The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 1988 M08 26 - 496 páginas The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... Capacity Constraints . . . . . . 534 5.3.1 Rationing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534 5.3.2 Price Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.3.3 Ex Ante Investment and Ex Post ...
... capacity, product positioning, research and development, and other strategic variables in oligopoly. It makes heavy use of some elementary notions of game theory. I have found this division into two parts useful for teaching purposes ...
... capacities. Similarly, the savings in peak-load capacity associated with the pooling of risk and the law of large numbers become smaller and smaller as the size of the firm grows. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that there may exist ...
... capacity is not satiated). The marginal cost of investing one unit of capacity is γ. 178 CHAPTER 1. MONOPOLY.
Jean Tirole. marginal cost of investing one unit of capacity is γ. The same capacity serves peak and off-peak demands.12 (i) Show that if off-peak demand is small relative to peak demand (where “small” is to be defined), the monopolist ...