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space in the next ten years. It also reveals that there may have to be some changes in policies and organizations if we are to be able to do what we can do.

But why should it be done at all? Why shouldn't the United States simply continue a space program primarily characterized by scientific exploration, supported by tax revenues from other sources, and operating with less than one percent of the federal budget?

Report of a Recent Study

It appears that an active, innovative, progressive, and stimulative space industrialization commitment may well create a space program that will not only pay for itself but will also enjoy public support because of its potential for creating new jobs, new capital resources, new technology, new products, and new services.

I have been studying space industrialization for over five years. Others have been involved longer. But for the past sixteen months, I have been part of a team of consultants working for Science Applications, Inc. on a study contract about space industrialization for the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. The primary people involved in the study and their fields of expertise were:

Gerald W. Driggers, aerospace engineering and principal

investigator on Part 2 of the study.

Dr. Ralph Sklarew, systems planning, environmental

assessment, and principal investigator on Part 1 of the study.

Robert Salkeld, systems planning and analysis.

Dr. J. Peter Vajk, world dynamics and impact assessments.
Paul L. Siegler, business and economics.

G. Harry Stine, industrial engineering and marketing. We operated in a totally unrestrained environment with no ties to the aerospace industry or NASA. We had no ax to grind. We are all interested in the subject, and we took the opportunity afforded us by the study contract to make the most honest intellectual evaluation possible. I am delighted to report that the NASA people involved in contract monitoring as well as the management of Science Applications, Inc. encouraged us to do it this way, gave us all the support we needed to do it this way, and expected that we would come up with some findings and recommendations that were unexpected and that might not agree with current popular views, opinions, and policies. We established a "blue ribbon panel" of highly visible individuals with diverse backgrounds who volunteered to review and comment upon the findings and directions of the study. As the work proceeded, we sought out individuals in domestic industry at the managerial, financial, research,

and engineering levels to provide us with feedback and industrial reaction to our work.

Following initial considerations of technology requirements, potential products and services, capital requirements, market surveys, and cash flow requirements, it was patently obvious that the total picture of the industrialization of space was not only a highly probably future, but also a very expensive one. But, the revenue potentials also appeared to be very large. Could the federal government do the job? Historically,

it has not been the government's role to engage in activities that would normally attract business investment, production, and marketing.

Could private enterprise do it? It has rarely been the role of domestic industry to pioneer in new product or service areas involving high risk, large capital requirements, lack of hard data on which to make the early business decisions, and long-term returns on investment.

It is my own belief, shared by most members of the SAI study team, that both government and domestic industry have definite historic roles to play in a situation such as this and that both parties will probably fulfil these roles. After all, it is what they have each proven they can do best.

Historically

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and there are many examples of this both ancient and recent -- the role of a government in this

situation is that of the explorer capable of taking the high

risks and expending the large amounts of capital required,
showing the way, developing devices and processes to the
point of proof-of-principle or prototype, getting hard data
in hand, and then permitting private enterprise to take over.
Domestic industry than phases-in, taking the R&D data and
optimizing it, doing the marketing, perfecting the product or
service, cranking up production or operation, selling it,
collecting money, providing a return on investment, and
paying taxes or license fees back to the government. The
government then uses all or part of the recouped funds to
do more exploration and research.

This is known as a positive feedback system. It may not
be the best possible system because we're still working on it.
But evidence from the last thousand years or so indicates that
it works. To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, it may not be
a very good system, but it is better than anything else we've
found so far.

The study team discovered that it had to get right to the core of the space industrialization concept: Based on certain assumptions, what would be profitable, what would have a market, how big would the market likely be, what would the capitalization requirements be, what would the revenues be, and when could one expect a return on investment? What part of space industrialization could pay for itself first? What information, data, technology, and systems elements were lacking to make this happen? In short,

ion

where should the United States

-

its government and its

domestic industry

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concentrate its efforts, time, and

money now? In five years? In ten years? Basically, how do
we make the Third Industrial Revolution happen?

In some cases, it was difficult to assess a potential market because of the uniqueness of the product or service. Therefore, analogous markets were used with the full realization that these might exhibit a less than one-to-one relationship.

Sources such as Predicasts and U.S. Department of Commerce data were used to provide basic data on existing markets, projected markets, rates, and gross sales volumes. Expert opinion was solicited in various specialized marketplaces. The methodology used was classical, straightforward, and almost textbook in nature. Attempts were made to assess both the best case and the worst case. Basic data points in time were established at 1990 and 2010. A relatively "surprise-free" future was assumed 1.e. no general war, no collapse of the debt or capital structure, no exaggerated trends or changes in political, societal, economic, technological, environmental, or military areas. It must be noted that such "surprise-free" futures have historically been far wide of the mark and highly conservative, but they are the only basis upon which long-range forecasting and planning can be carried out. Surprises must therefore be expected. But with good

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