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11. Do the Laws of Nature Govern?

[DEWEY, John, Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays, pp. 72-73. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1910.]

Elsewhere lurks the apprehension that the progress of scientific method will deliver the purposive freedom of man bound hand and foot to the fatal decrees of iron necessity, called natural law. The notion that laws govern and forces rule is an animistic survival. It is a product of reading nature in terms of politics in order to turn around and then read politics in the light of supposed sanctions of nature. This idea passed from medieval theology into the science of Newton, to whom the universe was the dominion of a sovereign whose laws were the laws of nature. From Newton it passed into the deism of the eighteenth century, whence it migrated into the philosophy of the Enlightenment, to make its last stand in Spencer's philosophy of the fixed environment and the static goal.

No, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding itself majestically from the reel of law under the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite congeries of changes. Laws are not governmental regulations which limit change, but are venient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of time, and then registered in statistical forms that are amenable to mathematical manipulation. . . . Savage and child delight in creating bogeys from which, their origin and structure being conveniently concealed, interesting thrills and shudders may be had. Civilized man in the nineteenth century outdid these bugaboos in his image of a fixed universe hung on a cast-iron framework of fixed, necessary, and universal laws. Knowledge of nature does not mean subjection to predestination, but insight into courses of change; an insight which is formulated in "laws," that is, "methods of subsequent procedure."

12. Causality and Some of the Difficulties in Determining Causal Relations

[ROBINSON, D. S., Principles of Reasoning, pp. 259-261. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1924.]

We may say that a causal relation is a continuous connection within a series of events constituting an implicative system, some of which may be singled out as constituting the cause and others as constituting the effect. The important

element is the necessary connection which forms the continuity in the series. This is the modern conception of causality. Wherever a constant coexistence or a regular sequence in events indicates a necessary connection the events in question are said to exhibit the causal relation. This is the real meaning of causality in science.

The actual existence of a causal relation in a given group of phenomena is frequently exceedingly difficult to determine. Mill's experimental methods are formal statements of the methods employed by scientists in determining causal relations, but before explaining them let us consider three difficulties which are often met with in applying them to a concrete problem.

1. In the first place, we sometimes meet with what is known as a reciprocity of phenomena. This really means that the causal relation is hard to find when the phenomena or events are coexistent instead of successive. Consider, for example, the phenomena of a burning candle. It is hard to say whether the melting wax is cause or effect. In fact, the flame is the cause of the melting of the tallow or wax, and the melting of the wax is the cause of the flame. Here we have a case of the same event being both cause and effect.

2. In the second place we often get a plurality of causes. When the cause of a death is sought, the answer might appear simple, but usually there are numerous causes at work, some of which can hardly be isolated. In fact, Mill was finally led to the view that the cause of every event is the sum-total of events in the universe which precede it. Then he made the distinction between the remote and the immediate cause or causes of an event. Usually a scientist is primarily interested in finding the immediate cause. This distinction applies also to the effect. There are immediate and remote effects. A single human act frequently carries in its train a veritable maze of consequences or effects. That is why it is so difficult to pass a fair judgment on the conduct of another.

3. And this leads to a third difficulty, usually known as the complexity of phenomena. In dealing with probability we were really dealing with exceedingly complex phenomena where the causal methods are blocked, and the investigator has to reply upon statistical enumeration. But even in cases where the causal methods are applicable, the phenomena are sometimes so highly complicated that it takes years of experimentation to unravel the various causal strands, thereby effecting a complete solution of the problem. Scientists have to work piecemeal, isolating first one causal nerus and then another. It may fall to the lot of some later thinker to discover the cause of residual phenomena, those which have not

been explained in the discovery of such causal relations as have been brought to light by previous investigators.

13. The Test of Thought

[Columbia Associates in Philosophy, An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, pp. 333-334. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923.]

The real question is not whether reflection has any value, it is the question of how it can be made most valuable, and this is a question concerning the concrete tests to which it can be put in specific situations. In comparing airplane motors, for instance, to determine which is best we must know what features to look for. Our conclusions may be wrong, not only because of error in applying some test, but also because of failure to apply all relevant tests. There may be some quality essential to a good motor of which we are not aware.

Likewise in comparing beliefs we must endeavor to test all qualities with respect to which one belief may be said to be better than another. Now there has never been perfect agreement as to just what qualities are to be included in this category. Most people will agree that clarity and intelligibility are desirable qualities in thought, and that in testing our beliefs we should determine whether they possess these qualities. On the other hand, there is great disagreement as to whether such a quality as personal preference for a belief should be considered in attempting to measure its value, apart from the reasons for which it is preferred. In a field like astronomy the power of certain ideas to enlist personal affections of this sort would seem irrelevant to most of us. But would it in the field of ethics?

Some philosophers, like Aristotle, have given systematic accounts of tests which may be applied to determine the validity of beliefs. These accounts constitute that branch of philosophy which is usually called logic. By some, logic is regarded as a completed science; that is, they believe all the tests of thought have been discovered. We shall not inquire into this question, but shall content ourselves with recalling those important tests upon which nearly all logicians are agreed, and which are amply illustrated in the examples of reflective thinking. They are as follows:

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1. Clarity. A good belief is unambiguous. We know unmis takably what it means.

2. Consistency with the Facts.-A good belief is founded on ex

tensive and accurate observation. It is not contradicted by experience.

3. Consistency with Other Beliefs.-There is a presumption against a belief that conflicts with other beliefs well certified by experience. Sometimes, however, it is the latter beliefs rather than the former that need to be revised.

4. Utility.-A good belief is often distinguished by its usefulness in suggesting further good beliefs.

5. Simplicity.-Other things being equal, that belief is best which makes fewest assumptions.

QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. What is the behavioristic program? Are all behaviorists mechanists? Is behaviorism a methodology or a program? Is there an identity between physiology and behavior? Are questions of monism, dualism, parallelism, and interactionism relevant to the science of psychology? Can one be a behaviorist without attachment to the neuromechanistic concept? Can one be an introspectionist and still believe in a neuromechanistic interpretation? Can the neuromechanistic interpretation take care of all that is well established in introspective psychology? Is there opposition between the introspective and the mechanistic interpretations?

2. Does behaviorism conflict with the basic principles of organized society? With juridical law? If behavior is purely mechanistic, is it not a bit strange that man can project the theory that he is a mere mechanism? Can behavior be explained in terms of bodily processes? Can it ever be? Should we confine ourselves to one method of observation and experimentation?

3. Evaluate Koffka's position with reference to the reconciliation of the mechanistic and vitalistic concepts. Is it philosophical or psychological? Is McDougall's view philosophical or psychological? What is Münsterberg's position with reference to causal and purposive psychology?

4. What is personalistic psychology? Is it a philosophical or psychological system?

5. What is Miss Calkins' conception of a "religious consciousness"?

6. How does the Gestalt interpretation of mind or behavior differ from that held by each of the following: Watson? McDougall? Münsterberg?

7. How does Morton Prince reconcile the purposive and mechanistic concepts? Do you believe his reasoning is valid? Why?

8. Evolve a system of psychological interpretation that is satisfying to you.

9. What are some of the difficulties in determining causal relations?

10. Read Psychologies of 1925, published by Clark University. On what issues do the contributors agree and on what do they disagree?

REFERENCES

ALLPORT, Floyd, Social Psychology (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924).

ANGELL, J. R., Introduction to Psychology (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1918).

BRILL, A. A., Psychoanalysis (Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Co., 1922.

CALKINS, Mary Whiton, First Book in Psychology (New York, Macmillan Co., 1910).

CARR, Harvey, Psychology (New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1925).

DEWEY, John, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, Henry Holt & So., 1922).

JAMES, William, Principles of Psychology (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1890).

JUDD, C. H., Psychology (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1917).

KANTOR, J. R., Principles of Psychology (New York, A. Knopf, 1924).

KOFFKA, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1925).

KOHLER, W., The Mentality of Apes (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924).

MACDOUGALL, Robert, The Problem of Psychology (New York, New York University Press, 1923).

MCDOUGALL, William, Outline of Psychology (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).

MOORE, Jared Sparks, Foundations of Psychology (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1921).

MÜNSTERBERG, Hugo, Psychology-General and Applied (New York, D. Appleton Co., 1915).

OGDEN, R. M., Psychology and Education (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926).

PRINCE, Morton, The Unconscious (New York, Macmillan Co., 1914).

Psychologies of 1925 (Clark University, 1925).

THORNDIKE, E. L., Educational Psychology (New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913-1914).

TITCHENER, E. B., Textbook in Psychology (New York, Macmillan Co., 1919).

ROYCE, Josiah, Outlines of Psychology (Macmillan Co., 1903). WATSON, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1919).

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