aimed at by each Body in the economy of Nature.* Under this diversity of aspect, Soul and Body are reciprocally integrant and complementary of each other, the real integer (the Living or Animated Body) including both.

Soul, in the Aristotelian point of view (what is common to all living bodies) comprises several varieties. But these varieties are not represented as forming a genus with co-ordinate species under it, in such manner that the counter-ordinate species, reciprocally excluding each other, are, when taken together, co-extensive with the whole genus-like Man and Brute in regard to animal. The varieties of Soul are distributed into successive stages gradually narrowing in extension and enlarging in comprehension; the first or lowest stage being co-extensive with the whole, but connoting only two or three simple attributes; the second, or next above, connoting all these and more besides, but denoting only part of the individuals denoted by the first; the third connoting all this and more, but denoting yet fewer individuals; and so on forward. Thus the concrete individuals called Living Bodies, include all plants as well as all animals; but the Form Soul (called Nutritive by Aristotle) corresponding thereto, connotes only nutrition, growth, decay, and generation of another similar individual. In the second stage, plants are left out, but all animals remain; the Sentient Soul, belonging to animals, but not belonging to any plants, connotes all the functions and faculties of the Nutritive Soul, together with sensible perception (at least in its rudest shape) besides.‡ We proceed onward in the same direction, taking in additional faculties-the Movent, Appetitive, Phantastic (Imaginative), Noëtic (Intelligent) Soul, and thus diminishing the total of individuals denoted. But each higher variety of soul continues to possess all the faculties of the lower. Thus the Sentient Soul cannot exist without comprehending all the faculties of the Nutritive, though the Nutritive exists (in plants) without any

* Aristot. De Animâ, II. 4, 415, a. 28, b. 12.

In the Aristotelian treatise De Plantis-p. 815, b. 15-it is stated that Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Demokritus, all affirmed that plants had both intellect and cognition, up to a certain moderate point. We do not cite this treatise as the composition of Aristotle; but it is reasonably good evidence, in reference to the doctrine of these other philosophers.

Aristot. De Animâ, I. 5, 411, b. 28.

admixture of the Sentient. Again, the Sentient Soul does not necessarily possess either memory, imagination, or intellect (Nous); but no soul can be either Imaginative or Noëtic, without being sentient as well as nutritive. The Noëtic Soul, as the highest of all, retains in itself all the lower faculties; but these are found to exist apart from it.*

We may remark here that the psychological classification of Aristotle proceeds in the inverse direction to that of Plato. In the Platonic Timæus, we begin with the grand soul of the Kosmos, and are conducted by successive steps of degradation to men, animals, plants; while Aristotle lays his foundation in the largest, most multiplied, and lowest range of individuals, carrying us by successive increase of conditions to the fewer and the higher.

The lowest or Nutritive soul, in spite of the small number of conditions involved in it, is the indispensable basis whereon all the others depend. None of the other Souls can exist apart from it. It is the first constituent of the living individual-the implication of Form with Matter in a natural body suitably organized; it is the preservative of the life of the individual, with its aggregate of functions and faculties, and with the proper limits of size and shape that characterize the species ;+ it is moreover the preservative of perpetuity to the species, inasmuch as it prompts and enables each individual to generate and leave behind a successor like himself; such is the only way that an individual can obtain quasi-immortality, though all of them aspire to become immortal.§ This lowest soul is the primary cause of digestion and nutrition. It is cognate with the celestial heat, which is essential also as a co-operative cause; accordingly all animated bodies possess an inherent natural heat.||

* Aristot. De Animâ, II. 2, 413, a. 25-30, b. 32; II. 3, 414, b. 30, 415, a. 10. + Aristot. De Animâ, II. 4, 415, a. 24. πρшτη Kai Koivotáty ôvvaμís ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ ̓ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζην ἅπασιν. 415, b. 9. τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή. ΙΙΙ., 12, 434, a. 22-30, b. 24.-Aristot. De Respiratione, 8, 474, a. 30, b. 11.

Aristot. De Animâ, II. 4, 416, a. 17.

§ Aristot. De Animâ, II. 4, 415, b. 2, 416, b. 25. émel d'àπÒ Tоû τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτὸ, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό. Also De Generat. Animal. II. 1, 731, b. 33.

Aristot. De Animâ, II. 4, 416, a. 10-18, b. 29.

We advance upwards now from the Nutritive Soul to that higher Soul which is at once Nutritive and Sentient ; for Aristotle does not follow the example of Plato in recognizing three souls to one body, but assigns only one and the same soul, though with multiplied faculties and functions, to one and the same body. Sensible perception, with its accompaniments, forms the charac teristic privilege of the animal as contrasted with the plant.* Sensible perception admits of many diversities, from the simplest and rudest tactile sensation, which even the lowest animals cannot be without, to the full equipment of five senses which Aristotle declares to be a maximum not susceptible of increase. But the sentient faculty, even in its lowest stage, indicates a remarkable exaltation of the Soul in its character of Form. The Soul, quâ sentient and percipient, receives the Form of the Perceptum without the matter; whereas the nutritive Soul cannot disconnect the two, but receives and appropriates the nutrient substance, Form and Matter in one and combined. Aristotle illustrates this characteristic feature of sensible perception by recurring to his former example of the wax and the figure. Just as wax receives from a signet the impression engraven thereon, whether the matter of the signet be iron, gold, stone, or wood; as the impression stamped has no regard to the matter, but reproduces only the figure engraven on the signet; the wax being only potential and undefined, until the signet comes to convert it into something actual and definite;§ so the percipient faculty in man is impressed by the substances in nature, not according to the matter of each, but according to the qualitative form of each. Such passive receptivity is the first and lowest form of sensation,||

* Aristot. De Sensu et Sensili, c. 1, p. 436, b. 12. He considers sponges to have some sensation-Hist. Animal, I. 487, b. 9.

+ Aristot. De Animâ, II. 3, 414, b. 2; III. 1, 424, b. 25, 415, a. 3; III. 13, 435, b. 15.

Aristot. De Animâ, II. 12, 424, a. 32, b. 4. διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν; καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερμαίνεται· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.

Themistius ad loc., p. 144, ed. Spengel. πάσχει (τὰ φυτὰ) συνεισιούσης τῆς ὕλης τοῦ ποιοῦντος, &c.

§ Aristot. De Animâ, II. 12, 424, a. 20.

| Aristot. De Anima, II. 12, 424, a. 25. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, &c.—III. 12, 434, Α. 29.

PROPERTIES OF THE SENTIENT SOUL.

631

not having any magnitude in itself, but residing in bodily organs which have magnitude, and separable from them only by logical abstraction. It is a potentiality, correlating with, and in due proportion to, the exterior Percipibile, which, when acting upon it, brings it into full actuality. The actuality of both (Percipiens and Perceptum) is one and the same, and cannot be disjoined in fact, though the potentialities of the two are distinct yet correlative; the Percipiens is not like the Percipibile originally, but becomes like it by being thus actualized.*

The Sentient Soul is communicated by the male parent in the act of generation,+ and is complete from the moment of birth, not requiring a process of teaching after birth; the Sentient Subject becomes at once and instantly, in regard to sense, on a level with one that has attained a certain actuality of cognition, but which is not at the moment reflecting upon the Cognitum. Potentiality and Actuality are in fact distinguishable into lower and higher degrees; the Potential that has been actualized in a first or lower stage, is still a Potential relatively to higher stages of Actuality. The Potential may be acted upon in two opposite ways; either by deadening and extinguishing it, or by developing and carrying it forward to realization. The Sentient Soul, when asleep or inert, requires a cause to stimulate it into actual seeing, or hearing; the Noëtic or Cognizant Soul, under like circumstances, must also be stimulated into actual meditation on its cognitum. But there is this difference between the two. The Sentient Soul communes with particulars; the Noëtic Soul with Universals. The Sentient Soul derives its stimulus

* Aristot. De Animâ, III. 2, 425, b. 25. de Toû aionτоû evéрyea καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ ̓ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. -ΙΙ. 5, 418, a. 3. τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχεια—πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὂν, πεπονθὸς δ ̓ ὁμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.—Also, 417, a. 7-14-20.

There were conflicting doctrines current in Aristotle's time; some said that for an agent to act upon a patient, there must be likeness between the two; others said that there must be unlikeness. Aristotle dissents from both, and adopts a sort of intermediate doctrine—415, a. 30, 416, a. 10.

Aristot. De Gener. Animal., II. 5, 741, a. 14, b. 7; De Animâ, II. 5, 417, b. 17.

Aristot. De Animâ, II. 5, 417, b. 18-31. See above, p. 623, note . The extent of Potentiality, or the partial Actuality, which Aristotle claims for the sentient Soul even at birth, deserves to be kept in mind: we shall contrast it presently with what he says about the Nous.

from without, and from some of the individual objects, tangible, visible, or audible; but the Noëtic Soul is put into action by the abstract and universal, which is in a certain sense within the Soul itself; so that a man can at any time meditate on what he pleases, but he cannot see or hear what he pleases, or anything except such visible or audible objects as are at hand.*

We have already remarked, that in many animals the Sentient Soul is little developed; being confined in some to the sense of Touch (which can never be wanting),† and in others to Touch and Taste. But even this minimum of Sense-though small, if compared with the variety of senses in man-is a prodigious step in advance of plants; it comprises a certain cognition, and within its own sphere it is always critical, comparing, discriminative. The Sentient Soul possesses this discriminative faculty in common with the Noëtic Soul or Intelligence, though applied to different objects and purposes; and possesses such faculty, because it is itself a mean or middle term between the two sensible extremes of which it takes cognizance,-hot and cold, hard and soft, wet and dry, white and black, acute and grave, bitter and sweet, light and darkness, visible and invisible, tangible and intangible, &c. We feel no sensation at all when the object touched is exactly of the same temperature with ourselves, neither hotter nor colder; the Sentient Soul, being a mean between the two extremes, is stimulated to assimilate itself for the time to either of them, according as it is acted upon from without. It thus makes comparison of each with the other, and of both with its own mean.§ Lastly, the sentient faculty in the Soul is

* Aristot. De Animâ, II. 5, 417, b. 20-25; III. 3, 427, b. 18. ALTIOV de ὅτι τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ενέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ ̓ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ ̓ ἐν αὐτῇ πως ἔστι τῇ ψυχῇ.

+ Aristot. De Animâ, III. 12, 434, "b. 24. pavepòv öτɩ ovx oïòv te ἄνευ αφῆς εἶναι ζῷον.

† Aristot. De Anima, III. 9, a. 16. τῷ κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ kai aioonoews.-III. 3, 427, a. 20, 426, b. 10-15. De Generat. Animal., I. 23, 731, a. 32, b. 5; De Somno et Vigil., c. 1, 458, b. 2. The sentient faculty is called dvvapiv ovμÞVTOV KρITIKÝV.—Analyt. Poster., II. 19, p. 99, b. 34.

§ Aristot. De Animâ, II. 10, 422, a. 20; II. 421, b. 4, 11, 423, b. 31, 424, a. 10. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητὰ—τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν.— ΙΙΙ. 7, 431, 8. 10. ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητική μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν, ἡ τοιαῦτα.-ΙΙΙ. 13, 435, a. 21.

He remarks that plants have no similar μeσóτητα-424, b. l.