Points to be conceded. - A great promotive both of fairness in discussion and of clearness in fixing the issue is the conceding of points on which there is no contest. A debater who will yield nothing is liable to incur the odium not only of being obstinate and wrong-headed but of having a lame cause. A debater who concedes broadly and generously, on points of common agreement, secures a fairer hearing, while also the spirit of concession betokens a broader and wiser mastery of the question. As a matter of clever procedure it is not infrequently wise to yield to one's opponent in every point except the one wherein he would make his opponent yield to him.

Points to be waived. To waive is not the same as to concede. It is simply to set aside or postpone some consideration which, though not yielded, is not relevant, not in place here. This belongs to the watchful business of keeping the course of argument simple and clear. The consideration thus waived may come up afterward, when the way is opened for it by argument. Or it may, if admitted, merely complicate or befog the case. An unscrupulous opponent may seek no better escape from a lame cause than to involve the debater in some irrelevant discussion. It is important, therefore, to have an alert sense for what should, or may, be waived as not to the present purpose.

Fairness of Encounter.

Fairness, largeness, honesty of encounter applies both to the statement of an opponent's views and to the estimate of an opponent's argument.

1. Fair and full statement of the opponent's position, without attempt to modify his words in order to favor your own side, is the only procedure that pays in the long run. It pays for your own argument; for if the opponent's position is strong, to whittle at it is only to attempt evasion, and thus indirectly to confess yourself baffled. It pays also in fortifying your own position; for if in representing your antagonist

you leave some unappreciated point, some underrated principle, it will work to your discomfiture.

2. While of course an opponent's weak argument is to be shown as weak, on the other hand, when an opponent's argument is found impregnable, honesty requires that the fact be fairly acknowledged. Subterfuge and evasion in the face of an evident truth may be the natural impulse of a wounded pride, but they are ruinous tactics for a broad and noble cause. As to the treatment of an opponent's argument recognized as strong, if its strength is evident and yet you surpass, you have the greater honor; the stronger foe gives the nobler victory.

III.

Order of Arguments. Although the order in which a body of arguments is arranged is a matter of cardinal importance, little can be laid down by way of rule. It must be left for the most part to the tact of the reasoner, the character of the audience, the state of feeling and knowledge regarding the question, the presuppositions to be encountered, and many other considerations that can be determined only in the individual case.

All that can be done here, therefore, is to note a few ways in which arguments of various types and characters derive advantage from the relative order in which they are placed.

As regards Kind of Argument. Some types of argument contain intrinsically a suggestion of the relative position they should occupy in the discussion.

In an inductive investigation, concerned with a question, the leading place is naturally due to considerations that establish an antecedent probability, the a priori type of argument. This becomes the basis of procedure, the hypothesis; and whatever is added by testimony comes in then either to

1 See above, p. 608 sq.

strengthen the probability or to compel modification.

Thus the order is from the more general to the more particular and circumstantial. If the argument from probability came in after the other, it would seem to betray the reasoner's sense that positive testimony is inadequate and must be buttressed up by something else.

The deductive type of argument, based as it is on acknowledged truths and principles, has something of a clinching and enforcing nature, and hence, in a series of arguments, would naturally occupy a place well along in the discussion, after the preliminaries are disposed of, and the course of thought draws toward its summary and conclusion. So much of suggestion, not absolute but to be taken for what the individual case makes it worth, may be drawn from the intrinsic character of the type.

Arguments from example and analogy, being of more expository and illustrative nature,1 come naturally near the beginning or near the end, according as they define the issue and lay it out, or summarize and clinch it.

As to Relative Strength of Arguments. A body of arguments, of all literary works, is especially susceptible to climax,

an order growing to greater strength and cogency. Yet also, so much depends on the vigor of the first impression, that it will not do to begin with an argument obviously weak, however its effect may be retrieved. The resource seems to be, to begin with arguments that are strong in the sense of being clear, explanatory, self-evident, — in other words, arguments that contain most of the expository virtue. On the same principle, the final argument, which gathers up the conclusiveness of the whole, should be strong in the sense of being comprehensive, summarizing, containing most of consequence and enforcement.

Arguments relatively weak, while they are to occupy the

1 See above, p. 615.

intermediate position, with bulk and prominence graduated to their intrinsic value, may derive, as to placing, much advantage from their companion arguments. Not infrequently an argument that does no more than open a probability for another to utilize, or add a coloring to its predecessor, may by its juxtaposition both receive and lend, till each has the strength of two. This fact dictates that a minor consideration should ally itself with pleas of more importance, so as to gain the advantage of fellowship and position.

Order of Refutation. The order that refutation should occupy in debate depends on the strength of the position refuted, and on the prominence it already has in the mind of the public addressed. When the opposed idea holds full possession of the field, the first business must be to dislodge it; there is no room for a new argument until the old view is cleared away. On the other hand, when the refuted position is insignificant, the order of refutation may recognize its insignificance; the refutation may come in incidentally as a corollary of the argument most potent to overthrow the

error.

All this is merely one aspect of the wisdom that is needed in refutation, manifest in the estimate placed upon the opponent's strength. In strength also, as well as in position, the refutation should be wisely adapted to the exact significance of the opposed argument, neither belittling nor exaggerating it. It is manifestly unwise to underrate the opponent's position; the refutation must be stronger if it is to act as a real refutation. On the other hand, it is manifestly unwise to spend superfluous energy in refuting a weak position; the very exertion put forth advertises it for strong. To put forth just the power requisite to dispossess the hearer of an erroneous view is the work of nice calculation and tact.

NOTE - In Webster's speech on "The Constitution not a Compact between Sovereign States," already quoted from to illustrate negative argument, the first half is devoted to an elaborate refutation of the widely prevalent Nullification doctrine. In Burke's Bristol Speech, where the refutation is merely an incidental answer to objections, it comes in as a supplementary part added in the interests of completeness.

II. ORATORY.

From debate, that comparatively simple body of arguments wherein ordering, tone, and style are determined by the subject-matter, we pass now to a far more complex kind of discourse, wherein not the subject-matter alone but the person apprehending it, not the brain alone but the emotions and the whole man, have their proportioned share in the appeal. In oratory, on account of the issues involved, we may fitly conceive all the elements of discourse raised, as it were, to a higher power, suffused with the glow of immediate personal interest, and vitalized from the inner world of motive. Thus we have reached the summit and crown of the rhetorical art, the utterance wherein style and invention, wherein subject, author, and audience, all come to typical relation and expression.

I.

The Essence of Oratory. Every hearer for whom oratory is designed has a vague ideal of what it should be; and if what he hears turns out to be merely a thing in oratory's clothing, a lecture, an essay read aloud, or a severely reasoned speech, he is aware that something is wrong, though he cannot define it; the spoken delivery has not made it oratory. It is important, then, to inquire what are the distinguishing qualities, the attributes essential to oratory.

By oratory we mean public discourse of the argumentative type, in which truth of personal import and issue is presented and enforced.