to be founded, and upon which they must ultimately rest for their justification and stability.

As to what the institutional or established law actually is or has been, at any period of time, or in any particular country, we shall have nothing to do with that question in the following investigations,—that is a subject of inquiry which belongs properly to the lawyers and judges of the time and place, whose business and office it is to propound, declare, and administer the laws whatever they may be. Our subject, on the contrary, is to demonstrate and determine what the established law should be in all matters relating to wealth or property, at all times and in all countries, without knowing or caring what it is in any.

The established laws, indeed, in countries which have a code approaching in any reasonable degree to common sense or justice, will of course coincide generally with the natural law, and consequently legal with natural right. But in no country will this coincidence be found universal or complete, since all the world knows that, even in countries where the institutions are the least imperfect, what is called a legal right is not unfrequently a natural and moral wrong.*

It is not, of course, insinuated that absolute perfection is to be attained in the laws or government of any state, any more than in the human character itself, or affairs in general; but if there is any one department of law which, more than any other, may be expected to approach perfection, it is that which relates to property and justice; and if absolute perfection should be unattainable even here, still it is allowable (I hope laudable) to endeavour to advance as near to it as we can. And it will not now, I trust, be considered as any improbable or unwarranted position to hold, that, by investigation, discussion, and reasoning, the laws may be improved in all countries, and legal and moral rights be made to approximate more nearly to one another than they yet do in any country, or under any government, even the best that exists; for the case with regard to improvement (it can never be

And yet it has been asserted by an author of no mean consideration or authority, that the only foundation of our right to property is "the law of the land," as if just grounds in reason could not be shown why certain rules or relations, and modes of conduct, in regard to property, should be "the law of the land;" or as if one set of such rules, or relations, and modes of conduct, could not be shown to be better, or more consistent with the general good of mankind, than another; which to assert would be to contend, that there was no such thing as right or wrong antecedent to "positive institution," and consequently no

too frequently repeated) is essentially altered now from what it was in times past, in consequence of that important event, the invention of printing, by means of which the experience and discoveries of every passing age are preserved, treasured up, and diffused so effectually, that right becomes ultimately so plain and obvious that it must be acted upon.

• Dr Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, book iii. part i. chap 4. It is in reference to property in land more especially that this author has applied the assertion alluded to in the text, viz. that "the real foundation of our right is the law of the land;" but what is most extraordinary is, that Dr Paley had no sooner pronounced this "extraordinary aphorism,” than, as if altogether forgetful of what he had just said, he proceeds immediately to adduce reasons why the institution of which he speaks should be "the law of the land ;" and elsewhere he states many reasons to account for the institution of property in general, endeavouring to deduce from them the important fact, that, "with a few exceptions, even the poorest and the worst provided, in countries where property and the consequences of property prevail, are in a better situation with respect to food, raiment, houses, and what are called the necessaries of life, than any are in places where most things remain in common," (p. 82,)—a fact which, it is hoped, will be made fully apparent in the course of the following work; and which should be sufficient to justify the institution of property on better and more enduring grounds than the mere fact that such institution exists.

such thing as good or evil, happiness or misery, pain or pleasure, in the world.

But there is no law or institution relating to property, (especially the more important or fundamental laws,) whose effects will not be either good or bad, useful or detrimental, and consistent or inconsistent with the general good of mankind, and which may not therefore be shown to be so; that is, be shown to be right or wrong, and consequently proper or improper to be established. And although this may appear somewhat difficult whilst we are unused to such investigations, it can only be really so in very unimportant instances; for we need not by any means despair of discovering moral as well as physical truth, if the same freedom be allowed, the same methods pursued, and the same ardour and perseverance exhibited in the investigation of the one as of the other.

In their notions concerning right to property, the great bulk of mankind seldom give place to any idea beyond the legal rights, or actual tenures, by which it is held. Nor ought this to call forth any surprise, seeing that these are the only effectual rights for the time being, and those alone which immediately affect men's interests,-a consideration which necessity too often compels the greater number to be so much concerned about, as to leave them but little either of leisure or inclination to attend to matters so remotely affecting them, and so far removed out of the beaten track, as the grounds on which they have been instituted. But what is indeed to be wondered at is, that we so very frequently observe a like ignorance or inattention where it has no proper excuse ;-that we observe every day men, and even legislators, pretending to reason concerning political justice and the general principles of law, as if there were no such distinction as that which has been here pointed out, and who seem to have scarcely the most distant comprehen

sion that there is a natural code discoverable by the light of reason, to which alone reference ought to be had when any law, or project of law, is brought into question either for the purpose of enactment or repeal. Instead of reasoning like legislators, such persons merely contend as lawyers; they but inquire what is, or what has been, not what ought to be; and, provided they can find a precedent, think they have no need to trouble themselves with any farther investigation as to right or wrong. They pronounce the two cabalistic words, "vested right," and think themselves at once intrenched behind an impregnable fortress, without considering it as at all incumbent upon them to show that the investiture is consistent with real and natural right.

But the actual tenures, or legal rights, whereby property is held, may be "vested" either according to or contrary to real right; that is to say, either, first, under authority of established law founded upon and coinciding with real right or justice, when they will, of course, be perfectly unexceptionable; or, secondly, under authority of established law alone, in opposition to real right and justice; in which case it will be not right but wrong that they should continue to be "vested" or established law.* And this is the

• When, however, we would repeal or alter any established law affecting property which is found to be wrong, it is, I trust, almost unnecessary to observe, that it must be done with a due regard to the interests of present incumbents, or those who repose under the immediate sanction of legal rights. The laws must of course be obeyed while they continue to be laws, (so long at least as they are not altogether oppressive and intolerable,) and the happiness or misery of human creatures must not be wantonly sported with; only we must not on this pretence endeavour to perpetuate abuses, or to consecrate wrong, as if we could convert it into right. Our denunciation is against the claim of perpetuity for error; and all we would desire is, that right should be gradually and deliberately introduced, when it is

sole question as respects the lawgiver, or those inquirers who would investigate the principles of natural right with a view to the improvement of established law.

If those persons, therefore, who advocate the authority of "vested rights," would say any thing to the purpose in their favour, they must show, not only that they are, but that they should be "vested;" they must be able to advance reasons why they should be vested; they must, in a word, show that they are right in the proper sense of the term; namely, that they are calculated to promote the general interest and advantage or happiness of mankind.

I shall conclude this part of the introductory observations I have to advance with affirming, that what has been established by human authority may be altered by human authority, if found to be wrong; but what is sanctioned by reason, and established in the nature of things, is right at all times, and in every region, and cannot be justly, nor, in enlightened times, safely or permanently contravened or contradicted by human institutions.

PART II.

If we examine with attention the questions and disputes which so much divide and agitate the different classes of men in society, and in this country at present, in reference to property, it will be easy to discover that the most serious of all is the conflicting claims and pretensions of labour and

made undeniably apparent and familiar to the eyes and understandings of mankind.