65 the ability now, for the first time, to start from the beginning with a previously planned program. These factors together are expected to reduce the annual cost of the proposed program to less than the present cost of NASA, and to increase the accomplishments by one to two orders of magnitude. Cost data taken from the accounting records of past space programs reflect none of the factors listed in the above paragraph. In order to initiate the reiterative planning process, it is therefore necessary to make preliminary cost estimates based on experience in the repetitive production and operation of standardized machines. A summary estimate is given in Table 6.3.5. It is an order of magnitude lower than would at first be suggested by the accounting records of past NASA programs. It has not been proven right, but neither has it been proven wrong. The writer's júdgement is that if we have learned nothing in past programs the estimate is wrong. Figure 6.3.3 places the cost estimate in perspective. The hypothetical benefits curve is geared to human competence expected to be generated by the space academy, Table 6.3.2. Time is necessary to generate human competence. The sooner the academy is started, the more the benefits curve will be shifted to the left in the figure. 6.4 EXPEDITING 6.4.1 REPROGRAMMING The proposed plan is an engineering plan, and not a technology R & D plan. It is based on what we know how to do, as defined in Section 1.3. The schedule calls for planning first, and action second, and not vice versa. For these reasons, it is expected to minimize the need for improvisation. Management is therefore expected to have time to cope with unpredictable problems as they arise, and to watch for unexpected opportunities. TABLE 6.3.5 ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST PURCHASE PARTS FOR TWO LAUNCH STAGES MOTORS, 40 MILLION LBS THRUST, $ 0.60/LB THRUST PURCHASE PARTS FOR 160 NOSE CONES 104 x 1 MILLION LBS THRUST, $ 0.60/LB THRUST 160 x 200,000 LBS THRUST, $ 0.60/LB THRJST 160 x 50,000 LBS THRUST, $ 1.00/LB THRUST 160 SETS OF TANKS AND INSULATION 104 EMPTY CABINS 56 EMPTY CABINS 108 POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 17 LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 9 AERODYNAMIC ENTRY CAPSULES, $ 5 MILLION EACH 160 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS PURCHASE CUSTOM ONBOARD EQUIPMENT ASSEMBLY AND LAUNCH SITE OPERATION PURCHASE LIQUIFIED GASES NITROGEN FOR STRETCH-FORMING TANKS 3 PROPELLANTS, 218 x 14 MILLION LBS, $ 0.05/LB 153 68 889 6.4.2 BARGAINING At all stages, from making the decision to expediting the program, what the management is permitted to do is determined by the familiar process of bargaining and competition. In bargaining, people having or claiming jurisdictions (ownership, authority, proprietary positions, etc) attempt to exact tribute before allowing an action to be carried out. In its usual manifestation bargaining is a bluffing process, in which one party cannot stay in business if he accepts less than some set of terms, and the other party cannot stay in business if he gives more than some set of terms. Each party seeks to convince his opponent that he himself. is reasonable to a point just within his opponent's limits, but that beyond that point he is utterly unreasonable. The same process governs markets, international relations, labor negotiations, and space management. In space planning, congressmen may demand contracts for their districts, industrialists may, attempt to unload obsolete hardware from their shelves, managers may seek to enlarge their jurisdictions, and scientists or engineers may use the budget to support their hobbies, all to the detriment of the space program. Competition, of course, is the process which forces bargainers to be reasonable, tending to adjust agreements toward compromises which result in maximum mutual advantage. A necessary step in making the proposed program manageable is a suitable organization, such as that shown in Table 6.3.1. By avoiding diffusion of responsibility and authority, and concentrating these in accountable hands, it will help to discourage "influence peddling", and encourage competition, by both vendors and employees. 7 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Only A total unified plan for space research and solar system exploration throughout the next 35 years has been described. existing engineering knowledge is used. Launch rockets would be recovered from all flights, in an upright attitude on the launch structure, ready for reuse without refurbishment. Standardized spacecraft would be used. All missions possible within foreseeable extensions of present technology are included, totalling 218 missions per year, to all parts of the solar system. The cost would be about $2 billion per year. The plan would be operational within ten years. The plan is comprehensive in scope, and sufficiently detailed to bracket the system uncertainties. However, it is recommended that a two year planning effort be completed in such detail that all contracts will be written, ready for signatures, before any final commitment is made. The planning effort requires an autonomous team. Meanwhile, interim prograns should be devised to use the existing space installations, hardware, and people for operations which are useful in their own right, or for their contribution to the program proposed in this paper. In addition to various proposals already being considered by NASA are the following: o The NASA-proposed manned earth-orbiting laboratory should be a prototype of the manned space ship described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. o The National Space Academy should be inaugurated in 1969 at the Manned Spacecraft Center, as described in Section 6.3. o A 365-day, round-trip, manned flyby trip to Venus, launched by a single SATURN V rocket, should be undertaken. Refer to Table 3.1.1. The writer hereby volunteers to man the flight, alone or with company, during the opportunities of 1972, 1974, 1975, or 1977. Rolition W. Willipin 69 |