the same principle into all its details; fixing the traitemens of the different judges and law officers at definite sums, and providing that these and other charges, fixed and variable, should all be paid by the state; whilst, on the other hand, the suitors pay considerable sums under the title of Droits de Greffe, of which the state receives the benefit; and the Droits de Timbre, on legal documents, form a much heavier burthen. The liquidation of costs, in a civil suit, is provided for by the French code of civil procedure, arts. 543, 544.; and the réglement relative thereto, confirmed by the above-mentioned decree of the 30th Jan. 1811. By the criminal law, a convicted person may be sentenced to pay to the party injured restitution, damages, and costs, and also to the state a fine and costs. (Code Pénal, arts. 51. 53.) Costs, however, do not always fall wholly on the unsuccessful party; but sometimes partially on the other party, if irregular in a particular stage of the procédure (Code de Procedure Civile, arts. 301. 358. 367., &c.); sometimes on the huissier (art. 293.); sometimes on the avoué (arts. 152. 293.); sometimes on the juge commissaire (art. 292.); and sometimes on the witness (art. 263.). The French financial accounts enable us, in some degree, to form an opinion how far the burthen of the administration of justice in general falls, in that country, on the suitors. In 1832, the charge on the state, under the head of "Service de la Justice," amounted to 18,915,760 fr.; On the other hand, the receipts of the state from Droits de Greffe, Amendes, and Recouvrement de Frais de Justice, amounted to 9,768,679 fr.: Of which the Droits de Greffe were Decimes on ditto Amendes Recouvrement de Frais Francs. - 4,285,278 - 1,321,870 But it is to be observed that the Droits de Timbre, which amounted to 28,929,497 fr., are in part to be added to the revenue which the state derives from the administration of justice; though, in our present state of information, we cannot precisely ascertain the proportion. Another important benefit is derived to the state from the sums lodged with it by way of security (cautionnement) for good behaviour by the greffiers, huissiers, avoués, and notaries, amounting altogether, in 1834, to 62,723,119 fr., and yielding an interest of 2,508,928 fr. Taking into account all these and minor details, which it would be tedious to notice, the probability seems to be, that the whole burthen of the administration of justice in France is directly or indirectly thrown on the civil suitors and cri minal offenders. It has appeared necessary to us, in considering the complex subject of costs, to inquire into their origin and history. In our future articles we shall see how the law now stands in this country, and what alterations may judiciously be made. ART. V.-LORD CHIEF BARON ABINGER. FEW men have ever appeared in the profession of the law endowed with a greater store of the qualities required to form an accomplished advocate than James Scarlett, afterwards raised to the Bench as Lord Chief Baron, and to the Peerage as Lord Abinger. His understanding was piercing and subtle; no man had more sagacity in seeing through obscure matters, or finding his way through conflicting difficulties, or reconciling contradictions, or dispelling doubts, or, if need were, of raising them; no man could bring more ingenuity to devise explanations, or overcome obstacles, or provide defence, or secure escape. Then he was, though naturally irritable, yet by habit completely master of his temper, always entirely selfpossessed, hardly ever to be thrown off his guard by anger or vexation; and, habit becoming a second nature, he had all the external aspect and much of the reality of a placid good-humour, though this was drawn over a somewhat sensitive interior. He had thus in the largest measure these two great qualifications of the Nisi Prius leader-perfect quickness of perception and decision, and imperturbable self-possession. There is the greatest difference between the two sides of Westminster Hall in the qualities which form the leading Advocate. In truth, Courts of Equity hardly know what the lead of a cause is; for each of three, or it may be four or five counsel, go in much the same way over nearly the same ground; and it does not even follow that the junior takes the same view of the case with those who have gone before him. All the materials on which they have to work are fully known before they enter the court; their adversary's case is as much before them as their own; nothing can possibly arise for which they were not thoroughly prepared; and even were it possible to make any slip, as in meeting or proving unable to meet some new view of the case unexpectedly taken by the opposite advocate, or thrown out by the court (a thing of very rare occurrence), abundant opportunities remain for supplying all defects and setting all oversights right. The words quick, ready, decisive, sudden, have therefore no application to equity practice, and are hardly intelligible in the courts where bills, answers, affidavits, and interrogatories reign. It is far otherwise at Nisi Prius. What was all argument, all talk in Equity, is here all work, all action. What was all preparation and previous plan there, here is all the perception of the moment, the decision at a glance, the plan of the instant, the execution on the spot. The office of the leader here well deserves its name; he is every thing; his coadjutors are useful, but they are helps only; they are important, but as tools rather than fellow workmen; they are often indispensable, but they are altogether subordinate. He is often wholly in some degree he is always--uncertain beforehand what his own case is to be; he is still more uncertain of his adversary's. He comes into court with an account in his hand of what his witnesses are expected to swear, because his client has seen and examined them, which he himself has not; but he is necessarily uncertain that they will so swear, both because his client may have ill examined them, and because they may give a different account upon oath before the court and jury. Then he is still more uncertain how far they may stand firm, how far they may be shaken upon cross examination, and upon the examination by the Judge. He is even uncertain of the effect his case and his witnesses may produce upon the judge and upon the jury. So far is the advocate at Nisi Prius in the dark as to his own case and witnesses. But of his adversary's he knows little or nothing; he may have to meet a story of which he had no kind of warning whatever; and he may have to protect his witnesses against evidence called to discredit them by proving that they have told a different story to others from that which they have told in court. Documents, letters, receipts, acquittances, releases, title deeds, judgments, fines, recoveries — all may meet him, as well as unexpected witnesses; and on the spot he may have to devise and execute his measures of protection or of defence. It is needless to observe that this gives the greatest advantage to an advocate of quickness, sagacity, and decision; and that it is a just remark which likens the tact, and generally the practical skill and firmness, of the leader in jury trials, to the coup-d'œil of the leader in war. Nor is this all. Far different from the effects of slip or blunder or oversight in equity are the consequences of the like mistakes or neglects at law; they are almost always irremediable, not seldom fatal. No relief is given against a verdict obtained by the miscarriage of counsel. Against a surprise in the adversary's case, or in the testimony of the witnesses of either side, there may be relief; but if the mishap was owing to the error of counsel, never. Thoughtless men have found fault with this rule; but were a contrary course pursued, the most careless transaction of all business would be one consequence, and another would be the giving business by favour or connection to the most incapable men. It is quite necessary that the client should, to some such extent and under some such qualification as has been mentioned, be bound by the conduct of his professional representative. From what has been said it will at once appear, first, how difficult and how anxious is the position of a Nisi Prius leader; next, how small a portion of his needful qualification consists of mere eloquence. That which to the vulgar, the spectators at large, may seem the most important part of the whole, is in truth the leader's least important qualification. The object is to gain the cause; mere talk, if he spoke "with the tongues of men and of angels," would never get the verdict. By a great speech he may atone for minor errors in the management of the cause; for great slips, or great imperfections in the conduct of it, the eloquence of Demosthenes and Cicero combined could afford no compensation, nor any substitute. The importance of eloquence is admitted; with equal, or nearly equal conduct, the great speaker will have the advantage; but conduct without eloquence is safer by much to trust for the victory than eloquence without conduct. Mr. Wallace was a successful Nisi Prius advocate, with hardly any powers of speech; Mr. Wedderburn, afterwards Lord Loughborough, had but little success, though a very fine speaker; but Wallace was an excellent lawyer and a good leader of a cause; Wedderburn had so little law, that J. Lee said what he took in on the circuit at York had run through him before he got to Newcastle; and he was moreover an indifferent conductor of a cause. What has just been said has prepared the reader for an admission that Mr. Scarlett was a more consummate leader in the conduct of a cause than in the eloquence wherewith he addressed the jury. Not that he was deficient in some of the greater qualities of the orator. He had a most easy and fluent style; a delivery free from all defects; an extremely sweet and pleasing voice-insomuch that a lady of good sense and of wit once said that as some people are asked to sing, Mr. Scarlett should be asked to speak, so agreeable and harmonious were his tones, though of little compass or variety. But he had far higher qualities than these, the mere external or ornamental parts of oratory. He had the most skilful arrangement of his topics, the quickest perception of their effect either upon the jury, the enemy, or the judge. Indeed he used to choose his seat while he ruled the Great Circuit (the Northern) second to that of which he had a rightful possession by his rank; he preferred the seat on the judge's left, because standing there he had the judge always in his eye as he spoke, and could |