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Simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt actions. Choice is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habits and impulses finds a way fully open. Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed, unified. As long as deliberation pictures shoals or rocks or troublesome gales as marking the route of a contemplated voyage, deliberation goes on. But when the various factors in action fit harmoniously together, when imagination finds no annoying hindrance, when there is a picture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds, the voyage is definitely entered upon. This decisive direction of actions constitutes choice. It is a great error to suppose we have no preferences until there is a choice. We are always biased beings, tending in one direction rather than another. The occasion of deliberation is an excess of preferences, not natural apathy or an absence of likings. We want things that are incompatible with one another; therefore, we have to make a choice of what we really want, of the course of action, that is, which most fully releases activities. Choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a

unified preference out of competing preferences. Biases that had held one another in check now, temporarily at least, reinforce one another, and constitute a unified attitude. The moment arrives when imagination pictures an objective consequence of action which supplies an adequate stimulus and releases definitive action. All deliberation is a search for a way to act, not for a final terminus. Its office is to facilitate stimulation. Deliberation is irrational in the degree in which an end is so fixed, a passion or interest so absorbing, that the foresight of consequences is warped to include only what furthers execution of its predetermined bias. Deliberation is rational in the degree in which forethought flexibly remakes old aims and habits, institutes perception and love of new ends and acts.

9. Mechanistic Conception of Behavior

[THORNDIKE, E. L., Educational Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 281-282. New York, Teachers College, Columber University, 1913.]

It would appear that Thorndike is not altogether satisfied with the dominating mechanistic tendency of his principles, and that he would like to overcome this implication by means of the Law of Effect. In his consideration of the ethical aspects of development, he clearly refers the possibility of

ethical progress to the Law of Effect which is based upon the individual's inherited tendencies.

His

Man is thus externally altering himself to suit himself. nature is not right in his own eyes. Only one thing in it, indeed, is unreservedly good, the power to make it better. This power, the power of learning, or modification in favor of the satisfying, the capacity represented by the law of effect, is the essential principle of reason and right in the world.

10. The Will

[BENTLEY, Madison, The Field of Psychology, pp. 291-293. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1924.]

The secret of willing lies in the fact of determination. The determination wears a double aspect, as we have seen in the "reaction" experiments; on the one side are the mental structures which bear a prophetic or forward-reaching meaning, and on the neural side is aroused an excitation running a fixed course and serving to give significance to the final stage of the action. "Look for a red square," so the instructions run, "and lift the right forefinger when it appears." These instructions create a determination and by virtue of this determination the red square, when it appears, is apprehended as the thing prophesied in the instructions and also the thing with which the appropriate movement is to be correlated. Now suppose that, instead of instructions so imparted in the experiments, one is determined through choice. The operation is essentially the same, as we have seen; but here the determination may emerge as "my intent." Deliberation infuses into the final selection the meaning, "this is my decision," or "I will." The determination then operates just as any other determination would, but because of its history we call the act a "willed" act. Indeed, deliberation is not always necessary to "willing." Any circumstance which leads to the significance "my determination" is sufficient. Thus the application of a rule or of a formula as "the unselfish course is always to be taken" or "good taste requires a polite performance" or "this would be right" may so promptly set up a determination that rival considerations (necessary to a real choice) do not enter the field. At times the individual has nothing behind the stern fiat of his "indomitable will," except some verbal formula, such as "my way is right" or "this is the command of God" to support his determination.

We may say, then, that any action in which the determina

tion includes a reference to the self is a willed action. Of course this designation only states a fact, it offers no substantiation for the common belief that, when one wills, a personal agent at the moment rules and dominates the organism adding a power which the organism does not possess. We can easily see that such a belief is extremely gratifying to man's love of power and also that its moral implications are weighty. At the same time we have to acknowledge that unbiased observation does not discover such an arbitrary ruler-one who does not derive his powers from the psychosome slowly fashioned throughout a long period of personal and racial history. At the same time, we see that in determination-the central fact in action-mental structure and meaning play as important part as neurone and synapse; so we are saved by our psychosomatic function from a description in purely physical terms. It is quite obvious that if we were to remove from action meaning or significance, especially the significance which bears upon the future, we should essentially change its character. We could, of course, substitute a kind of biologic teleology, as the behaviorists sometimes do, and speak of the organism as "adapting" or "adjusting" itself to conditions by "responding to the demands of the environment." But this procedure has two scientific defects; the concepts of response and adaptation substitute the behavorist's interpretation of natural facts for the facts themselves, and the method employed ignores that aspect of action which is most amenable to our direct and immediate inspection. What we do seem to discover, when we project the "willed" actions and resolutions upon the general background of life, is that they mark a distinct advance in the increasing self-sufficiency of the organism.

11. The Training of the Will

Will is commonly thought of as the power of making a choice or a decision. It is a principle of organization and control that is constantly undergoing development. Will grows and evolves with experience.

When making a choice between different courses of action, one thinks of the probable results of each and selects the one that is expected to bring about the desired outcome. When we will to do a certain act, the choice is a choice of ends. Desire and duty are the conditions which determine a given

choice. Desire is determined by hereditary influences and the entire experience of the individual, while duty comes largely from social influences and ideals.

Dewey says, "The term will has a narrower and a wider sense. In its broad sense it is synonymous with all psychical activity having a mental and not merely a physiological stimulus, and which accomplishes any result whether intended or not. In the narrower sense the word is limited to action arising from an idea and ending in making this idea real; in changing it from an idea into a presentation." 1

In order to get action a definite purpose is the first requirement; without a definite purpose one shifts and expends no great energy. The goal should be attractive, attainable and not too far in the distance. One should not say,

"I will try," but rather "I will do it." Success is the greatest stimulant. Morale is at its best when one is drawing near the goal and not when every effort is meeting with defeat.

Training the will is largely a matter of training the individual. Learning by doing is just as applicable in the training of the will as in any form of learning. The more one knows the more probable it will be that one will make the right choice. Effective effort in the pursuit of an end with its accompanying satisfaction is excellent training of the will. A will worthily motivated is a good will. It is by doing righteous acts that one becomes righteous, by doing courageous acts one becomes courageous. Good health has a very important bearing on decision and control of will. An individual is strong willed when he always has ideals and bends his energies toward the attainment of those ideals; while the weak-willed individual is controlled by his instincts and impulses. One forms largely the ideals of his family and the community in which he lives.

Three important phases of will training are: (1) developing ideals. Direct training in the development of ideals is possible. Effective ideals are largely developed through group approval or disapproval. Very soon the child accepts

1 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913) Chap. iii.

the ideals of the parents and society as his ideals. (2) Choice is largely a matter of habit. Satisfaction strengthens the choice of decision and dissatisfaction makes it less likely that a previous choice will appear a second time. (3) The individual should make it a habit to act in light of the very best knowledge and ideals that he possesses. Occasionally an individual sees the right and does the wrong. A definite plan of action should be developed in such an individual by showing the individual the advantages of the proper decision and the disadvantages of the wrong choice. Right habits should be developed before wrong habits are completely formed.

When noble ideas issue readily in decisive action and are welded together through the glow of feeling, much progress has been made in will training.

Summarizing, training the will is primarily a matter of establishing habits and developing ideals. In the last analysis, it is the training of the individual. Will has been defined as the sum total of the conditions of choice, and as the sum total of the conditions, whether inherited or acquired, that determine our action. In the first place, choice is very often a matter of habit. However, when we speak of will we think of the individual as being confronted by some situation which requires deliberation, and then choice. In training the individual's will, it is highly important that a system of ideals be developed, and habits of action in living up to these ideals be formed. This means, in other words, that the individual must be given opportunity to face situations requiring decision and choice. It means that he will learn how to meet situations adequately and wisely by being given the opportunity to meet them. It is very desirable that the learner be impressed with the fact that decision or choice is within his own range and that he can be more and do more if he only will.

12. Development of the Will in the Child

[BOLTON, F. E., Everyday Psychology for Teachers, pp. 306-308. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.]

Instead of being a fixed quantity the will of the child grows through experience. At the outset the child possesses through

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