TITCHENER, E. B., Textbook of Psychology (New York, Macmillan Co., 1910), pp. 307-373.

WARREN, H. C., Human Psychology (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919), Chap. xii.

WOODWORTH, R. S., Psychology (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1921), Chap. xvii.

CHAPTER XIII

ASSOCIATION AND MEMORY

Every one has observed that ideas which have for any reason been associated with one another in the past tend to recur together. The readings describe in some detail the nature and the laws of association. There are four phases of the memory process-impression, retention, recall, and recognition. Any adequate reading on this subject should include readings on all four phases. Motivation, clearness of impression, organization, repetition, and review will facilitate the formation of associations. While our readings include some general rules for economical memorizing, the questions pertaining to the extent and wisdom of memory work as such is not raised.

The selections from articles by Reed (11), and Pechstein (12) on the Part versus the Whole Methods of Memorizing are designed to temper present dogmatic assertions regarding the superiority of the Whole Method. The effect of attitudes and purpose in memory work is clearly pointed out in the selections from the writings of Bolton (9) and Peterson (16). The place of cramming (18) and the use of mnemonic or crutch devices when memorizing are discussed in selections from Woodworth (20) and Whipple (21).

Thousands of dollars are spent annually for memory courses. Common sense will tell one that if a man can learn all the things required in a memory course he does not need the course. The selections from Bolton (24) and Angell (23) should be studied carefully. One of the best chapters on memory training may be found in Seashore's Psychology in Daily Life. The training consists primarily in the use of proper methods of making impressions, practicing recall, and organizing material.

1. Association

[BETTS, George Herbert, The Mind and Its Education, p. 148. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1924.]

Whence came the thought that occupies you at this moment, and what determines the next that is to follow? Introspection reveals no more interesting fact concerning our minds than that our thoughts move in a connected and orderly array and not in a hit-and-miss fashion. Our mental states do not throng the stream of consciousness like so many pieces of wood following each other at random down a rushing current, now this one ahead, now that. On the contrary, our thoughts come one after another, as they are beckoned or caused. The thought now in the focal point of your consciousness appeared because it sprouted out of one just preceding it; and the present thought, before it departs, will determine its successor and lead it upon the scene. This is to say that our thought stream possesses not only a continuity, but also unity; it has coherence and system. This coherence and system which operates in accordance with definite laws, is brought about by what the psychologist calls association.

2. Association of Ideas

[ANGELL, J. R., Introduction to Psychology, pp. 160-164. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1918.]

It remains to examine some of the principles determining the sequence of the successive links in a chain of thought or images. This is a problem which has interested every generation of psychologists, from Aristotle down to the present time.

The Association of Ideas.-That ideas which have for any reason been connected with one another in the past tend to hang together, so that if one presents itself to the mind the others tend to come with it, has attracted again and again the attention of even superficial observers. In like fashion the tendencies of ideas to suggest others which resemble them has repeatedly been noticed. . . .

...

Association and the Law of Habit.-All the principles of association may be considered as in one way or another expressions of the general law of habit. Frequency of connection is the most obvious instance of the principle. Ideas which have been frequently united tend to recall one another at the expense of less frequently connected thoughts. The date 1492 is in this way connected with Columbus. Intensity in an experience may

serve to bind permanently together psychological elements that otherwise would never suggest one another. The thoughts of the several moments of a very terrifying experience, e.g., escape from a sinking ship, may thus become permanently fused. Again the recency of a conjunction may bring it about that the train of ideas reflects this connection, rather than others which have been more frequent, and even some which may have been more intense.

Evidently these three factors, if they were the only influences at work, might make it substantially impossible to predict in a given case what associations should actually dominate, because it might well occur that a particular idea a, should have been frequently connected with b, recently connected with c, and at some remote time vividly connected with d. Synaptic conditions would therefore permit that the idea a should lead to b, c or d. Which one actually succeeds a will depend upon the momentary condition of the brain, which we have no means of determining. Meantime, it is clear enough that the sequence of ideas is determined by perfectly definite causes, even if we are not in a position to state in a given case just what they are.

Undoubtedly among the most important determining factors are our interests, temporary or permanent, and our emotional mood. If our minds are preoccupied with some exciting or entertaining train of thought, it is practically impossible for ideas connected with wholly different topics to arise. Similarly if we are in the clutch of any strong emotion, only such ideas as are relevant to its course can get a hearing, or, indeed, can reach the field of consciousness at all. . . .

No account of association would be correct which implied that the succession of ideas one upon another could be explained in terms of single ideas. For example, the fact that idea b follows idea a is probably never completely to be accounted for by the presence of a alone. Certainly in all ordinary instances the appearance of b is due to the entire context amid which a appears. Thus the idea wood brings up an entirely different group of associations when it occurs in connection with the search for fuel and in connection with an examination of furniture. The memory of words affords innumerable instances of the same kind of thing.

The Association of Similars.-Few forms of association have attracted more attention and perhaps none is more significant for human thought processes, than that of resemblance, or similarity. The older writers on psychology used to group the

various forms of association under the headings-contiguity in space and time, similarity, contrast, cause, and effect. The reader will readily recognize that we have already in substance dealt with the case of contiguity and to some extent with that of cause and effect. In our original comments upon association were cited instances in which ideas which had previously occurred together, or in immediate succession, tended to recall one another. Associations involving contrast, e.g., black-white, large-small, etc., are closely related to the cases of contiguity and we shall not pause to discuss them, but a few further words must be devoted to associations involving similarity.

It is in this type of associative sequence that we seem to break most completely with past experience and seem to achieve freshness and originality in the order of our thought. It has often been said, and probably with much truth, that it is our wide and subtle use of this kind of associative nexus which marks us off most unequivocally from the animals. Ideas which are similar may recall one another, even though they have never before been in any way immediately conjoined in a thought

process.

3. The Fixing of Associations

[TITCHENER, E. B., Beginners' Psychology, p. 158. Copyright, 1915, by the Macmillan Co. Reprinted by permission.]

If a group of tendencies. . . does escape interference, then the brain settles down of itself. Schoolboys, with a keen sense for economy of effort, learn their lessons only partway over night, and find that a hasty review next morning is enough to fix them; the associative tendencies work while their owners sleep. The practised speaker, knowing that he has to talk on a certain subject at a certain date, marshals his present ideas in half an hour of concentrated attention, and then drops the whole thing; his brain incubates it for him; and when the appointed day comes near, he finds that his associative tendencies have practically prepared his address.

4. The Effect of Environment upon Association [TURNER, E. M., and BETTS, G. H., Laboratory Studies in Educational Psychology, p. 77. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1924.]

In spite of our attempts to conceal our mental content we often give evidences of that content by our words and actions.