ternal factors within the individual. Indeed, under ordinary conditions they are the most important element in the determination of individual as well as of group behavior. It is, however, the creative individual who usually initiates changes in the form and organization, culture and behavior, of groups. Thus we see again that the individual and society are correlatives and that neither can be understood apart from the other.

4. What Is Psychology?

[BODE, B. H., "What is Psychology?" Psychological Review, July, 1922, Vol. 29, pp. 250-258.]

(Abridged.)

. . . Instead of one universal psychological creed, there are now at least three rival standpoints, each of which claims to have the truth in its keeping. . . .

The psychology in which most, if not all, of us were nurtured is the psychology that defines itself as the description and explanation of mental states or states of consciousness. It is the only one of the three standpoints that has a long and continuous tradition behind it. Its parentage is not scientific but metaphysical. The dualism of mind and matter, which was evolved from theological and philosophical speculation, furnished it with a point of departure and with its fundamental axiom. . .

The net result of all this has been that psychology has gravitated steadily towards a state of innocuous desuetude. As some one has said, it became the science that explains what every one knows in language that no one can understand. In so far as it secured valuable results-and I have no wish to minimize its achievements these results bore no necessary relation whatever to the hypothesis of sensations or mental elements. Eventually the dissatisfaction with its procedure bore fruit in the movement or doctrine commonly known as behaviorism. This doctrine forms a clean-cut contrast with the psychology of mental states. It refuses to have any dealings with mental states. The subject-matter of psychology as it maintains, is not states of consciousness, but behavior. In its hands experience gives up the ghost and retains only such qualities as are tangible or measurable. Visual images, for example, are reduced to eye strains, and the like, and thought becomes a reaction of the nervous system.

Behaviorism faces in the right direction when it insists that psychology is a science of adaptive behavior. This new

outlook upon psychology, however, is seriously distorted by reason of the fact that it retains the conception of bodily behavior which was held by the psychology of mental states. According to this conception, all bodily behavior can be read off in terms of reflexes. Originally it was supposed that some entity, called the mind or soul, was enthroned in the cerebrum, where it manipulated the various motor centers according to the exigencies of the moment. Later on this soul was replaced by mental states, and eventually the control by these mental states was extensively revised, or even abolished, in the doctrines of parallelism and epiphenomenalism. . .

.. What is the remedy? We cannot go back to the traditional standpoint with its dry rot of antiquated metaphysics. But, on the other hand, there is nothing to hope for from behaviorism, except more neural reactions, more mechanisms. What we need, first of all, is recognition and acceptance of ezperiential facts which would be obvious to everybody if we were not corrupted in advance by antecedent bias. A toothache, an inspiration, an emotion,-these are not neural actions, let the behaviorist say what he will. They are just what they are, and not something else. I do not question the fact that they are connected with neural reactions, but that is another story. If psychology is to find its way out of the present slough of despond, it must make a beginning at this point.. It must take facts as it finds them, and not insist antecedently that these facts are really mental states or neural reactions. . . .

The standpoint which I have indicated so sketchily just now is the third possible alternative in psychology at the present time. It, too, has been sometimes called behaviorism, but it is behaviorism of a different sort. It takes no interest in subjective "states of consciousness," and it is interested in neural processes only in so far as acquaintance with these is necessary for an understanding of the control which the environment exercises over the conduct of individual. Its chief concern is with the unique and irreducible nature of the stimulus, which has been persistently neglected in the past and which is our best hope for a clue to the nature of purposive behavior. . . .

5. Three Fundamental Errors of the Behaviorists

[PRINCE, Morton, "Three Fundamental Errors of the Behaviorists and the Reconciliation of the Purposive and Mechanistic Concepts," Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology, March, 1925, Vol. 32, pp. 143-165.]

The first fundamental error [of one type] of behaviorists is the assumption of epiphenomenalism leading to the denial of consciousness as the cause of bodily reactions. This is harking back to the "steam whistle" theory of Huxley. Even if we cannot understand the how, any doctrine which denies that consciousness determines behavior is in conflict with the basic principles of organized society and juridical law, such as the principle of "criminal intent," and will never be accepted by common sense people.

The second error is to suppose that behavior can be to-day completely explained in terms of the correlated neural and other bodily processes alone. It . . . would be a great desideratum if it could be done. But we have not the faintest glimpse of the neural "patterns" awakened by the "adequate stimulus" and involved in behavior, or, any way, of discovering by objective methods what "patterns" did the job.

The third fundamental error of the behaviorists is in confining themselves to only one method of observation and experimentation. As in the physical sciences, different problems require different and often many methods, according to the nature of the problem; so in psychology. The behaviorist, when he attempts to follow the "adequate stimulus" beyond the sensory receptors, runs up against a stone wall or loses his path in a jungle. Accordingly the behaviorist . . . willy or nilly, is compelled by the hard facts of nature to shift to some other method after he has carried his objective method as far as he can; or else get nowhere. The only other method at present open to him is the introspective method, of which there are many kinds. [Watson's views are discussed at some length in this paper.]

The reconciliation of the purposive and the mechanistic concepts may be attained by the theory of the identification of the inner reality of neural processes with consciousness-a theory long maintained by the writer. According to this theory consciousness is the reality and neural processes the mode by which this reality is apprehended by a second organism. Accordingly it would follow that that which is experienced as will and purpose,

if objectively apprehended through the senses, would necessarily be apprehended as mechanistic in terms of reflexes.

So when we think in terms of mind, we must think in terms of mechanisms and reflexes. In principle it is immaterial which terms we use. Each has equal validity. Practically, however, as we know nothing about brain processes, we are compelled to explain causal antecedents of behavior in terms of mind, of will, and purpose. [This theory is discussed at length in the paper.]

6. The Mechanistic versus the Personalistic Psychology as Applied to Religious Education

[BENTLEY, John Edward, "The Mechanistic and Personalistic Psychological Contributions to the Field of Religious Education," Boston University Bulletin, August 15, 1925, Vol. 14, No. 24.]

Materialistic and naturalistic systems of philosophy and psychology applied to religious education have tended to reduce religion to a set of social values in which God has been exchanged for social substitutes. A few influential writers on religious education have built their theories on a more or less pragmatic philosophy and extremely functional psychology. Since these types of philosophy and psychology have been current in the literature of secular education it has seemed quite natural for religious educators to borrow from this source. But, in our judgment, they have borrowed unwisely. A continuation of this practice would constitute a serious menace to the Christian religion.

Functional psychology can make a valid contribution to the methods and technique of religious pedagogy, but to the subject-matter of religious education its contribution is limited. Extreme functionalism is too mechanical and too materialistic to be an asset to religious educational content. Undue emphasis on mechanical science will place the religious educator in a dilemma. He will find himself at the cross roads of functional adjustment and theistic faith. The mechanical conception will render him unfit to present the ideals, needs, purposes and powers of a religion that demands a God who is a vital presence; a religion that recognizes the need of the religious consciousness; a religion that knows God to be the source of man's deepest intuitions and aspirations.

Religious education needs a metaphysical philosophy in addition to psychology. Its supreme end is seen in the universal demand for unity. It asserts its faith in a changeless Reality

beneath the flux of phenomena. Despite our training in modern scientific psychology, many of us still accept the view that the changes in phenomena are governed by moral law; that the world is something more than change or chance; that there is some purpose, some final cause, some end in things. We assert, therefore, that there is a belief in the Right, which we experience in our own Spirit rather than in Nature. And, moreover, we cannot find any theory based on utility that has, so far, accounted for the moral and religious consciousness. God, for us, represents causality, and creates in us the demand for human perfection and felicity connected with the belief in the Right. These beliefs and demands, centered in the human consciousness, are then not "by-products" of lower utilitarian or mechanical attitudes and habits but are found in the earliest and even crudest forms of thought; and thought is Being-Cogito, ergo sum-for in the principles of human reason man glimpses the Supreme Reality. The age-long problem of the Heraclitean flux, or Becoming, while it is not denied philosophically urges us to say somewhat with the contemplative mind of Parmenides, that we seek a permanence and changelessness amid the varieties of phenomena. We are compelled therefore to postulate a Supreme Being in which there is a fixed order of purpose and law, guiding human destiny.

Functionalism in religious education, stressing a religion of expanded social values, will rob the Christian consciousness of its God, who is a vital, dynamic and valid presence. Functionalism makes God a mechanical sequence to human action.

Many of us still believe in theistic Reality but it is to be feared that there are those who do not take this to be the essential groundwork of religious education. They are, in our judgment, moralizing education, and this is not necessarily religious education. A constructive philosophy of religious education must be created in which the child is made to feel his responsibility and relationship to a personal God who is the center of religious faith and from whom proceeds the impetus for moralized conduct. Without such a center something is lacking that cannot, in our opinion, be supplied by the functional emphasis alone.

The purpose of this paper is to enquire specifically what are the legitimate contributions of mechanical psychology and personalistic philosophy to the theory of religious education. We shall attempt to present a sketch of the schools of modern scientific psychology in order to state their varied trends, thus