already been accomplished, to discuss the more salient features of the present state of affairs, and to see what light the experience of the past can throw on the new questions which are now coming into prominence.

The story of the regeneration of Egypt under the master-hand of Lord Cromer has been often told and forms the subject of a considerable mass of literature, beginning with Lord Milner's standard work 'England in Egypt,' first published in 1892, and ending with the admirable account of the making of modern Egypt by Sir Auckland Colvin, Egypt's first financial adviser. We do not propose here to tell that story over again or to attempt to enumerate the facts which testify to the success of Great Britain's work. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to indicate the main diseases from which the Egyptian body politic suffered in 1883, the remedies applied, and the result of twenty-one years of the treatment.

At the time when Lord Cromer, then Sir Evelyn Baring, entered upon his long and laborious task, four questions of the

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first importance forced themselves upon his attention. most urgent was the fruit of the financial follies and ruinous extravagance of the former Khedive Ismaïl, which had reduced the country to the verge of bankruptcy. A foreign debt out of all proportion to the national resources, an empty treasury, a population taxed almost beyond endurance, an universal clamour for increased expenditure on urgent and indispensable reforms, these were the chief features of the financial situation. Secondly, the machine of government had fallen to pieces and chaos reigned in every department. The authority and prestige of the Khedive, which was the mainspring of the old administrative system, had temporarily vanished and there was no outward and visible sign to replace it in the eyes of the people. The native tribunals, recently organised under Lord Dufferin's scheme, were inexperienced and the system of criminal procedure adopted was far too elaborate for the requirements of the country. The paralysis of the old authority which had succeeded in maintaining order, though its methods were abusive, and the inadequacy of the new affected very adversely the state of public security in the provinces and culminated in 1885 in a severe outbreak of brigandage. The army had been disbanded after the suppression of the rebellion, the police force was disorganised and quite inefficient, and the irrigation service upon which the daily life of the country depended was defective in system and corrupt in practice.

A third complication arose out of the international system which had established itself in Egypt in a far more acute form than elsewhere in the Ottoman dominions. The powers of the Egyptian Government over resident foreigners in regard to taxation and civil and criminal jurisdiction were restricted within very narrow limits by virtue of the Turkish conventions with the Powers of Europe known as the Capitulations. The local authorities had no right to arrest, imprison or punish a foreign criminal, such matters being of the exclusive competence of his own consul. No direct tax could be imposed on a foreign merchant or householder without the previous consent of his Government. Further, the financial administration of the country was regulated by a tangled mass of international agreements, the combined product of the many settlements of the Egyptian Debt which preceded the period of the occupation. It would be a waste of time to explain all the complicated and vexatious stipulations which have now happily disappeared, and it is sufficient here to point out that almost any financial legislation was certain to conflict with arrangements which could not be changed without the assent of all the Great Powers of Europe.

The last and blackest cloud that overshadowed the horizon was the dervish rising in the Soudan. The courageous and fanatical followers of the Mahdi, by the extermination of the disorganised rabble sent against them under General Hicks and by their victories over the Egyptian troops near Suakin, became masters of those distant provinces within a month or two of Lord Cromer's arrival in Cairo. Flushed with success, they were busily engaged in reducing one by one the Egyptian garrisons that still held out, massacring their gallant defenders without mercy, and there seemed every prospect that the invasion would spread to Egypt proper. The newly created Egyptian army was still undisciplined and untried, and, with the exception of the British garrison, there were no troops in the country capable of taking either offensive or defensive operations against the forces of the false prophet.

The outlook was sufficiently gloomy, but matters were further complicated by the presence of special and peculiar obstacles, of which the first and greatest was due to the provisional character of the occupation. Though no precise date was ever fixed, it was understood that the British troops were to leave the country as soon as order was restored. The prospect of this contingency had, throughout the course of the earlier years, a paralysing effect upon the introduction of serious reforms into the administration. What was the use of planning and erecting an elaborate structure if it were destined to crumble to pieces within a short time? In such a case it was more practical to patch up temporarily the old building and make it as habitable as possible. Hence the first efforts of the Anglo-Egyptian reformers bore a somewhat hand-tomouth character, and it was not until 1888, when it became evident to all the world that a precipitate withdrawal of the British garrison would render the last state of Egypt worse than the first, that this disturbing influence passed away. Not only did the workers commence their labours under the shadow of an impending evacuation, but they were at first deprived of the incentive which those employed in distant lands expect to find in the encouragement and applause of their countrymen at home. The British Governments of those days, both Conservative and Liberal, heartily disliked the occupation. Lord Salisbury even made a serious attempt to bring it to a close by approving the abortive convention which Sir Henry Drummond Wolff signed with the Porte in May 1887, but which, with the proverbial good-luck which has so often enabled England to escape from the consequences of her own follies, the Sultan ultimately refused to ratify. Nor

were the British public more sympathetic or more appreciative. To the man in the street during the eighties Egypt spelt loss of British lives, loss of British money, and the abandonment of a national hero; to the Cabinet Minister it represented the assumption of undesired responsibilities and the weakest spot in England's diplomatic armour.

The discouragement occasioned by English indifference was not lessened by the general hostility with which the great experiment being carried out on the banks of the Nile was regarded in Europe. Though the Great Powers, with France at their head, were unwilling to participate in the task of restoring order in Egypt and had reluctantly assented to it being entrusted to this country, they viewed our intervention with jealousy and mistrust and neglected no opportunity of opposing, both openly and in secret, the execution of our programme. We have already seen what facilities for obstruction were afforded by the hold which internationalism had acquired in the reign of Ismaïl. In consequence, many of the most urgent proposals for dealing with a very critical state of affairs entailed months of wrangling and bargaining in all the chanceries of Europe, whilst others equally urgent had to be abandoned altogether in consequence of the opposition which they were certain to encounter. Moreover, the unfriendly attitude of the European Governments produced a corresponding effect upon their colonies in Egypt. Though the foreign residents in that country form but a small part of the total population, their influence, owing to the privileges and immunities with which they have been so long surrounded, is out of all proportion to their number, and the passive resistance with which many of them met our first efforts at reform was no mean obstacle to overcome.

Another initial difficulty was due to the fact that the great majority of the Anglo-Egyptian officials had little or no experience of the country over the government of which they were expected to exercise a controlling influence. Mistakes were made which, with some knowledge of local conditions, might have been avoided. The wishes and prejudices of the native population were not always treated with due consideration. Zealous but hasty reformers endeavoured to introduce ready-made Western ideas before a somewhat unfavourable soil had been sufficiently prepared. The Egyptians on their side had not yet learnt to understand the methods of their new rulers, and the recollection of centuries of oppression under alien masters inclined them to be extremely suspicious of their motives. These misunderstandings between the Englishman and the

Egyptian, arising out of imperfect acquaintance, affected in a more pronounced form the relations between the higher officials of the two nationalities. In matters of policy and administration it was inevitable that the views of the newly arrived reformer should differ widely from those of the old-fashioned Egyptian minister trained in the despotic methods of the Khedive Ismaïl. The internal friction developed under the stress of conflicting opinions was considerable and at times threatened to bring the machine almost to a standstill. It must be added that some of the most bitter controversies of those early days arose between rival Britons, each with his own special panacea to advocate, and that on such occasions the Egyptian Prime Minister was not slow to seize the opportunity of displaying the Oriental talent for fishing in troubled waters.

It would not be easy to conceive a more unpromising combination of circumstances than that which has thus been briefly described. Fortunately, there was a silver lining to the cloud, or the story of the regeneration of Egypt might still remain to be told. The brightest spot was to be found in the fact that England had, by a chance rare in her history, for once selected the right man for the place, and, having selected him, had, by a still rarer chance, allowed him a free hand to manage the business in his own way. Whatever view may be taken of the work that has been accomplished in Egypt, there can be no doubt as to the man who inspired the policy and controlled its execution. The Egypt of to-day is the handiwork of Lord Cromer, whose reputation as a statesman and administrator must rest entirely upon his achievements on the banks of the Nile. The unique position which Lord Cromer occupies in the minds not only of his countrymen, but also of the millions over whose welfare he watches, is due to the possession in a very high degree of those qualities which are the most valuable heritage of the Anglo-Saxon race and to which the success of that race in ruling Eastern peoples may be attributed. A strong will, absolutely straightforward methods-sometimes qualified by a harsher epithet by those who have suffered from themjudgement to recognise the right course and patience to wait for the right moment to take it, an absence of all personal vanity or jealousy so entire that it has often been complained that Lord Cromer having no such human weaknesses himself is unable to sympathise with their existence in others, the power of getting the best possible work out of those with whom he has to co-operate, and of inspiring the mass of the governed with confidence in his intentions and in the wisdom of the measures carried out under his direction-these are the distinguishing