have been heretofore inserted by some conveyancers, as applicable to several assurances, will be omitted in deeds intended to have operation under it: although we are by no means sure of this, as conveyancers cling with the greatest affection to their old words, and some good or doubtful reason (which is quite sufficient), may be found for retaining them. But the only new effect that this section can have on the deed itself, is to strike out two or three of these operative words which may possibly be supplied by others.

The sixth section deprives the words "grant" and "exchange” of the effect of creating any warranty or right of re-entry, or of creating any covenant by implication, except in cases where, by any act of parliament, it is or shall be declared that the word "grant" shall have such effect. The practice of conveyancing, even if there were ever any serious doubt on the point', has long since rendered harmless the word "grant." The effect of the word "exchange" was more powerful, and so far this is really a necessary clause.

Next comes the eighth clause, which is, in our opinion, the most useful, so far as the intention goes, in the Act. It enacts that, after the 1st of January, no estate in land shall be created by way of contingent remainder, but every estate which, before this time, would have taken effect as a contingent remainder, shall take effect (if in a will or codicil), as an executory devise, and (if in a deed), as an executory estate of the same nature, and having the same properties as an executory devise: It further enacts, that contingent remainders existing under deeds, wills, or instruments executed or made before the time when the act comes into operation, shall not fail or be destroyed or barred, merely by reason of the destruction or merger of any preceding estate.

This clause will probably render the limitation usually inserted in marriage settlements to trustees, "to preserve contingent remainders" unnecessary. The first part of Mr. Fearne's celebrated Essay will henceforth be a treatise on an estate which can no longer be created, and the clause will, we trust, settle effectually many doubts and difficulties which ought in fact never to have arisen. Were we inclined, however, to be hyper

! See Butl. Co. Litt. 384 a. n. 1.

critical, we might here ask, whether it be possible for an act of parliament, omnipotent as its power is, to enact that “no estate in land shall be created by way of contingent remainder." An act of parliament may deprive this estate of its peculiar properties or effects; but how can it be said that it shall not in future be created? If an estate be limited to A., remainder to B., if C. comes from Rome before next January, will this not be still a contingent remainder, although by this act it may take effect as an executory estate. The marginal note to this section, indeed, carries this doctrine a point further, as according to this "contingent remainders " are "abolished." This reminds us of a story told of a learned and eloquent person who may be considered to be the survivor of Lord Eldon's school: when it was suggested to him that a bill for abolishing contingent remainders would be desirable, he exclaimed," Abolish contingent remainders! Why not repeal the law of gravitation?”

The ninth clause may be said to have a violent effect. It enacts, that when any person entitled to any freehold or copyhold land by way of mortgage, has or shall have departed this life, and his executor or administrator is or shall be entitled to the money secured by the mortgage, and the legal estate in such land is, or shall be vested in the heir or devisee of such mortgagee, or the heir, devisee, or other assign of such heir or devisee, and possession of the land shall not have been taken by virtue of the mortgage; nor any action or suit be depending, such executor or administrator shall have power upon payment of the principal money and interest due to him on the said mortgage, to convey by deed or surrender (as the case may require) the legal estate which became vested in such heir or devisee, and such conveyance shall be as effectual as if the same had been made by any such heir or devisee, his heirs or assigns. Would it not have been better to have made the estate created by the mortgage cease or determine on payment of the mortgage money. As it is, we will venture to say that this clause will frequently lead in practice to a conveyance being taken from both heir and executor to avoid all questions under the act.

The tenth clause has a very useful object. It provides that the bonâ fide payment to, and the receipt of any person

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to whom any money shall be payable upon any express or implied trust, or for any limited purpose, or of the survivors or survivor of two or more mortgagees or holders, or the executors or administrators of such survivor, or their, or his assigns, shall effectually discharge the person paying the same, from seeing to the application or being answerable for the misapplication thereof, unless the contrary shall be expressly declared by the instrument creating the trust or security. This, if not expressly aimed at, will in some cases supersede the necessity for one of the most usual common forms, which runs in the precedent books, "trustees' receipts to be sufficient discharges." This at any rate must be held to be the intention of the act.

The eleventh clause begins with the beginning, and from the 1st day of January next declares, that "it shall not be necessary in any case to have a deed indented." But as the statute does not say that a deed between, and executed by, several parties shall have the effect of an indenture as to estoppels, &c. it seems doubtful whether even after the 1st of January an indenture can be safely dispensed with. It further removes any real or supposed distinction between indentures and deeds poll as to a person not a party to the deed taking an immediate benefit under it.

These are the only clauses of the act, which in any way affect the formal parts of deeds, and we have endeavoured to do them full justice. In the main, we approve of the alteration made by the act, but it surely cannot be said, that they are all that are necessary. The substitution of the word "deed" for indenture; the dispensing with the waving line which has in fact long been dispensed with; the superseding the necessity for two common forms, even if the Act has this effect, and the questionable transfer of the legal estate from the heir to the executor in paying off a mortgage; these are surely not the only obvious blots on the present system of conveyancing. This is not that amendment which was called for by the profession in 1829, and has been expected ever since. This act, curtailed as it was in its progress through the House of Lords, would surely not have been the result of the inquiries of the Real Property Commissioners had they ever fully prosecuted them on this

subject. We gladly hail these alterations as an earnest of the intentions of the Lord Chancellor; they are steps in the right direction; they are an instalment of the debt which has so long been due; they prove that Her Majesty's Government are directing their attention to the subject, and they are an important admission of the principle that some of the common forms of conveyancing may be superseded by legislative enactment. More than this we cannot say. We think however the whole subject of the revision of the common assurances of the land deserving of the most careful attention. We would further say, that it is a matter as to which partial and bit by bit legislation is peculiarly unappropriate and in convenient.

We are desirous therefore of rendering all the assistance in our power, and would wish the profession to consider the two branches of the subject, suggested by the Real Property Commissioners, as they both appear to us, either separately or together, particularly well-fitted for discussion in a work of this nature. Let us however endeavour to remove one or two stumbling-blocks in the way of their free and unbiassed consideration.

The usual argument then against any change of this nature has been, that the common forms of conveyancing, to which a well-known meaning is attached, and which, in fact, embody the wisdom of ages on the subject of the alienation of property, would be displaced by any legislation of this nature. Now we are enthusiasts in the love of these very forms: their value is inestimable; and so far as our own opinion and prepossessions are concerned, in any dealing with property which concerns ourselves, we would not dispense with one of them. reverence every word of them, and if ever we married we would certainly jointure our wife in the words of Ignora

mus:

We

'Ego Ambidexter Ignoramus infeoffo te, uxorem meam Rosabellam in taile special de situ manerii de Longuewell cum capitali messuagio, et do tibi omnia et singula messuagia, tofta, crofta, cottagia et columbaria, molendina, fullonica, aquatica, ventritica, gardina, tenementa, boscos, subboscos, jampna, brueria, moras, mariscos salsos, mariscos freschos, juncaria, turbaria, alneta, moscheta, communia pasture, liberam warrennam, piscariam, faldagium, et

decimas garbarum, bladorum granorum, agnellorum, fœni, lini, cannabis, tallagium, stallagium, pontagium, picagium, escheta, catalla felonum, waviata extrahuras, wrecca maris."

Ignoramus, Act I. Scene 5.

But the abandonment of these forms we submit is not the question to be resolved. The real question now is, must these forms be detailed in every particular deed, or cannot their benefit be obtained by a reference to them? Would it not be of inestimable advantage first to have these common forms settled and approved by the most competent persons in the profession, and then to have the power of referring to them by using some very short form? Is this an impossible thing to be achieved? The forms are now to be found with certain variations, and in a more or less imperfect shape in the pigeon-holes of the conveyancer, whence they are taken and inserted in each particular deed, dealing with property according to its nature one set for purchase deeds, another set for mortgages, a third for settlements of real estate, and a fourth for settlements of personal estate, and so on. Would it not be possible to give the public, yes, and the profession also, the benefit of these well-known forms on some other plan? and is not this a worthy object to which to draw the attention of persons competent to consider the matter, or are we to be precluded from even discussing this question?

We are very desirous however of not being misunderstood on one point which has been supposed to be intimately connected with any alteration of the nature alluded to. It has been supposed, that it must materially affect the profits of the profession. Now the opinion of this Journal has been already and distinctly avowed to be in favour of the proper remuneration of the profession. The interests committed to both branches of it are too dear to us all, not to be guarded with the utmost vigilance. The services performed cannot in our opinion be sufficiently estimated or rewarded. We need not say therefore, that we are not going to halloo on the public. against the profession, or proclaim any war against its fees or emoluments. This in our eyes would be as idle and wicked as it would be vain and absurd. We shall, so far as we are able, support and protect the just rights and interests of the profession. But, to do this effectually, we