equal competition, or to attempt to enhance their gains by means which are unjust and injurious to their neighbours.

In the following work an attempt is made to elucidate this question with the views that have been stated, and with an equal and impartial regard to the rights and just interests of the parties concerned; and if it is not discussed in its utmost extent, or with all that minuteness and fulness of detail which its importance demands, still it is hoped that such hints are given, and such a train laid, as may serve for the groundwork of a full discussion of it, and as may lead to a permanent and satisfactory adjustment of all the claims and interests involved in that discussion, upon the only principles that can be either satisfactory or permanent-those of equity and justice.

ON THE NATURAL GROUNDS OF RIGHT TO VENDIBLE PROPERTY OR WEALTH, AS ARISING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH IT IS PRODUCED OR ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY, AND FROM THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO ITS EXISTENCE IN ANY CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY OR ABUNDANCE.

CHAPTER I.

OF WEALTH, PROPERTY, AND VALUE.-WEALTH DEFINED.

THAT sort of property or wealth, the protection and security of which forms the second grand object of law and government, and consequently of political science,—the protection and security of persons forming the first,-may be defined in two words,-vendible property. More particularly wealth may be defined as follows:-Those external material objects, necessary, useful, or agreeable to mankind, which it costs some considerable exertion of human labour or industry to produce or acquire originally, and which, when once acquired, can be transferred from one to another appropriated or alienated.

1. Those things which nature provides in such abundance

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as to exceed the desires or wants of mankind, as common air, the light and heat of the sun, &c., as they cannot be exclusively appropriated, and require not to be purchased by labour or industry, are not wealth; at least they are not that sort of wealth which requires to be protected or guaranteed to the possessor or proprietor by law and force, and consequently not that sort which can form any object of political science. Such things no person needs to buy, or will buy, and such things no person can sell. They are not vendible property.

2. Again, those things which are inherent and inalienable, however valuable they may be, and however limited in quantity, as the organs and members of our bodies, as well as our natural and acquired talents or abilities, though necessary, useful, and indispensable as the means or instruments of acquiring wealth, are not wealth themselves. Such things cannot be transferred from one to another, and they are therefore not wealth or vendible property. Vigorous and robust limbs and organs, or corporeal powers, as well as art or skill in professions and employments, with many other natural and acquired talents or abilities,-may increase the quantity or improve the quality of our labour; but labour is not wealth, but a part of the means only of producing or procuring it. For although wealth may arise from labour when it is employed in particular ways, none can arise from it till it be exerted; and man himself, unless where he is a slave and the property of another, is not actual wealth, but one of the instruments by which it is produced.

3. But those things necessary, useful, or agreeable to mankind, which can be appropriated or alienated, and which are only to be procured by the assistance and industry of man himself, as corn, cloth, houses, &c., as they require to be protected and guaranteed to the possessor or proprietor by law and force, so they are necessarily the objects of political science in general, and they constitute exclusively that

sort of wealth which is the peculiar subject of justice and of political economy.

The foregoing definition admits of being divided into two separate and distinct affirmative propositions, each of which may be illustrated by itself as follows :—

I. That sort of wealth which is the object of political science, or of political economy, must require some considerable exertion of human labour to produce or procure it originally, and must be capable of being exclusively appropriated.

1. There are some things which never are, or can be, wealth or vendible property, under any circumstances; because under no circumstances can they ever be exclusively appropriated, nor can they ever require any portion of labour or industry to produce or procure them. Such are those things first mentioned above, namely, the air, which surrounds us at all times, and the light and heat of the sun, which are rayed out upon us gratuitously. Such things never can become the objects of political science; because the interposition or assistance of society, or of law and force, can never be required to guarantee the possession of them; all men being at full liberty to use and enjoy as much as they please of those first and most indispensable of all necessaries, at all times, without price, and without challenge or charge.

2. Again, there are some things which are wealth in one situation and not in another, because it requires labour or industry to procure them in the one and not in the other. Such things are common sand and water.

Thus, sand upon the seashore, and water in a great river, are not wealth, because in those situations they can be procured with small and inconsiderable labour, viz. with so much merely as is necessary to lift them from the place where they lie; but let them be carried to a distance where the

are wanted, and where they cannot be brought without considerable labour, and immediately they become wealth and vendible property. Let the sand, for example, be carried to any considerable distance, where it is wanted to be mixed with lime for building, and it then becomes wealth. Here it is brought with considerable exertion of labour or industry; and this circumstance it is, combined with the demand for it, that is, with the desire of mankind to possess it under such circumstances, which at once confers upon it the character of wealth. In like manner, water in a great river, where it can be had at will in unlimited quantity, and with no more labour than is merely required to lift it from the stream, is not wealth; at least it is not that sort of wealth which falls to be treated or considered in the science of Political Economy. But let the same element be brought to a distance, let a part of the same river be carried, either by the labour of men directly, or by means of a canal or aqueduct, (in the construction and maintenance of which human labour is necessarily required,) to a neighbouring city, and then and there it instantly becomes wealth. It is not wealth at the river-side, where it can be had with small and inconsiderable exertion; but when by labour and industry it is brought where it is wanted, and where it is not otherwise to be had, then, and not before, it becomes wealth. If you could take the city, and place it by the river-side, or if it had been originally seated there, water, being in abundance, would never have become wealth, unless the extension of streets and houses were such as to require considerable labour and industry to bring an article so indispensable to its farthest parts.

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But perhaps it may be said and objected, that even sand the seashore, and water in a great river, are wealth and property, as belonging to the proprietor of the adjoining land, who is not obliged to part with them, and might not choose to do so but for some equivalent price

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