a family in respectability and comfort, or to advance their interests, makes the spring and summer of life be spent, even by the moderately wealthy, in laborious enterprises. And thus it is that, either for ourselves, or for those with whose welfare our own is inseparably connected, the principle of increase is perpetually urging individuals to new efforts of skill and economy. Had this principle not existed, or been comparatively feeble, activity would have been superseded by indolence, and men, from being enterprising and ambitious, would have sunk into a state of torpor; for in that case, every additional acquisition, whether of skill or wealth, would, by lessening the necessity for fresh acquisitions, have infallibly occasioned a decline in the spirit of improvement; so that, instead of proceeding, as it became older, with accelerated steps in the career of discovery, the fair inference is, that society would either have been entirely arrested in its progress, or its advance rendered next to imperceptible. But it is so ordered that, whatever may at any time occasion a decline of the inventive powers, must be of an accidental and ephemeral character, and cannot originate in a diminution of the advantages resulting from their exercise. Even in the most improved societies, the principle of increase inspires by far the largest class—those who depend on their labour for the means of support-with all those powerful motives to contrive, produce, and accumulate, that actuated the whole community in more early ages. No people can rest satisfied with acquisitions already made. The increase of population, though generally subordinate to the increase of food, is always sufficiently powerful to keep invention on the stretch, rendering the demand for fresh inventions and discoveries as great at one time as at another, and securing the forward progress of the species. A deficiency of subsistence at home leads to migrations to distant countries; and thus not only provides for the gradual occupation of the earth, but carries the languages, arts, and sciences of those who have made the farthest advances in civilisation to those that are comparatively bar

barous. It may perhaps, happen, though we doubt whether it be possible to specify any instance of the kind, that population should continue, for a while, so far to outrun production, that the condition of society is changed for the worse. But, if so, the evils thence arising will bring with them a provision for their cure: they will make all classes better acquainted with the circumstances which determine their situation; and while they call forth fresh displays of invention and economy, they will, at the same time, dignify and exalt the character, by teaching us to exercise the prudential virtues, and to subject the passions to the control of reason.

It does, therefore, seem reasonable to conclude, that the law of increase, as previously explained, is in every respect consistent with the beneficent arrangements of Providence ; and that, instead of being subversive of human happiness, it has increased it in no ordinary degree. Happiness is not to be found in apathy and idleness, but in zeal and activity. It depends far more on the intensity of the pursuit than on the attainment of the end. The "progressive state" is justly characterised by Smith "as being in reality the cheerful and hearty state to all the different orders of society; the stationary is dull, the declining melancholy." But had the principle of increase been less strong, the progress of society would have been less rapid. While, however, its energy is, on the one hand, sufficient to bring every faculty of the mind and body into action, it is, on the other, so far subject to control, that, speaking generally, its beneficial far outweigh its pernicious consequences.

To suppose, as some have done, that the astonishing improvements in the arts, and the all but immeasurable additions that have in consequence been made to the comforts and enjoyments of man, would have been equal or greater had the principle of increase been less powerful, is, in truth, equivalent to supposing, that industry and invention would not be affected by weakening the motives to their exercise, and lessening the advantages of which they are productive! There might, perhaps, though that be very doubtful, have

R

been less squalid poverty amongst the dregs of the population, had there been no principle of increase; but it is a contradiction to pretend, had such really been the case, that the powers and resources of industry would have been so astonishingly developed, that scientific investigations would have been prosecuted with equal perseverance and zeal, that so much wealth would have been accumulated by the upper and middle classes, or that the same circumstances which impelled society forward in its infancy, should have continued, in every subsequent age, to preserve their energy unimpaired and it may well be doubted whether an exemption from the evils incident to poverty would not be dearly purchased, even by the lowest classes, by the sacrifice of the hopes and fears attached to their present condition, and the gratification they now reap from successful industry, economy, and forbearance.

If these conclusions be well founded, it follows that the schemes proposed in the ancient and modern world for directly repressing population, besides being, for the most part, atrocious and disgusting, have really been opposed to the ultimate objects their projectors had in view. Could we subject the rate of increase to any easily applied physical control, few, comparatively, among the poorer classes, would be inclined to burden themselves with the task of providing for a family; and the most effective stimulus to exertion being destroyed, society would gradually sink into apathy and languor. It is, therefore, to the principle of moral restraint, or to the exercise of the prudential virtues, that we should exclusively trust for the regulation of the increase of population. In an instructed society, where there are no institutions favourable to improvidence, this check is sufficiently powerful to confine the progress of population within due limits, at the same time that it is not so powerful as to hinder it from uniformly operating as the strongest incentive to industry and economy.

The readiness with which the lower classes send their children to foundling hospitals seems a sufficient proof of this.

Those who wish to enter more at large into the discussion of the interesting topics now briefly touched upon, would do well to consult the second volume of the valuable work of Dr Sumner, Archbishop of Canterbury, on the "Records of the Creation." This learned prelate has not endeavoured "to show that the human race is in the best conceivable condition, or that no evils accompany the law which regulates their increase; but that this law makes, upon the whole, an effectual provision for their general welfare, and that the prospective wisdom of the Creator is distinguishable in the establishment of an ordinance which is no less beneficial in its collateral effects, than it is efficacious in accomplishing the first and principal design of its enactment." 1

"If then," says the Archbishop in another place, "the wisdom is to be estimated by the fitness of the design to its purpose, and the habitual exercise of the energies of mankind is allowed to be that purpose, enough has been said to confirm the original proposition. The Deity has provided, that by the operation of an instinctive principle in our nature, the human race should be uniformly brought into a state in which they are forced to exert and improve their powers: the lowest rank to obtain support; the one next in order to escape from the difficulties immediately beneath it; and all the classes upwards, either to keep their level, while they are pressed on each side by rival industry, or to raise themselves above the standard of their birth by useful exertions of their activity, or by successful cultivation of their natural powers. If, indeed, it were possible that the stimulus arising from this principle should be suddenly removed, it is not easy to determine what life would be except a dreary blank, or the world except an uncultivated waste. Every exertion to which civilisation can be traced, proceeds, directly or indirectly, from its effects; either from the actual desire of having a family, or the pressing obligation of providing for

"Records of the Creation," vol. ii. p. 160. 4th ed.

one, or from the necessity of rivalling the efforts produced by the operation of these motives in others." 1

However inexplicable it may now seem, it is a fact no less true than melancholy, that the practice of infanticide has prevailed to a very great extent even in some highly civilised countries. It may, indeed, be said to have been general throughout the ancient world. The laws of Sparta ordered that every child that was either weakly or deformed should be put to death. And this practice was not merely legalised by the savage enactments of a barbarous code, but was vindicated by the ablest Greek philosophers. Aristotle, in his work on government, does not so much as insinuate a doubt of the propriety of destroying such children as are maimed or deformed, and carries still farther his "stern decisions," as they are gently termed by Dr Gillies. Even the "divine" Plato did not scruple to recommend the same monstrous practices. Thebes alone, of all the Grecian cities, seems to have been free from this infamy. The existence of infanticide in Athens is established beyond a doubt, by the allusions of the poets, and their descriptions of the prevailing manners.5

Every one is aware that a Roman citizen had the unrestrained power of life and death over his children, whatever might be their age. And there are abundant examples to prove that this right was not suffered to fall into disuse, but was frequently exercised with the most unrelenting severity.6

1 "Records of the Creation," vol. ii. p. 152. 4th ed.

2 Cragius" de Republicá Lacedæmoniorum," lib. iii. cap. 2.

Aristotle's "Ethics and Politics," by Dr Gillies, vol. ii. p. 287. 3d edition. "Travels of Anacharsis," vol. iii. p. 277. Eng. ed.

5 Gouroff, "Essai sur l'Histoire des Enfans Trouvés," p. 19.

6 "Les Romains ne mirent point des bornes à l'empire des pères sur leurs enfans ; quelque âge qu'ils eussent, et à quelque dignité qu'ils fussent élevés, ils étoient toujours soumis à la correction de leurs pères. Ceux-ci avoient droit de les frapper, de les envoyer enchainés cultiver la terre, de les déshériter, de les vendre comme des esclaves, et même de leur donner la mort."TERASSON, Histoire de la Jurisprudence Romaine, p. 54.