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gram,” which means stop treating it as though it were a scientific curiosity and get some people like Bechtel & Stearns-Rogers, or Brown & Root in there to have a look at this.
So I have drawn some conclusions from all of this.
A viable space program in the next 15 years must be a balanced mix of both space exploration and space industrialization, but space industrialization must be a cooperative effort between Government and domestic industry. More emphasis must be placed on space industrialization, particularly in the public awareness and educational area. Most people I talk to are totally unaware of the prospects for space industrialization. When I tell them about it, it changes their whole image of the space program to a very, very positive one.
In the communications area we have to develop large multiuse systems in geosynchronous orbit to head off the possibility of communications rationing in the year 1980 or beyond.
In the materials area, we have to find out, and soon, whether or not some of the projected space products are real, economical, and marketable. It looks promising, but we don't know for certain. And because the potential is there, a figurative vacuum will exist if American Government and industry does not attempt to exploit it. This vacuum will attract firms from other nations. It is already doing so.
We have been No. 2 in space before. We did not like it then and we will not like it in the future. This time we will be No. 2 in space industrialization, which has worldwide markets, and these worldwide markets are available for tweaking the guidance system before entry. You can put the product down in Hong Kong or Singapore or anyplace else you want.
There is very strong interest in the solar power satellite but we've got to get the data.
Now I'm going to make some recommendations. Some of them are not going to create friends, but I'd rather have a few enemies than to have to learn a foreign language to participate in space industrialization. That's a cheap price to pay.
No. 1, NSA should shift its public affairs and educational programs and policy emphasis to stress both space exploration and space industrialization.
Quite frankly, NASA has not done very well in communicating the essentials of our national space program to the American public, in spite of the valiant efforts of a number of very highly qualified and dedicated individuals within NASA. Part of NASA's job is to communicate. I would therefore recommend that it acquire the services of an external public relations firm selected on the basis of competitive bidding and get some help. NASA has recognized weakness here. They should therefore get some help and correct the situation.
No. 2, because of the lack of the sort of hard data needed by domestic industry to make decisions permitting them to enter the space industrialization field, NASA should continue and increase study work in space industrialization, particularly the sort of studies that produce information of interest to domestic industry. The money required to do this is miniscule in comparison with the money laid out for the classical sort of hardware studies normally supported by NASA. The information to be gained from such space industrialization studies will have much greater impact and utility than more hardware studies. NASA should also support and otherwise encourage applied research and development in the various areas of space industrialization where our studies have shown that the data is weak or nonexistent.
No. 3, NASA should establish an impartial, outside nonaerospace team under contract to interface with NASA and domestic industry, to act as a translator or integrator, and provide feedback in both directions. If this is being done at the moment, Mr. Chairman, my own interface with domestic industry indicates that it is not effective in its present form because the message is not getting through to domestic industry.
No. 4, NASA should form a working group consisting of its own people and people from the communications industry to characterize and specifics of this geosynchronous orbit crowding problem, to arrive at an acceptable plan for a large geosynchronous orbit platform program and to see that it happens with proper funding and timely activity.
No. 5, because of the apparent potential for space industrialization and the growing interest in it, the fourth and fifth Space Shuttle orbiters should be authorized, built and operated, so that American industry will not be short-changed when it comes to available payload space 5 years from now. I have seen the momentum in space industrialization grow from some mere concepts and ideas expressed with some reservations in technical circles 5 years ago to a full congressional hearing today. Five years from today, the activity can be intense and it probably will be. The additional orbiters are relatively inexpensive insurance in view of the total return possible.
No. 6, NASA should offer the Space Shuttle's external tank in nearEarth orbit as a "free resource" to industry, a space industrial park, if you will, and initiate studies concerning its potential use in this area. It is designed and built as an insulated pressure vessel, and as such will be useful in orbit. Considerable propulsive energy will have been consumed in putting it almost in orbit, and just a little extra “Delta-V” will put it there to stay for a long, long time. Then you have a pressurized, insulated presssure vessel in orbit. Let's use this resource.
No. 7, Congress and the executive branch should initiate immediate joint studies in concert with business and financial people concerning needed changes in administrative rules and regulations and present Federal law in order to permit and encourage and stimulate the necessarv concentration of capital resources that will be needed for the capital-intensive future of space industrialization by domestic industry. I understand that some people down at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center have already on their own started to look into this. More work needs to be done.
No. 8, lower cost space transportation surfaced in every one of the contracts we made. It is a very sensitive issue. That is no surprise, because intuitively we have known it would be a sensitive issue and we have known it for years. Therefore, as quickly as the present Space Shuttle system is operational, NASA should seek to make it obsolete with a better and cheaper system. Immediate work must be started on an interim heavy-lift vehicle for the anticipated large payloads. In order to do this, NASA should get busy at something that it is very, very good at: research, development, and testing of space transportation systems. But the operational Space Shuttle should be turned over to a commercial contract operator as a common carrier with special arrangements being made for Department of Defense crews to operate the Space Shuttle for military missions. We have got basically a nationalized space transportation system now-well, it isn't the only one. We have Amtrack, which is our nationalized rail system. And I understand there was some talk about nationalized air transportation that some people were calling "Flytrak." I have a suggestion for a name for nationalized space transportation, if we decided to go that way. Let's call it "Startrak." NASA was not intended to be an operating agency when it was established. It has proven itself to be outstanding in space exploration and space transportation development. Let them do what they are best at and support them fully in that role.
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No. 9, NASA and industry should begin work on large space systems now, leading to near-Earth orbit demonstration of a pilot plant solar power satellite by 1985. And if it is found feasible, a prototype
a solar power satellite in geosynchronous orbit by 1992. This work is basically a space transportation issue, requiring efficient heavy-lift launch vehicles. This work should define milestores and decision points where "go" or "no-go" decisions should be made. It should quantify both the dollars and numbers of people involved, as well as identifying sources of funding other than NASA. The concept is exciting and encouraging, but much work remains to be done before committing the large amounts of capital resources which apparently will be required. We need the answers. We need to know if a solar power satellite is a real possibility for harnessing a renewable, inexhaustible energy source. Or, if it is economically or technically infeasible, we need to know what would be required in the way of technology to make it economical and technically feasible. Let's get the answers. Let's find out what the problems are that must be solved. Other baseload energy systems studies noir for coal, geothermal, wind power and fusion are getting millions of dollars per year. Solar power satellites studies are funded at perhaps $3 to $5 million. If this goes on at this level of effort, we will never get the answers. We might as well save the money, because we will still be studying it in the year 2010. Let's get the answers. Coal, natural gas and petroleum should be used for chemical feedbacks, not for burning. Let's harness real fusion power out there. Let's harness the sun.
No. 10, an extensive study should be started on the potential impacts of space industrialization on our economy, on jobs, technological progress, gross national products, the Third World, and our way of life in general. Mr. Chairman, I believe this is the thrust of the House Concurrent Resolution 451 submitted by Mr. Teague. I support it completely. It makes sense. We stand on the threshold of the final frontier. For the first time in human history we know it. We have both the knowledge and the ability to think it through and do it right for a change.
Now, what if we don't do any of these things? What if we just sit back and let things go on and muddle through? Space industrialization will still be there for others to exploit. It's a reality and others know it. They will exploit it whether we do or not.
I mentioned some potential timetables in the statement. They will only be set back 5, 10 or perhaps 15 years at most, by any American failure of will or nerve in space industrialization. You may hear people speak of the limits to growth. I can't find any. And we looked hard. You will hear them speak of sacrifice and suffering being good for us. It isn't and it never has been. We don't need it. We don't have to sacrifice or suffer, and the American people will not.
As Americans, we and our forefathers did not create this Nation and economy and culture unique in human history by sitting timidly in our seaport cities on the Atlantic coast with an untamed wilderness 100 miles to the west of us. We did not simply address the problems. We got out there. We rolled up our sleeves and we took huge risks and we worked hard and we turned the wilderness into the wonder of the world, and many people died in the process. A lot of people thought that the wilderness was useless and they said so. We discovered otherwise. Where it was useless, we made it into something useful.
We now face another frontier that is not 100 miles inland. It is 100 miles over our heads. Twenty years ago, it was as hostile and alien as the great wilderness must have seemed to the Founding Fathers. But we have explored this new frontier. We've found that we can use it.
Furthermore, following what our forefathers taught us, it looks like we can make money by doing it, and bring benefits to many people. It will not be easy or cheap. But the payoffs seem to be tremendous and they will probably far exceed our wildest dreams.
This is a critical moment in human history. A whole new ecological niche has opened and is available to us. The final frontier is there. Will we take advantage of it?
Mr. Chairman, we can do it. We will do it. We must do it.
Thank you for this opportunity and for the honor of being heard. I will be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Mr. Stine.
I think in the interest of time we will proceed with the other witnesses, if you can be available for questions at the end.
Mr. Stine. I will be happy to.
Mr. FUQUA. We will now hear from Mr. George Jeffs, the president of North American Space Operations and corporate vice president of Rockwell International Corp.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jeffs follows:]