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this situation. However, a combination of the Large Space Telescope, already under development, with a Landsat type of sensor system could provide an image from geosynchronous altitudes as often as required. The ground resolution at the nadir point would approach ten meters, which is considerably better than that planned for Landsat-D. It would be quite feasible to obtain an image each hour of the whole United States. A combination of the Large Space Telescope and Landsat would be a very complex device and the probability of failure may seem high. That danger would decrease greatly were we able to offer service to such an assembly using a Space Tug carrying human technicians and maintenance engineers. From this point of view, there are advantages to setting up

a single, loosely-coupled set of application satellites at one geosynchronous location. Such a Combined Applications Platform (CAP) should include the working quarters for service and maintenance personnel. The latter will not live there. They will make service calls on a regular basis, to check instrument performance, replace parts, and vary the orbiting devices to reflect new technology or changed data needs.

The Combined Applications Platform, with human service, needs a Space Tug to make it an economical and practical reality.

Proposed: That a CAP project be initiated, with launch planned for 1993. I suggest that the CAP may include a pilot version of the solar power satellite. This would not be the large structure envisioned for provision of gigawatts of power. Rather, it would be a test version, scoped to confirm a basic design philosophy and establish system efficiency.

I believe that this approach is consistent with Resolution 451, introduced by Mr. Teague in December, 1977, and I believe that it has one very attractive feature: it does not put all our eggs in one basket. If there should be a breakthrough in clean fusion power in the next fifteen years,

and if as a result solar power then looks non-competitive, the CAP is still justified by its other uses in earth resources, weather and communications.

If the steps I propose are taken, at the times that I have suggested, the position by the end of the 1990's will be attractive.

First, we will have given up none of our options. If solar power looks economical and useful, we can have a small pilot project up there and working. At the same time, we will have a much clearer idea whether or not the Moon can be a feasible source of materials for solar power satellites and other large space structures. We will have an improved launch capability that makes further lunar work, or even manned planetary expeditions, much less expensive t will also provide a service function for unmanned applications satellites, in low or geosynchronous orbit. Finally, we will have gained a much larger body of knowledge regarding man in space.

At that point, twenty years from now, we will have to make some more decisions but we will have many more facts available to make them than we have now. We should be able to look at solar power satellites and space stations from a much sounder basis of knowledge. The analysis of costs and benefits becomes a more reasonable activity. The danger is that we may fail to undertake initiatives now, because of fallacious attempts to see accurately to the end of this century.


As you can see, I have confined myself to only three major goals. I regard the great virtue of the Apollo program as the existence of a single, clearly-defined objective with a definite completion date.

The three goals given here, like Apollo, imply a host of subsidiary milestones, but I do not want consideration of them to dilute the focus on the main objectives. With the program suggested here, there is less danger of being led into a fragmented effort and a piecemeal approach.

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There is one factor that is missing from this discussion. The United States spends and will continue to spend considerable resources in space systems dedicated to defense objectives. Obviously, I have not sought to integrate such systems, present and planned, into my analysis. I would like to urge this committee to seek to maximize the overlap of the civilian and military space programs, and to make sure that any study that may result from these hearings has a suitable emphasis on that subject. The projects we are discussing are expensive, and we have no money to spare for duplication of effort or re-discovery of the wheel.

If my proposals appear prosaic, and lacking in the drama and imaginative scope conjured by the phrase 'The High Frontier', that is only because I believe strongly that we must anchor our dreams in engineering reality. Space is a frontier. For the foreseeable future, it is not only a high frontier, it is a high-technology frontier. If we are misled by analogies to previous expansion phases of the human race, so that we lose sight of the central role that technology and engineering feasibility must play in any space program, then we will be unable to structure a real program.

That would be a tragedy. In my opinion the U.S. Space Program, over the past twenty years, has amazed the whole world. More than that, it is the only major effort in that time that the United States has undertaken and demonstrably succeeded in. The war on crime, the war on drugs, Vietnam, the increased expenditures on education, on welfare and on energy independ

all these, realistically, have been failures.

I believe that a bold space program, clearly defined with realistic goals and aggressively pursued, can repeat in the next twenty years the pattern of success that we have experienced in the past twenty.

Thank you.




Mr. SHEFFIELD. I am honored to be here today and to be a witness at these hearings.

It is very interesting to me to note that although Mr. Jeffs, Mr. Stine, and I have not talked to each other prior to these hearings, we have considerable overlap in our views.

Benjamin Disraeli once remarked that all sensible men were of the same religion. When asked what religion that was, he said sensible men never tell. Apparently, sensible men often tend to the same views about the space program.

I am a vice president of Earth Satellite Corp., and I also serve as first vice president of the American Astronautical Society. I will try and wear both hats in this testimony.

In one role I am immediately concerned with how you make a profit right now with application of the space program. With the American Astronautical Society, I am much more concerned with the broad view of the whole U.S. space activity.

I think the best way to give you my idea of where we go in the space program is to give a concrete plan for the next 20 years. The plan has three major pieces.

First of all, it contains my perception of what I think the best combination has to be between practical application and long-range development.

Second, any plan has to address the relationship of the unmanned program and the manned program.

And, third, any plan, to be useful, has to keep flexibility.

Like all witnesses appearing before this committee today and on subsequent days, I began with a certain preestablished set of convictions of my own. To avoid confusion, I will state those in advance as explicitly as possible. I would like to begin by quoting one of your colleagues, as follows:

We all know that it has more than three times as many mountains, inaccessible and rocky hills, and sandy wastes, as are possessed by any State of the Union. But how much is there of useful land? How much that may be made to contribute to the support of man and of society? These ought to be the questions ** the agricultural products of the whole surface * * * never will be equal to one half part of those of the State of Illinois; no, nor yet a fourth, or perhaps a tenth part.

This sounds as if it might be a commentary on a proposed lunar program, or perhaps taken from a speech about the Viking Mars-landers. It is not. It is taken from a speech made in the Senate by Daniel Webster, on June 27, 1850. His remarks referred to the State of California. They were made in connection with the proposed admission of that territory to the Union of States.

I know that some people on the east coast will still tell you that California is a big desert, but this is probably a minority viewpoint now. I am introducing Mr. Webster's words here to point out something that should be clear to all of us. We have no idea of the long-term benefits that can accrue from a territory or a development.

If you had asked people 80 years ago what Alaska was, they would have said it was a bunch of frozen land that was useless. The point I am making is that if we attempt, right now, to itemize the long-term benefits from the space program, we will be talking through our hats.

We can't do it. The idea of a cost-benefit study, or a cost-effectiveness study, as the dominant way in which we decide our priorities is in my opinion a very badly mistaken idea, and so my first assumption is as follows:

A rational series of long-range priorities for the U.S. space program cannot be established using only cost-benefit or any other accounting method.

There are two problems. One is that you can use a cost-benefit study to hide behind, and you avoid going out on the line with a tough decision. Second, if you rely too much on this you take away the main reason for having intelligent and responsible people running the space


Now I have talked about the benefit side and illustrated it with California, but equally well, we don't have much idea what the cost side will be in the long term, 30 or 40 years out. We may run into problems we don't understand yet.

To me that says that any program you follow must be kept as flexible as possible and be able to adapt to changing programs and take advantage of changing solutions. I translate that into my own terms. And my second assumption is that although we can do a lot with machines in space, we will still need to keep man up there.

So assumption two is, that the manned program is an essential piece of the U.S. space program. I know that is a bit controversial in some places, and they will say you can do as well with the unmanned spacecraft and telemetry from the ground, but I don't believe it. I do believe that the way in which we use man in space has to change. I think at the moment space is restricted to the perfect physical specimen who can take 10 or 15g and still feel happy with it. If we really go together into space, it will have to be accessible to people like us, who don't see too well, and who have sprained backs and who feel dizzy if they go up in high-speed elevators. We just have to get space accessible to normal people.

My third assumption concerns the technology. Twenty years ago Sputnik I went up and stimulated a tremendous effort on the part of the United States. The first result of that effort was the launch of Explorer I. It went up 20 years ago next Tuesday, on the 31st of January, 1958. At that time to get that satellite up required every bit of technology we had. I think everybody here will remember the sequence of failures that preceded the successful launch of Explorer I.

Look at the situation today. We have on hand adequate technology to handle a whole slew of projects in low Earth orbit. We have a good deal of capability for geosynchronous orbit and for lunar and planetary exploration. So we now have a different problem. The problem we have now is, we can't marry all the girls. We have to make some decisions as to which projects should be highest on our list of priorities.

So my third assumption is as follows: that technology is no longer the main bottlenack for space exploration and utilization.

I would not like that to be quoted out of context, because there are still very substantial engineering problems to be solved and some of these are going to require new ideas, not just the application of money but the application of considerable brains. But it does mean that we can have some choice in picking the projects that we think are most important.

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