all along been suggesting. Organic evolution operated to establish self-sufficiency in the animal until finally an animal was produced in whom inner conscious processes outweighed all others in importance. These inner processes are important because they make possible the most complete readjustment of the environment. The inner processes are also highly significant because they give rise to a new world, the world of language and art which supports and fosters the further evolution of consciousness until there is established through consciousness a new system of life. . . .

Consciousness continues and carries to a higher level the process of differentiation of the individual from his environment which has been going on throughout all organic evolution. The examples discussed show also, I believe, that consciousness is the means of changing very materially the significance of the environment to the individual. . . . I hold that consciousness is a cause of events in the physical world. . . . Consciousness is the essential fact in human life as I have attempted to show. What man does with his environment depends upon consciousness. That phase of individuality which is important enough to change the type of evolution certainly cannot be described as non-existent or as merely resolvable into its elements. . . .

The doctrine of evolution opens the way for a wholly different view of causation. Cause ought to be definable in terms which shall make life, not a new force, not an increment in the energy of the world, but a sphere of existence, a center of reorganization. . . .

There are many of our acts which are not dependent for their character and influence upon higher processes of comparison, memory, and self control. This internal separation of the individual into higher and lower functions has given color to all of our ideas about the nature of behavior. Each individual is trying to develop inner coherency. The individual with his different levels has been so acutely aware of his effort to work out this coherency that he has had all kinds of views with regard to the higher self and the lower self. The antithesis carried man so far that he lost sight at first of the utility of his higher self as a center of functional adaptations and he grew accustomed to describing his conscious life. as pure and unrelated to practical conduct. Later he was led to change his views regarding his own nature very radi cally. When he saw the significance of his conscious life in the evolutionary process he began to identify all his activities

with sensory-motor processes which he had all along recognized as practical and thus arrived at the grotesque conclusion that he must be treated just like the lower animals..

...

It is enough for our present purposes to point out that the evolution of consciousness has been so intimately related to the evolution of the higher forms of behavior that the progress of human intellection can be traced in the record of behavior. The science of psychology will not find itself until it turns away from impressions and sensory details and recognizes that the inner processes of conscious organization so transform sensory elements that there is in sensation little of value for the student of consciousness. Behavior on the other hand is the expression and end of all inner organization. To study behavior more completely is therefore the most urgent of our problems,in a very important sense it is our chief problem. When we know the evolution of consciousness we shall find the relation between consciousness and behavior solving itself as two phases of the same single process of adaptation. .

Consciousness as a static fact [as treated by the structuralists] to be dissected loses its whole significance, for consciousness like life is a type of functioning [the functionalist's viewpoint].

Finally, I believe that the applications of psychology to practical problems will be fully worked out only when we recognize the importance of consciousness in evolution.

28. The Function of Mind

[ELLWOOD, Charles A., An Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 30-33. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1922.]

Read the following references and compare with the view held by Ellwood: Angell, J. R., Psychology, pp. 7-9. Judd, C. H., "Evolution and Consciousness" in the Psychological Review, Vol. 17, pp. 77-97. Gates, A. I., Psychology for Students of Education, pp. 463-466.

Mentality may, from a strictly biological point of view, be regarded as a variation in the life process. It is a variation which natural selection has favored from the beginning in the animal world. Among animals, those that would stand the best chance of survival would not be those that developed the greatest physical strength, but rather those that developed the keenest intelligence; that by means of it could adapt themselves quickly to their environment; that could sense approaching

danger and escape it. Intelligence, it is evident, has had a survival value from the start far in excess of almost any other organic trait. . . . Now consciousness, intelligence, seems to have been developed as a control over the complex and varied movements of the higher forms of animals. Even in the highest animals, however, there are many bodily activities which are not accompanied by consciousness. The need of control by consciousness apparently exists only at those points where changes, new adjustments, in relatively complex activities occur. We may conclude, therefore, that consciousness is associated with that process in living creatures which we know as adaptation, especially when the process of adaptation is rapid and complex. The function of the mind in the life process seems, therefore, to be: to furnish a superior method of control over complex adaptative processes. Intelligence and the neural processes immediately involved in consciousness constitute the master device produced by organic evolution to perfect the control of the organism over its environment.

According to this view of mind, it is not something apart from the life process. It is subject, therefore, to organic evolution, like all other elements in life. The things that stimulate it and its methods of response may be as much affected by natural selection as any other form of the inherent elements of our organic make-up. Our capacities for sensations, our eyes and ears, and all the mechanism of perception, our natural disposition, our emotions, our intellect and even our reason have been produced by organic evolution and fixed in us by selection. All these things have relevancy to the life process. They must be understood as functioning within that process. This does not mean, of course, that they may not function at times in very imperfect and even disadvantageous ways. But it does mean that the whole mechanism of the mind must be regarded as an instrument, however imperfect it may be, of adaptation, an instrument for doing things which are important for life.

If the function of the mind is to bring about rapid, short cut adaptations of the organism to its environment, then manifestly it must select, among the countless stimuli which surround an organism, those which need attention for the maintenance and development of the organism's activities. Hence intelligence is selective even in its earliest beginnings. From the first, therefore, mental activity is more or less purposeful or teleological activity. Purposeful activity (active adaptation) must be regarded, therefore, like mind itself, as a variation which

has been found useful to living creatures and hence perpetuated and developed by natural selection. It is not so important, from a strictly scientific point of view, to decide the old metaphysical debate as to whether purposeful activity is a form of mechanical reaction or not, as it is to see that such activities are peculiar to living creatures and have been developed because of their survival value.

.. The mental, the purposeful, the teleological becomes increasingly important as we ascend in the scale of life. These are facts. . . of the utmost significance for the social life of man. Human society is no theater of the play of blind, mechanical forces. Society is . . . from the start, a more or less purposeful activity. It becomes increasingly so, until, when we reach the level of the present most highly civilized human society, we may properly say that it is dominantly so. And, indeed, the purpose of the social sciences is nothing less than to replace the action of blind, mechanical force in human social life by the action of intelligent purposes.

29. Organic Evolution and Mental Evolution

[ELLWOOD, Charles A., The Psychology of Human Society, pp. 70–74. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1925.]

Mental evolution is not something apart from organic evolution. If we take a strictly biological point of view, mentality may be regarded as a variation in the life-process. It is the most significant mutation which life has brought forth; for when mind or consciousness appeared in organic evolution, the whole balance of the world of life was changed. Thereafter, the determining factors in the life-process became more and more the inner and psychic, not the outer and physical. Among animals those that had this inner control over behavior would stand the best chance of survival; for by means of it they could adapt themselves quickly to their environment. The animal that could sense approaching danger and develop conscious control over its behavior could escape; again, if it could sense food, it could survive better than a form of life without consciousness. Mentality, it is evident, has had a survival value from the start far in excess of almost any other organic trait.

Since all organisms do not show signs of mental life, we must seek to locate mind, if possible, in the scheme of organic development. The lowest organisms do not possess nervous systems; hence, in their case, it would seem idle to raise the ques

tion whether they have neural processes which are accompanied by consciousness. In such forms of life, which include the lower animal types and the whole plant world, adaptation to environment is probably secured by purely physical or mechanical means. The plant is sessile and its movements are of the simplest kind; therefore, its life-processes do not need conscious guidance. But as we ascend in the animal scale, the katabolic tendencies of the organism-that is, the tendencies to expend energy rather than to store it up-increase, and hence bodily movements become greater, more varied, and more complex. Now the mind, with its consciousness, seems to have been developed as a control over the complex and varied movements which we find in the higher types of animal behavior.1 Even in the highest animals, however, there are many bodily activities which are not accompanied by consciousness. The need of conscious control apparently exists only at those points where new adjustments are required, where changes in relatively complex activities occur. We may conclude, therefore, that consciousness is associated in living creatures with the process of adaptation, especially when the process is rapid and complex. The mind is evidently an organ of adaptation, whose function is to furnish a superior method of control over the adaptive processes of life. The neural processes involved in consciousness, therefore, constitute the master device produced by organic evolution to perfect the control of the organism over its environment.

According to this view, which is that of modern psychology, mind is not something apart from life, but is a functioning element in the life-process. Like all other elements in life, it is subject to the laws of organic evolution. The fundamental attributes of our mental life must, therefore, be regarded as produced by variation, transmitted by heredity, and fixed by selection. They are as much determined by variation, heredity, and selection as the general characteristics of our bodies. Our capacities for sensation, for perception, for thought, our natural impulses, our emotions, and even our power of abstraction and reasoning, as we have seen, have been produced by organic evo

1 Some of the chief texts in psychology which have set forth the functional view of mind are: James, Principles of Psychology (New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1890); Angell, Psychology; Thorndike, Elements of Psychology (New York, A. G. Seiler, 1907); McDougall, Outline of Psychology (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923); Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution.