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1.2 METHODOLOGY OF PLANNING

As yet, most people do not understand one another when discussing: planning procedures and findings. One fallacy should be erased at the outset. A planning effort is not a commitment. The confusing of planning with commitment seems to be confined mainly to members of the NASA headquarters management team, who seem timid about explaining the difference to Congress and the public.. Clearly, congressmen can understand the distinction, for they do not expect the Department of Defense to fight every war for which a plan is prepared. It would be equally ridiculous for anyone to expect that NASA will automatically carry out every proposed space plan. But Congress and the public should be shown plans which can be rejected or accepted on their merits.

Less than 1/2000 of the NASA expenditures during the past six years have been devoted to activities directly related to planning for nanned planetary exploration, including contract and in-house efforts, and organizational overhead charges. This amounts to less than one NASA hour per NASA year. Even if we should immediately begin as rapid. an expansion of the planning effort as possible, it would take at least two years to complete a master plan, ready for large-scale work assignments, and to assimilate enough people to use a budget as large as five to ten million dollars per year. Clearly, such an effort should not be confused with commitment, for it could be terminated at any time with negligible impact on the national economy.

There are three levels of planning, as suggested by the schematic in Figure 1.2. Each has its use and its limitations. Parametric analysis has been irreverently dubbed "analysis paralysis" owing to itc frequent misuse to avoid controversy rather than to achieve results. The central problem in its use is that all the combinations of parεmeters in a complex system outnumber the atoms in the universe, liter-. ally. Some rational way must be found to be selective in the corbinations studied. Otherwise, the number of combinations will be restricted by the exhaustion of time, money, and imagination. A suitable method, which should always be an integral part of any parametric analysis, is the continuing elimination of impossible or noncompetitive combinations as these reveal themselves during the course of the study. The method

is much easier to apply when the study is otherwise restricted to existing engineering knowledge.

Reliance on the evolutionary improvement of existing hardware has characterized the automobile industry, and is accepted by many as an appropriate way to proceed in the space industry. Nevertheless, most of the missions listed in this paper would be precluded by such an approach. The projections of costs and returns based on the use of existing hardwa ‘e, even with extensive upratings, have lead many to reject a continuation of the manned exploration of space after the completion of the APOLLO moon-landing program, or at least to advocate postponement until some vague future time when we might have a better technology.

The plan proposed in this paper is based, not on the evolutionary improvement of existing hardware, but on the evolutionary improvement of a concept limited only by existing engineering knowledge. The method is first to assume a future situation, and then repeatedly rerationalize the assumption to eliminate internal inconsistencies, and to improve external relationships. The method is described in the following section of this paper.

1.3 DEFINITION OF A SPACE PLAN

In defining a space plan it will help to first define definition. A definition is a description or an example of an entity or a concept which is internally consistent and externally bounded. A definition must not be confused with usage, although informed usage tends to conform with good definition.

-Definition of a workable and competitive space plan is achieved by finding the overlap in what we want to do, what we know how to do, and what we can afford to do.

What we wait to do.

o Adventure- the pioneering spirit; needed now more than ever. o Philosophy- broadening our horizons- putting meaning into our lives.

o Technology- especially the unexpected discoveries.

o Manage sent― simulating the management of the man-earth
system, which is a large, closed-cycle space ship, in an
orbit round the sun.

What we know how to do.

o Confine the program to existing engineering knowledge,
requiring us research or development beyond that alrondy
completed during previous projects.

o Juxtapose the insensitive regions of all important variables.

What we ce. afford to do.

o We can afford to do what costs less to do than not to do.

A completely unbiased list of wants night include visits to Alpha Centauri, or tapering with the ageing process by accelerating people to the speed of light, but past studies have taught us not to waste auch time and efort wanting these things. Selecting fron among real choices, we have four categories of wants, described below.

The central problem of our overcrowded citics, with their artificial environments, is boredom, from lack of opportunity for adventure. It is well know that the cuicide rate falls dramatically during wars. lot altogether facetiously, it has been said that the primary function of army training camps, beyond furnishing men as subjects for officer training, is to confine men in such monotonous environments that they will ergerly accept unpleasant and hazardous assignments to escape the boredon. Spanic bull fights, continued as a tradition since the time of ancient Babylon and the time of pre-Atlantan Crete, Roan circuDER the Crusades of the Kiddle Ages, and the "youth rebellion" of today. have all been ofticts for the spirit of adventure. It is sometimeo

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argued that the resources expended on space exploration would be better expended on alleviating the conditions in big-city slums. The argument misses the main point. Space exploration does alleviate the central problem of the slums- boredom.

Adventure does more than entertain the masses. It keeps alive the pioneering spirit among the few who contribute significantly to progress. One person thus stimulated may contribute more to human happiness and usefulness than the entire national anti-poverty program as it is now constituted. History has always been made by the few, and if our nation wants a future history it should cultivate the few who will make it.

Philosophy is the attempt to broader our horizons, and to put meaning into our lives. Such has been the goal of the prophets, poets, scholars, and the rest of us. A reasonable estimate is that more than 10% of all human endeavor since the beginnings of magic 100,000 years ago has been devoted to the practice of magic, the support of religious institutions, the prosecution of holy wars, the persecution of heretics, social identification, and other actiors directed toward individual differentiation and identification. The NASA space program has scarcely reached 1% of the gross national product of the United States alone, and that only momentarily. Yet it has contributed in many ways to the formation of a satisfying concept of nature and man's place in nature. Cosmology, comparative planetology, life on other planets, the stretching of our mindsthese pursuits distinguish us from other animals, giving us individuality and identification and dignity as human beings.

We want space science and technology because they extend our insights and capabilities. If history is a guide, the predicted extensions will be largely forgotten, and the unpredicted extensions will far exceed our grandest expectations. We want space science for exactly the same reason we want any science or technology. We believe we see employment of our insights, skills, labor, and capital, at high wages and profits, individually and socially.