The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 1988 M08 26 - 496 páginas The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... assumption (e.g. some agricultural markets), most markets are served by a small number of firms with non-negligible ... assumptions of competitive-equilibrium analysis are relaxed, very little can be said about economic allocations ...
... assumption that bargaining with the specific buyer leads to an equal division of the gains from trade, trade takes place with this specific buyer at price p such that v − p = [p − c(I)] − [v − c(λI)]. One immediately sees that the ...
... levels of effort—low and high (eL and eH)—rather than a continuum. On the assumption that the shareholders want to induce the high level of effort, the incentive-compatibility constraint becomes ∫ Π Π 134 THE THEORY OF THE FIRM.
... assumption has the flavor of decreasing returns to scale.105 Equation 12 also teaches us something interesting about the value of a signal. Suppose that the shareholders observe not only profit Π but also some other signal, s. This ...
... assumption that demand is downward sloping ensures that the first term in R (p) is negative. The second term is nonpositive if demand is linear or, more generally, concave. If demand is convex, the revenue function—and thus the profit ...