which he commands, whether it be his own or borrowed of other people, in some one or other of those three ways.

"In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the violence of their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great part of their stock, in order to have it always at hand to carry with them to some place of safety, in case of their being threatened with any of those disasters to which they consider themselves as at all times exposed. This is said to be a common practice in Turkey, in Indostan, and I believe in most other governments of Asia. It seems to have been a common practice among our ancestors during the violence of the feudal government. Treasuretrove was in those times considered as no contemptible part of the revenue of the greatest sovereigns in Europe. It consisted in such treasure as was found concealed in the earth, and to which no particular person could prove any right. This was regarded in those times as so important an object, that it was always considered as belonging to the sovereign, and neither to the finder nor to the proprietor of the land, unless the right to it had been conveyed to the latter by an express clause in his charter. It was put upon the same footing with gold and silver mines, which, without a special clause in the charter, were never supposed to be comprehended in the general grant of the lands, though mines of lead, copper, tin, and coal were, as things of smaller consequence."*

On the same subject Mr Malthus writes as follows:"The fundamental cause of the low state of population in Turkey," says he, " compared with its extent of territory, is undoubtedly the nature of the government. Its tyranny, its feebleness, its bad laws and worse administration of them, together with the consequent insecurity of property, throw such obstacles in the way of agriculture that the means of subsistence are necessarily decreasing yearly, and with them, of course, the number of people. The miri, or general land-tax

Wealth of Nations, book ii. chap. 1.

paid to the sultan, is in itself moderate; but by abuses inherent in the Turkish government the pachas and their agents have found out the means of rendering it ruinous. Though they cannot absolutely alter the impost which has been established by the sultan, they have introduced a multitude of changes, which without the name produce all the effects of an augmentation. In Syria, according to Volney, having the greatest part of the land at their disposal, they clog their concessions with burdensome conditions, and exact the half and sometimes even two-thirds of the crop. When the harvest is over, they cavil about losses, and as they have the power in their hands, they carry off what they think proper. If the season fail, they still exact the same sum, and expose every thing that the poor peasant possesses to sale. To these constant oppressions are added a thousand accidental extortions. Sometimes a whole village is laid under contribution for some real or imaginary offence. Arbitrary presents are exacted on the accession of each governor; grass, barley, and straw are demanded for his horses; and commissions are multiplied, that the soldiers who carry the orders may live upon the starving peasants, whom they treat with the most brutal insolence and injustice.

"The consequence of these depredations is, that the poorer class of inhabitants ruined, and unable any longer to pay the miri, become a burden to the village, or fly into the cities; but the miri is unalterable, and the sum to be levied must be found somewhere. The portion of those who are thus driven from their homes falls on the remaining inhabitants, whose burden, though at first light, now becomes insupportable. If they should be visited by two years of drought and famine the whole village is ruined and abandoned, and the tax which it should have paid is levied on the neighbouring lands.

"The same mode of proceeding takes place with regard to the tax on the Christians, which has been raised by these means from three, five, and eleven piastres, at which it was first fixed, to thirty-five and forty, which absolutely impoverishes those on whom it is levied, and obliges them to leave the country. It has been remarked, that these exactions have

made a rapid progress during the last forty years; from which time are dated the decline of agriculture, the depopulation of the country, and the diminution in the quantity of specie carried into Constantinople.

"The food of the peasants is almost everywhere reduced to a little flat cake of barley or doura, onions, lentils, and water. Not to lose any part of their corn, they leave in it all sorts of wild grain, which often produce bad consequences. In the mountains of Lebanon and Nablous, in time of dearth, they gather the acorns from the oaks, which they eat after boiling or roasting them on the ashes.

"By a natural consequence of this misery, the art of cultivation is in the most deplorable state. The husbandman is almost without instruments, and those he has are very bad. His plough is frequently no more than the branch of a tree cut below a fork, and used without wheels. The ground is tilled by asses and cows, rarely by oxen, which would bespeak too much riches. In the districts exposed to the Arabs, as in Palestine, the countryman must sow with his musket in his hand; and scarcely does the corn turn yellow before it is reaped, and concealed in subterraneous caverns. As little as possible is employed for seed-corn, because the peasants sow no more than is barely necessary for their subsistence. Their whole industry is limited to a supply of their immediate wants; and to procure a little bread, a few onions, a blue shirt, and a bit of woollen, much labour is not necessary. The peasant lives therefore in distress; but at least he does not enrich his tyrants, and the avarice of despotism is its own punishment.

"This picture, which is drawn by Volney, in describing the state of the peasants in Syria, seems to be confirmed by all other travellers in these countries; and, according to Eton, it represents very nearly the condition of the peasants in the greatest part of the Turkish dominions. Universally, the offices of every denomination are set up to public sale; and in the intrigues of the seraglio, by which the disposal of all places is regulated, every thing is done by means of bribes. The pachas, in consequence, who are sent into the provinces,

exert to the utmost their power of extortion; but are always outdone by the officers immediately below them, who, in their turn, leave room for their subordinate agents.

"The pacha must raise money to pay the tribute, and also to indemnify himself for the purchase of his office, support his dignity, and make a provision in case of accidents; and as all power, both military and civil, centres in his person from his representing the sultan, the means are at his discretion, and the quickest are invariably considered as the best. Uncertain of to-morrow, he treats his province as a mere transient possession, and endeavours to reap, if possible, in one day the fruit of many years, without the smallest regard to his successor, or the injury that he may do to the permanent revenue.'

Again:

A

"Some tribes, from the nature of the deserts in which they live, seem to be necessarily condemned to a pastoral life; but even those which inhabit soils proper for agriculture, have but little temptation to practise this art while surrounded by marauding neighbours. The peasants of the frontier provinces of Syria, Persia, and Siberia, exposed, as they are, to the constant incursions of a devastating enemy, do not lead a life that is to be envied by the wandering Tartar or Arab. certain degree of security is perhaps still more necessary than richness of soil to encourage the change from the pastoral to the agricultural state; and where this cannot be attained, the sedentary labourer is more exposed to the vicissitudes of fortune than he who leads a wandering life, and carries all his property with him. Under the feeble, yet oppressive government of the Turks, it is not uncommon for peasants to desert their villages and betake themselves to a pastoral state, in which they expect to be better able to escape from the plunder of their Turkish masters and Arab neighbours."+ And universally throughout his Essay on Population, as

1

Essay on Population, book i. chap. 10. + Ibid. book i. chap. 7.

well as in his "Principles of Political Economy," Mr Malthus acknowledges and enforces this important truth,—that the numbers, condition, and habits of the people depend in the greatest degree on the character of the government under which they live.

This, then, is our second moral cause of production,-political justice, law, and government; or protection and security to person and property,—which, it evidently appears, are absolutely indispensable requisites to the accumulation or existence of wealth in any considerable quantity or abundance; and such is a specimen of the facts or examples which demonstrate the importance of the quality of this second moral cause; that is to say, of the goodness or badness, perfection or imperfection of the laws and government. Such examples show that if the government be very bad, as in the instance of Turkey, it becomes itself the great robber of its subjects, and prevents, after a small and comparatively inconsiderable accumulation, all farther advance in wealth or improvement. Protection and security are then required against the acts and rapaciousness of the government itself; and no effectual way of securing this object has yet been discovered but that which is afforded by the intervention of an assembly of representatives chosen by the governed.

SECTION IV.

OF THE EFFECTS OF GOOD GOVERNMENT.

1

SUCH then, as they have now been explained, are the two grand moral causes of production, and of improvement in general of every description,-the greatness or smallness of whose effects depends entirely upon the quality of the second moral cause,-government; viz. upon its being good or bad.