The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 1988 M08 26 - 496 páginas The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... quantity to be delivered (here, 0 or 1). The delivery price is c.” With bilateral asymmetric information, assigning one party the right to choose the price, or to choose the quantity at a previously agreed-upon price, in general is no ...
... quantity when the cost function is C1 (·); pm2 and qm2 are defined similarly. When the cost function is C1 (·), the monopolist prefers charging pm1 rather than any other price. In particular, he could charge price pm2 and sell quantity ...
... quantity demanded only slightly in response to a unit price increase. Consequently, in precisely these situations, price changes do not affect quantity consumed very much; rather, they elicit a large monetary transfer from consumers to ...
... quantity and price adjustments, when a firm faces shocks and can smooth its price path and its production path through inventory holdings. For instance, Blinder (1982) analyzes how a monopolist's production, inventories, and price ...
... quantity adjustment for low demand, but not for high demand, the monopolist's price tends to react more to upward ... quantities of those goods to be supplied 188 CHAPTER 1. MONOPOLY.